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ABSTRACT
This report describes the results of the.Air Traffic Control
Surveillance Accuracy and Update Rate Study which TRW performed
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard
Space Flight Center. The objective of the ATC Surveillance
Accuracy and Update Rate Study was to establish quantitative
relationships between the surveillance accuracies, update rates,
and the communications load associated with the tactical control
of aircraft for conflict resolution. These relationships are
established for typical types of aircraft, phases of flight, and
types of airspace. The Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate (SAUR)
computer program developed to determine these relationships "flies"
two aircraft towards one another under various realistic circum-
stances, and analyzes the interaction between the two pilots and
the controller. Ten specific cases are analyzed to determine
relationships between the surveillance accuracies and update
rates which will be required in order to prevent these aircraft
from getting too close to each other.
For these ten specific cases, involving a broad range of aircraft
types, phases of flight, and types of airspace, the demands on
surveillance system accuracies span a wide range, i.e., from less
than 100 feet to greater than 10 miles. The necessary surveil-
lance system update interval does not cover such a large range.
With one exception it varies from 1 to 10 seconds. In the case
study evaluation, a short update interval was needed in more
cases than was a high accuracy surveillance system. Therefore,
it appears that reducing total system reaction time is more
important than increasing surveillance accuracy.
Preceding page blank
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1. PREFACE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This document contains a description of the essential elements of the
Air Traffic Control Surveillance Accuracy and Update Rate Study which TRW
performed for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard
Space Flight Center, under Contract NAS-5-21603. This study was initiated
at a time when NASA had responsibility for the development of the technol-
ogy associated with application satellites such as those associated with
air traffic control. NASA had, under a previous contract, developed the
technology of satellite-based air traffic control (ATC) to the point where
the feasibility of a very high performance satellite-based ATC surveillance
system was established. However, the need for this technology was not clear
at that time. Thus, NASA initiated this study in order to establish a sub-
stantial basis for the performance capability that an air traffic control
satellite would be required to provide.
Subsequent to this time other studies have indicated the desirability
of satellites for domestic ATC application. The contents of this report,
however, can be applied to the question of ATC surveillance accuracy and
update rate requirements, independent of the particular surveillance tech-
nique generating the data.
1.2 BACKGROUND
The Department of Transportation Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee
in December of 1969 stated that the three critical problems which urgently
required solutions were:
1) The shortage of terminal capacity
2) The need for new means of assuring separation
3) The limited capacity and increasing cost of ATC.
This Air Traffic Control Surveillance Accuracy Update Rate Study addresses
the second of those three critical problems. The Air Traffic Control Advi-
sory Committee went on to state that "measures beyond the present use of
'see-and-avoid' in portions of 'mixed airspace' will become mandatory by
1980." The committee report (Reference 1) went on to recommend a process
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called Intermittent Positive Control (IPC) which involved automating and
making more precise the air traffic advisory service. Although this study
addresses all levels of control and types of airspace, an evaluation of the
IPC concept and the problems associated with mixed airspace is the essence
of the study.
1.3 APPROACH
The objective of the ATC Surveillance Accuracy and Update Rate Study
was to establish quantitative relationships between the surveillance
accuracies, update rates, and the communications load associated with the
tactical control of aircraft for conflict resolution. These relationships
are established for typical types of aircraft, phases of flight, and types
of airspace. The Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate (SAUR) computer program
developed to determine these relationships "flies" two aircraft towards
one another under various realistic circumstances, and analyzes the inter-
action between the two pilots and the controller. For a given pair of
collision avoidance commands to the two aircraft, the program searches
through possible maneuvers by the two aircraft and finds the minimum dis-
tance of closest approach. The program then searches through all possible
command pairs to find the maximum of the minimum distances of closest
approach. Ten specific cases are analyzed in this way. Application of
this program determines relationships between the surveillance accuracies
and update rates which will be required in order to prevent these aircraft
from getting too close to each other. In addition, the communication rate
associated with traffic vectoring under various conditions of traffic load-
ing is determined. The resulting combination of information allows one to
render sound judgements in the selection of two key surveillance system
design parameters.
1.4 CONTENTS
Section 2 of this report contains a development of the surveillance
accuracy/update rate relationships as they pertain to the pilot/controller
interaction in the separation assurance process. Section 3 contains an
analysis of the key input parameters in the Surveillance Accuracy/Update
Rate and Communication Rate formulations. Sections 4 and 5 contain descrip-
tions of the Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate and Collision Warning Commu-
nication Rate formulations. Section 6 contains the results of ten case
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studies and a discussion concerning the implications of these results.
Section 7 contains a report on the filter mechanization analysis, which was
an investigation to determine the accuracy with which the present position
and velocity state of various aircraft could be estimated, and how that
accuracy depends on the surveillance system, aircraft dynamics, and data
processing (filtering) procedure. Section 8 contains two special studies,
the first a brief analysis of some 55 actual mid-air collisions, and the
second an analysis of air traffic control communications in remote areas.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes the major results of the Air Traffic Control
Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate Study.
1.5.1 Conclusions
The following conclusions are drawn from the analyses described in
this report:
1) Surveillance Accuracy and Update Rate
For the ten specific cases involving a broad range of
aircraft types, phases of flight, and types of airspace,
the demands on surveillance system accuracies span a
wide range i.e., from less than 100 feet to greater than
10 miles. The necessary surveillance system update
interval does not cover such a large range. With one
exception it varies from 1 to 10 seconds.
The need for high performance surveillance in terminal
areas is clearly indicated. Accuracy demands drop off
rapidly, so that in the transition and enroute areas
present radar accuracy capabilities appear sufficient.
The update rates indicated do not drop off so rapidly;
and, in general, both existing terminal and enroute
radar update intervals are longer than desirable.
2) System Reaction Time
In the case study evaluation, a short update interval was
needed in more cases than was a high accuracy surveillance
system. Therefore, it appears that reducing total system
reaction time is more important than increasing surveillance
accuracy.
The present concept, involving voice communications and
acknowledgement, as well as the reaction times by both
pilot and controller, results in total system reaction
3
times that can cause significant increases in communication
loads and false alarm rates.
3) Single Aircraft Response
In the event that the decision is made to assume that only
one aircraft will respond to a collision avoidance command,
the surveillance accuracy and update rate requirements could
become significantly more stringent than has been indicated
in this study. When only one aircraft performed a commanded
maneuver, the results were quite variable. In a high per-
formance aircraft/low performance aircraft encounter situ-
ation the results did not change if the low performance
aircraft was not commanded. On the other hand, if the two
aircraft were of similar performance capabilities the sur-
veillance accuracy update demands usually become much more
stringent.
4) Collision Avoidance Maneuvers
Commanded horizontal maneuvers were shown to be much more
effective than vertical maneuvers in collision avoidance.
If the ATC commands were limited to changes in altitude,
the separation that a controller could guarantee would
be markedly reduced, resulting in more stringent
surveillance requirements.
5) Filter Mechanization
Sophisticated filters for accuracy or prediction did not
help the conflict prediction and resolution process. The
accuracy with which the position and velocity of aircraft
can be specified depends strongly on the characteristics
of the surveillance system, aircraft, and trajectories.
However, the accuracy was shown to be relatively indepen-
dent of the complexity of the filter used.
The existing ATCRBS system with 10 seconds surveillance
intervals is incapable of tracking many types of currently
operational aircraft (executing maneuvers within their
allowed dynamic constraints) with an error of less than
2500 feet irrespective of the degree of sophistication
of the data processing used. This is mainly due to the
length of time between surveillance updates (not
measurement inaccuracy) - an aircraft can be perfectly
on course at one surveillance time, then execute a 2 or
3 g maneuver and be 3000-5000 feet off its original
flight plan 10 seconds later just before the next
measurement occurs.
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The performance of a high quality multilateration system
with a 1 second surveillance interval is totally determined
by and directly proportional to the bias errors in the range
measurements. Nominal values for these bias errors in a
typical* satellite system produce a maximum error of
400 feet.
6) Remote Area Communications
Remote area air traffic control communications do not
appear to impose critical or state-of-the art require-
ments on a satellite-based ATC system. Based on a brief
message traffic analysis the remote area communications
needs (exclusive of collision avoidance) can be met
through 1995 by some eight 1200-bit per second data
link channels.
1.5.2 Observations
In arriving at the findings described above it was possible to make
a number of observations regarding the system implications of the foregoing
results and also on the study methodology itself.
1.5.2.1 System Implications
High accuracy multilateration concepts,which are readily implemented
with satellites,provide their greatest usefulness around airports (Cases 4,
6A, and 6B). Terminal and enroute radar from an accuracy point of view are
usually adequate to do the conflict prediction and resolution tasks; but
the update interval of the enroute radar, and, to some extent, the terminal
radar, is usually too long. Reduction of total system reaction time is of
such importance that detailed investigation of the use of data link is
clearly called for. The future of satellites for domestic air traffic
control does not appear to hinge on the high accuracy capability of the
satellite systems alone, because the high accuracy requirements occur in
limited areas where ground-based systems could be competitive. It has been
shown in previous studies that satellites providing communication, navi-
gation, and/or surveillance functions in remote areas are cost competitive.
Thus, the decision to use satellites for domestic ATC may well be made on
the basis of a combination of the foregoing performance, coverage, and cost
advantages, rather than on any one alone.
Not optimized for accuracy. See Reference 2
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1.5.2.2 Study Methodology
The SAUR/CR methodology appears valid and useful. The relationships
between surveillance accuracy and update rate obtained in this study appear
valid for preliminary indications of the major system design parameters;
but the study was not of sufficient scope and the data is not of sufficient
fidelity on which to base final implementation or design conclusions. Appli-
cation of this methodology to obtain additional, more detailed, and higher
fidelity data appears desirable for advanced air traffic management system
analyses and for design tradeoff studies.
1.5.3 Recommendations
Several near-term efforts to support advanced air traffic management
system planning and design efforts are recommended. They include:
* Additional use of the Surveillance and Command
Communications formulations developed here to
provide higher resolution data, tailored for
specific cases as part of Advanced Air Traffic
Management System analysis efforts.
* More detailed investigation of the multiple
aircraft encounter situation. Although the
command communications formulation used here is
an extension of previous analyses, the problem
merits even further extension in order to verify
the important design parameters of the vital IPC
concept.
* Additional analysis and test efforts relating to
reduction of total system reaction time, especially
with regard to implementation of data link.
* Analyses of navigation/surveillance interaction using
smaller pilot-initiated maneuvers that are related
to probable navigation errors.
These individual efforts should be performed as a prelude to or as part of
a complete IPC Concept synthesis, based on the surveillance formulation, for
real-time collision avoidance.
Longer term efforts should include design tradeoff studies involving
cost analyses of both the ground and airborne elements of the communications,
navigation, surveillance and data management functions of the total Advanced
Air Traffic Management System.
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2. SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY/UPDATE RATE RELATIONSHIP
To illustrate important facets of pilot/controller interaction, con-
sider the aircraft situation as shown in Figure 1. Consider a hypothetical
controller, faced with the task of preventing a collision between the two
aircraft. (The reasoning of the hypothetical controller is presumed to be
that of the program.) A Cessna 172 is currently in a level turn at 5000
feet through a roughly northwest heading. A Boeing 737 is currently des-
cending through 5500 feet and going roughly southeast. The controller
knows the position and velocity of both aircraft from the surveillance
system.
If both aircraft continue their present flight paths, there will be
a collision 60 seconds from now. If either one changes its flight path,
they will miss each other. If both change, they will very probably miss
each other, but could possible still collide at a different point.
Although the controller is concerned about the situation, it is not
obvious, without further calculations, that any commands are necessary.
The controller might find that he can wait and it might happen that one
or both of the two aircraft will change course and create non-collision
situation. The controller must decide whether he can afford to wait and;
if he decides he can't wait, he must determine what commands to send to
the aircraft.
To make the decision, the controller first asks what would happen if
he gave commands now. There are a large number of choices available 
to him
for commands, so he must analyze sets of commands.
For example, he might command the 737 (now descending) to climb,
and the 172 (now flying level) to descend. Even if he gives the commands
now, however, they will not be acted on until they have been sent out 
and
the pilot has reacted to them. The controller might assume that 
this will
*The "hypothetical controller" could be a human controller operating with
today's manual system, a human controller aided by various levels of
automation, or a completely automated system, where the computer could be
either on the ground (centralized control) or in the aircraft (distribution
control). The discussion here is more from the point of view of centralized
control. 7
B737, DESCENDING THROUGH
5500 FEET AT 500 FT/MIN,
250 KNOTS, MAINTAINING
A TRUE COURSE OF 154*
NORTH
\ NON-COLLISION COURSE
ORIGINAL
COLLISION
COURSES
WEST EAST
COLLISION
POI INTS
C172, FLYING AT A CONSTANT
ALTITUDE OF 5000 FEET,
MAINTINAING 100 KNOTS, IN
A 1*/SEC RIGHT TURN, PASS-
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Figure 1. Collision Situation Geometry
take 10 seconds - i.e., if the controller decides to give a command now,
the two pilots will start moving the controls to follow the command in
10 seconds.
During this first 10 seconds after the commands are given the
controller has no control. He therefore assumes the worst. The 172, now
flying level, might suddenly start climbing - this will partly negate the
effect of the descend command the controller is thinking about sending.
The 737, now descending, might continue to descend. (Actually, the con-
troller might want to assume that the 737 will start descending even
faster and the program allows for this. In the sample problem we assumed
that it was already descending at its maximum rate.)
Assuming these worst case conditions about any pilot-initiated man-
euvers, it is possible to calculate for the particular pairs of commands
which were given to the two aircraft how close the aircraft will get.
Using a set of assumed values of climb rates, etc., the program computes
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a miss distance of about 8000 feet, about (not necessarily exactly), 60
seconds from now. If the controller's requirements are to guarantee a
separation of 1000 feet under all circumstances, this now suggests that
it is not necessarily to give a command yet. This would be the correct
answer with a surveillance system which is providing perfect, continuous
data.
However, suppose each aircraft's position is only known to within an
uncertainty of 3500 feet (the surveillance accuracy). Then the two aircraft
might be twice that distance, or 7000 feet closer together than the con-
troller thinks they are, and thus they might well be 7000 feet closer to-
gether in 60 seconds. This would make the predicted worst case distance
of closest approach (DCA) equal to 1000 feet. It would therefore be
necessary to give a command now. If the surveillance system gives better
than 3500 feet accuracy, it would be necessary to give a command now with
a surveillance system which provides data continuously.
Suppose that the above test shows that it is not necessary to give a
command now. However, suppose also that the surveillance system only gives
data every 10 seconds. (This is the present update interval for an enroute
radar.) The next chance to make a decision will be 10 seconds from now.
If no command is given now, the controller must assume that the aircraft
will be doing the "worst" maneuvers for the next 20 seconds - the 10 second
surveillance data interval plus the 10 second system reaction time. He
should therefore perform the previous calculations with an effective system
reaction time of 20 seconds. The results show the aircraft getting to
within 2000 feet of each other. In this case if the surveillance system
uncertainty is worse than 500 feet he cannot guarantee 1000 feet separation
unless he gives the commands now. Note that the increased update interval
results in an increased accuracy requirement.
From this reasoning one can infer the relationship between the surveillance
accuracy required, the distance of closest approach, and guaranteed
separation:
SAR = 1/2 (DCA - GS)
From this it may be seen that system reaction time and update interval are
identical in their effect on surveillance accuracy requirements. Or, put
another way, the update interval is part of the total effective reaction
time in the system.
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Figure 2 shows curves of DCA and surveillance accuracy requirements
versus total reaction time, T (which includes controller reaction time;
communication transmission time, including delays; pilot reaction time; and
surveillance update interval) for various decision times. Decision time
(T) is defined as the length of time prior to a potential mid-air collision
that the controller makes a decision to intervene or not to intervene. If
the controller goes through the thought process described above at an
earlier point in time (a larger T ), he can allow a larger total reaction
time and/or a larger surveillance position determination uncertainty. It
can be seen from this figure that if the total effective reaction time
exceeds about 30 seconds, a T of 60 seconds does not allow sufficient man-
euver time to provide the desired 1000 feet "guaranteed separation," re-
gardless of surveillance accuracy. It might by pointed out here that a
shortened update interval will reduce the required accuracy (i.e. increase
the position uncertainty), but at the same time it will increase the
achievable accuracy (reduce the position uncertainty) for a particular
surveillance system concept.
40,000
GS = I000 FT
15,000
30,000 -
5,ooo
o
00 5,000
o o10,000
TO 20 30 40 50 60
TOTAL REACTION TIME (T, IN SECi
Figure 2. Surveillance Accuracy Versus Reaction
Time and Decision Time
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In the complete analysis, the controller would also analyze many other
pairs of commands. He might choose those commands which would maximize 
the
distance of closest approach, or he might choose the most expedient commands
that yielded some desirable separation standard.
The SAUR Program works by following the above line of reasoning.
For a given pair of commands and a given set of uncommanded maneuvers it
computes a distance of closest approach (DCA). One can also specify the
commands and the program will search through a number of possible uncom-
manded maneuvers to find the maneuvers which give the smallest DCA. The
program will also search through a number of command pairs to determine
which command pair gives the largest of these smallest DCA's, i.e., the
max-min DCA. It is this last, most general case that provides the results
such as are shown in Figure 2. Section 4 presents a description of the
detailed operation of the SAUR Program. Section 5 describes a collision
warning communication rate analysis which was performed in conjunction with
the SAUR analysis in order to shed more light on the preferred value of
the surveillance parameters.
The significant difference between the SAUR formulation and many
similar analyses performed in the past is that whereas many of the latter
dealt with probable aircraft flight paths and the probability of collision
the SAUR formulation deals with the envelope of possible aircraft flight
paths. The air traffic controller must deal with all possible maneuvers
if he is to guarantee separation between aircraft; and in the event that
either aircraft is free to alter his flight path at will .(VFR or IPC con-
ditions), or in the presence of unintentional, unplanned and/or unforseen
flight path changes for aircraft under instrument flight rules, that is
precisely his responsibility. It should be pointed out that no claim is
made for the "superiority" of the SAUR formulation. Both types of
analyses - probabilistic and deterministic - can be valuable tools in air
traffic control analysis. For example, the heanling of IFR anomalies will
probably not be a sufficiently strong case for the SAUR formulation and
the use of probable navigation and surveillance errors is useful; but
dealing with VFR/IPC aircraft in mixed airspace is clearly of sufficient
importance to warrant this type of analysis.
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3. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM VARIABLES
This section contains a brief discussion.of the key major elements
of the problem and the key input parameters to the SAUR and Communication
Rate Analyses. The selection of an appropriate value or range of values
for the system variables used will, of course, have a significant effect
on the end results. Thus, this section might be thought of as the quanti-
fication of the justification for the assumptions made in the analysis.
3.1 SELECTION OF CASES FOR ANALYSIS
The cases selected for study are listed in Table 1. Although it is
clear that these cases represent only a small fraction of the great number
of collision encounter situations possible, they are considered to be repre-
sentative. The cases are also bounding in the sense that some place high
demands on surveillance system performance while others will allow very
relaxed accuracies and update rates.
In order to come up with a representative set of cases, it seemed
reasonable to examine the characteristics of mid-air collisions which
occurred over a number of years (References 3 through 22). The results
of this examination are reported in Section 8 of this report. It was
found that from 1959 through 1968 there were 223 mid-air collisions in-
volving U.S.-registered aircraft. About half of these accidents were
fatal, resulting in 528 fatalities. Ninety-eight percent of these colli-
sions involved general aviation aircraft. Although air carrier aircraft
were involved in only 6.7 percent of the accidents, the occupants of these
aircraft accounted for 66 percent of the fatalities.
Accordingly 7 of the 10 cases involve general aviation aircraft be-
cause of their predominant involvement on a percentage basis. Since more
loss of life is involved with midair collisions involving air carrier
aircraft, they too are involved in 7 of the 10 cases. Military aircraft
are involved in four of the cases.
Cases 4, 5, and 6 are intended to represent bounding cases on sur-
veillance accuracy and update rate. Case 5, for high altitude enroute
situations, makes very relaxed demands. Case 6 involves very tight require-
ments associated with independently operated instrument runways with only
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Table 1. SAUR Cases
Representative
Case Aircraft Types Representative
4o. Description #1 #2 Aircraft Type(s)
1. Air carrier descending toward 172 737 Mixed* or positive
encounters light general avia- control
tion aircraft in a level turn
2. A number of air carrier and 172 737 Mixed or positive
light general aviation control
encounters
3. Military very high performance F-104 Cita- Mixed or positive
jet in a steep climb from air- tion control
port encounters a general
aviation business jet in level
flight
4. Two light general aviation 172 Volks- Uncontrolled, mixed or
aircraft in VFR landing plane positive control
pattern encounter
5. a) Very high performance 747 YF-12 Positive control
(supersonic military jet)
encounters air carrier in
level flight
b) A high altitude encounter YF-12 YF-12 Positive control
between two supersonic
aircraft
6. Two aircraft in parallel track Mixed or positive
encounters control
a) Parallel runway (5000 ft 737 737
separation)
b) Parallel runway (2500 ft 737 737
separation)
c) Airway 737 Cita-
tion
7. An all-V/STOL encounter Twin UH-1 Mixed or positive
situation Otter control
8. The March 1967 mid-air col- DC-9 B-55 Mixed or positive
lision between a Beechcraft control
B-55 and a McDonnell Douglas
DC-9 near Urbana, Ohio
9. The 4 December 1965 mid-air 707 Con- Mixed or positive
collision between a Boeing stella- control
707 and a Lockheed constel- tion
iation near Carmel, New York
10. The June 1971 mid-air colli- F-4 DC-9 Mixed or positive
sion between a Marine F-4 and control
a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 near
Durate, California
Also called "Controlled" airspace
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a 2500 foot separation distance (wherein one aircraft initiates a turn
toward the other runway). Case 4, involving light general aviation aircraft
in a traffic pattern, also represents tight requirements.
From Reference 22 it was found that the problem of mixed airspace is
also critical, as indicated by the following:
"The Board has noted, from studies of recent near mid-air
collision reports and its findings in the investigation of
several catastrophic mid-air collision accidents of the past
several years, that conflict between the "known" and "unknown"
traffic (VFR/IFR mix) was a factor. The problem stems from
traffic cleared to operate under instrument flight rules but
operating in VFR conditions. Such operation does not relieve
the IFR operator from the responsibility to see and avoid,
even though the cockpit duties for instrument flight are more
numerous than those for VFR operations. This conflict is now
beginning to reveal the true magnitude of the impact on our
Air Traffic System created by the ever-growing number of VFR
and IFR operations."
In recognition of the seriousness of this problem, the study cases
have been selected so that in 8 of the cases the results are directly
applicable to mixed airspace encounters. For a ninth case (Case 6), the
results could also apply to VFR traffic approaching an aircraft making an
instrument approach.
3.2 CONTROL PHILOSOPHY
As pointed out in Reference 2, there are a number of competing control
philosophies. Indeed, they are reflected in the competing airspace organi-
zations listed in Table 2. The following listing is representative of the
various types of control exercised over aircraft with the addition of one
new classification which evolved from the Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate
Study. Various levels of control, listed somewhat in order of increasing
control requirements are:
1) Procedural
Rules of the Air, e.g., quadrantal altitude separation,
speed limits, and radio-out procedures.
2) Flight Following
No surveillance data. Delayed position reports allow
ground control only a rough knowledge of aircraft position.
Therefore, tight tactical or strategic control is not possible.
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Table 2. Airspace Categories as Designated by Various Sources
1967 - Radio Technical Commission .1972 - FAA (Ref. 27)
for Aeronautics (Ref. 23)
1. Positive control area
1. Controlled 2. Control area (mixed airspace)
2. Uncontrolled 3. Terminal control area (positive
3. Special use control)
4. Control zone
1969 - DOT/ATC Advisory Committee 5. Low altitude routes and airways
(Ref. 1) (mixed airspace)
6. High altitude routes (positive
1. High density airspace control)
2. Positive controlled airspace 7. Special use airspace
3. Mixed airspace (with IPC) 8. Uncontrolled airspace
4. Uncontrolled airspace
1972 - Boeing (Ref. 28)
1969 - General Aviation 
(Ref. 24)
1. High density positive control
1. Controlled 2. Medium and low density positive
2. Mixed airspace control
3. Uncontrolled 3. Mixed
4. Uncontrolled
1969 - FAA (Ref. 25)
1972 - Lincoln Laboratories (Ref. 28)
1. PCA
2. TPCA 1. High density positive control
3. Control zones airspace
4. High density terminal area 2. High density controlled (mixed)
airspace (initially mixed airspace
airspace, going TPCA) 3. Low density positive control
airspace
1969 - Air Transport Association 4. Low density controlled (mixed)
(Ref. 26) airspace
1. Controlled: 1972 -Autonetics (Ref. 28)
Type (1): Positive control i. Positive controlof aircraft
Type (2): IFR/IFR control 1.1 High density
IFR/VFR control 1.2 Medium density
VFR/VFR advisory 1.3 Low density
Type (3): IFR/VFR - no service
IFR/IFR control 2. Intermediate (mixed)
IFR/VFR control 2.1 High density
2. Uncontrolled: No service 2.2 Low and medium density
3. Uncontrolled
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3) Strategic Control
Control wherein the aircraft is under surveillance and
is required to conform to his flight plan but the flight
plan itself, having been determined to be conflict-free,
remains unchanged.
4) Tactical/Vectoring
Tactical control means control of aircraft involving
changes to their flight plan and conformance to the new
flight plan. Tactical/vectoring control is defined here
to mean tactical control wherein the flight plan is
changed early enough and greatly enough to avoid the
possibility of an encounter situation. The closed-loop
dynamics of the aircraft/control system are not
important.
5) Tactical/Encounter
Control is delayed long enough to allow a non-critical
encounter situation to develop, exercising control only
when deemed necessary to avoid a collision or close
passage between two aircraft. In this case the closed-
loop dynamics of the aircraft, aircrew, surveillance
system, communications system, controller, and control
laws must be taken into account. It is this situation
that the IPC concept addresses and the SAUR formulation
simulates.
These various levels of control each carry with them responsibilities
on the part of the controlling agency as well as on the part of the pilots.
Services which can be rendered to the pilot (again listed in order of in-
creasing in-flight requirements) include:
1) Milestone checking
Milestone checking, e.g., cross-checking between sectors
along an aircraft flight path, with possible initiation
of search and rescue in the event of excessively late
arrival at the destination or enroute reporting point.
2) In-flight services
In-flight services which require general knowledge of
aircraft position, e.g., notification of severe weather
phenomena.
3) Traffic advisories
Traffic advisories which involve determination of
position of the individual aircraft plus other 
aircraft
in the area.
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4) Traffic control
Traffic control, which is an attempt to provide
separation of aircraft in a given area to the degree
possible with the equipment available. Under circum-
stances, however, aircraft may be close enough together
to allow one aircraft to veer into another before ATC
can effect an escape maneuver on the part of one or
both aircraft.
5) Guaranteed separation
Guaranteed separation - a service which, in the absence
of failures or deliberate violations, will allow the
air traffic controller to guarantee that participating
aircraft are not involved in a mid-air collision.
Table 3 shows a postulated set of relationships between the flight
plan filed by the pilot, the equipment onboard the aircraft in question,
the services provided by the air traffic control system, and the degree
of control required in order to provide those services. Note that the
term "Intermittent Positive Control" does not appear in either the flight
plan or the control column. The pilot, when he flies a flight plan, as
pointed out earlier, signs a contract with the government. He either
agrees to be under control or he doesn't. Controlled conformal means that
the pilot wishes to conform to his approved flight plan and is willing to
accept control commands from the ground in order to meet safety require-
ments even if this involves a change to a new flight plan (to which he
also agrees to conform, once he accepts the new amended clearance). Con-
trolled non-conformal flight plans reflect what was in the minds of the
authors of the Intermittent Positive Control concept, i.e., the pilot
prefers to fly a non-conformal flight, not necessarily adhering to any
specific predetermined trajectory. On the other hand, he is willing to
accept control commands for safety of flight purposes. Therefore, he is
on a controlled flight plan. ATC may not actually exercise control over
him, just as they may never have to control a controlled conformal flight
which is able to adhere closely to plan; but he has agreed to accept con-
trol. The point is that there can be nothing intermittent about the
authority to exercise or the ability to follow positive control.
A pilot may file an uncontrolled cooperative flight plan wherein he
does not accept control from the ground (nor is he necessarily provided
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Table 3. Conceptual Flight Plan, Control, Equipment, and Service Chart
SEPARATION SERVICE PROVIDED
COMM NAV. ACCURACY (VS. OTHER FLIGHT PLAN)
FLIGHT PLAN CONTROL DATA VOICE HI MED LO SURV. 1 2 3 4
la CONTROLLED CONFORMAL S, TV or TE X X X X GS GS GS N
lb CONTROLLED CONFORMAL S or TV X X X GS GS GS N
Ic CONTROLLED CONFORMAL S or TV X X X GS GS GS N
Id CONTROLLED CONFORMAL TV, TE or S X X X GS GS GS N
2a CONTROLLED NON- TV or TE X X X X GS GS TC N
CONFORMAL
2b CONTROLLED NON- TV X X X X GS GS TC N
CONFORMAL
2c CONTROLLED NON- TV X X X GS GS TC N
CONFORMAL
2d CONTROLLED NON- TV or TE X X X GS GS TC N
CONFORMAL
3a UNCONTROLLED P or FF X X X X TA TA TA N
COOPERATIVE
3b UNCONTROLLED P or FF X X X TA TA TA N
COOPERATIVE
4 UNCONTROLLED/ P X X N N N N
NON-COOPERATIVE
NOTE: TE - TACTICAL/ENCOUNTER NOTE: X = EQUIPMENT NOTE: GS - GUARANTEED
TV - TACTICAL/VECTORING OPERATING SEPARATION
S - STRATEGIC TC - TRAFFIC CONTROL
FF - FLIGHT FOLLOWING TA - TRAFFIC
P - PROCEDURE ADVISORIES
N - NONE
separation by ATC), but where he is willing to make himself visible to the
system by carrying a cooperative surveillance device. Thus, other aircraft
can be warned of his presence and/or vectored around him. Mixed airspace
as it presently exists would no longer be allowed. Aircraft which are both
invisible and unknown to the system would no longer be allowed to operate
in controlled airspace. Note, the distinction between invisible and un-
known here is important. The air traffic control system could handle an
invisible aircraft (e.g., one whose transponder has failed in flight or
one flown by a pilot who has filed a special "no transponder" flight plan
in advance) by following its position using verbal position reports and
providing larger separation standards around that aircraft. It cannot,
of course, handle unknown aircraft. Should such an aircraft be discovered
the responsible person(s) should be subject to legal prosecution.
A pilot who is neither willing to accept commands nor carry coopera-
tive equipment would file an uncontrolled non-cooperative flight plan
(undoubtedly some euphemism would be developed for this flight plan).
Flight plans lb through ld and 2b through 2d are listed to show that air-
craft can operate in the system with equipment failures. For example, an
aircraft who files a la flight plan might become a lb if he loses his data
light or a lc if he loses his surveillance device. Certain types of equip-
ment failures could possibly prevent an aircraft from filing a flight plan
for a given area but, of course, the system must be able to continue to
provide the contracted-for service even if the pilot loses part of his
equipment in flight. In actual practice, more subcases than are shown
here would have to be accounted for. The Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate
Analysis is relevant to all encounters involving flight plan 1 aircraft;
all encounters involving flight plan 2 aircraft; and those encounters in-
volving flight plan 3 aircraft which also involve a flight plan 1 or flight
plan 2 aircraft. Thus, any time guaranteed separation involving tactical/
encounter control is provided as indicated in Table 3, the SAUR formulation
and results are relevant. It might also be pointed out that the control
philosophy is independent of time of day and weather conditions.
3.3 SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY AND UPDATE RATE
The surveillance position determination uncertainties of interest
range from several miles, as in the case of some of the poorer radar
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situations, to uncertainties on the order of 100 feet or less, representa-
tive of the LIT concept and several other multilateration techniques.
Update intervals associated with present surveillance systems are from four
to twenty seconds. For LIT and other satellite systems the update intervals
are considered to run from a fraction of a second to about four seconds, but
can certainly be longer if desired. The update interval as pointed out in
Section 2 is simply a linear term in the total system reaction time.
3.4 TOTAL SYSTEM REACTION TIME
This parameter is defined as the length of time from a collision
avoidance command to when the aircraft collision avoidance maneuver begins.
It takes into account a number of variables (including update interval) each
of which deserves discussion. Table 4 has reaction time budgets for both a
manual system and a semi-automatic system wherein a human controller looks
at a radar scope to determine relative position of various aircraft, inter-
prets the scope, decides on a course of action, reacts, executes a communi-
cation message of some specific length; this is then interpreted by a pilot
who decides on his proper conformity action and, following some reaction
time on his own part, initiates a maneuver.
In the semi-automatic system it is assumed that the data on the two
aircraft locations are fed into a computer which decides that there is a
conflict, determines what the appropriate resolution of that conflict
should be, and provides a human controller with a concise presentation
concerning the existence of a conflict, the aircraft involved, and the action
required by the controller. This action is presumed to consist of pushing a
button which releases a formatted message via data link to the aircraft
through a wide bandwidth circuit involving virtually no communication delays.
The situation in the aircraft changes very little. The pilot reaction time
might be expected to be less, but interpretation of his collision warning
message could actually take him longer if the technique providing him with
this information is not well designed. For the SAUR study, however, we have
assumed a simple unequivocal display, accompanied by an aural signal to get
the pilot's attention, producing the same time budget for the pilot as in
the manual system. Whereas a total system reaction time of six or seven
seconds is quite possible, it would not be prudent to design the system at
that figure unless absolutely necessary and unless appropriate procedures
were invoked. 21
Table 4. Total System Reaction Time
Semi -automatic
Manual System System
Full Likely Full Likely
Range Range Range Range
Seconds Seconds Seconds Seconds
CONTROLLER
Interpretation 1-5 2 1-3 1
Determination of Necessary 1-10 3-4 1-3 0-2
Action
Human Response 0-1 0 0-1 0
2-16 5-6 2-7 1-3
COMMUNICATIONS
Delay/Execution 0-10 0-2 0-1 0
Message Length 2-5 4 0-1 0
2-15 4-6' 0-2 0
PILOT
Interpretation 1-5 2 1-5 0
Determination of Necessary 1-20 2-4 1-20 2-4
Action
Human Response 0-1 0 0-1 0
Initiate Maneuver 1-4 2 1-4 2
3-30 6-8 .3-30 6-8
SURVEILLANCE
Update Interval
Standard 10-20 5-10 10-20 5-10
High Performance 1-4 1-2 1-4 1-2
TOTAL Standard 17-81 20-30 (25)15-59 14-23 (19)
High Performance 8-65 17-22 (19) 6-43 10-15 (12)
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The full range reaction time budget for the manual system indicates
that it is quite possible for over a minute to elapse from the moment when
a collision situation develops to the time that one or both pilots initiates
a collision avoidance maneuver. This is not unrealistic. For example, if
one aircraft banked sharply, blanking out the ATC RBS antenna for two pulses,
thirty seconds could elapse between updates. If this put the aircraft in an
unexpected position, or his reappearing on the scope caused some confusion
for the controller, it is possible that his interpretation and decision
time could involve another 10 or 15 seconds. Next, the controller's warning
command might at first be blocked by another transmission causing a 10
second delay, forcing the communications time up near the 15 second mark.
Finally, if the pilot was busy and under stress, it could easily take him
another 10 or 15 seconds to react. Clearly, this is not a likely occurrence;
but it is not an impossible one either. The values in parentheses at the
bottom of the likely range columns for both manual and semi-automatic systems
are the ones used in the analysis.
It is important to note that additional work in the area is needed to
establish a sound basis for appropriate design levels of reaction time as a
function of the various surveillance, communications, and control concepts
which could be implemented.
3.5 DECISION TIME
The decision time (T) is used in the SAUR Program as the length of
time prior to the instant of closest approach at which the controller makes
a decision to intervene or not to intervene in the case of two aircraft in
potential conflict. This conflict is considered in the tactical sense,
i.e., the aircraft are flying in reasonably close proximity such that it is
possible that some action will be required by a controller, who can then
observe the results of his action in real-time, to ascertain that a collision
will be avoided. The SAUR analysis iteslf sheds no light on a desirable
value of decision time. (See Section 5.) Consequently, the range of values
over which T should be examined was determined as follows:
* For very large values of T - say, 3 to 5 minutes - the
SAUR analysis does not apply. The aircraft are so far
apart that the situation is not tactical. The con-
troller is not concerned with what one or both pilots
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might do in the seconds prior to his giving them a
vector command. If large values are used (e.g., a
decision time of 8 minutes and a total effective
reaction time of 4 minutes), then one or both air-
craft could conduct maneuvers such as full 3600 turns
and the mathematical model itself becomes less relevant.
A decision time of much over 90 seconds would involve
more strategic control.
* If the decision time is very small, say, ten seconds,
then it is very likely too late to avoid a collision.
The decision time must exceed the reaction time by at
least the length of time to perform an escape maneuver
which will provide the desired guaranteed separation
distance. Experience and other analyses (e.g., those
related to airborne CAS) have indicated that it is
difficult to guarantee safe separation after some
25 or 30 seconds before collision
* The range of values for decision time considered most
relevant in this study, then, is that related to tactical
encounter control, i.e., from about 30 to 90 seconds.
3.6 GUARANTEED SEPARATION
In the derivation of the required surveillance accuracy from the
distance of closest approach, as determined by the SAUR model, the assumption
is made that uncorrelated errors in the positions of the two aircraft are pre-
cisely co-linear but opposite in sign. To do less (e.g., RSSing the errors)
would mean that the controller would be providing probable, not guaranteed
separation. The question arises, "What value of guaranteed separation should
be used?" Remembering that the chances of two aircraft actually getting that
close as a result of surveillance errors is quite remote, an arbitrary selec-
tion of 1,000 feet was made in the SAUR formulation, except in the case of
two supersonic aircraft in a head-on collision situation where 10,000 feet
was used. A discussion of the effects on the output results of varying
guaranteed separation is given in Section 6.2.
3.7 AIRCRAFT DYNAMICS
Of major importance in the SAUR analysis is the nature of aircraft
maneuvers - both those commanded by the controller and those initiated by
the pilot on his own volition. The maneuvering capability of each aircraft
was calculated using basic data from Reference 29, performance techniques
from References 30 and 31, and airplane stability and control techniques
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from References 30 and 32. The pilot-initiated maneuvers were assumed to be
relatively close to the limits of the maneuvering capability of the aircraft,
modified as appropriate by the particular case (e.g., limitations in maneuvers
close to the ground). The controller-initiated maneuvers were somewhat
smaller in that it could not be certain that a controller could count on the
pilot being able to get the full range of performance out of the aircraft in
responding to a collision warning command. For example, some pilots could
be willing and able to execute a very steep turn in a certain type situation,
whereas the second pilot might, for reasons of passenger comfort, safety, or
his own ability, execute a collision avoidance command with a less pronounced
maneuver. Thus, the controller-initiated maneuvers were usually some fraction
(e.g., 1/2 to 2/3) of the pilot-initiated maneuvers.
3.8 ATC SYSTEM LOAD AND AIRCRAFT DENSITY
Although the SAUR Program is strictly a two-body problem, the communi-
cation rate analysis does take into account the local aircraft population in
order to determine the communication rates associated with solving all of the
individual two-body problems. Using instantaneous airborne count figures
which were estimated using data from References 1, 2, and 3, the following
population densities were calculated for the ten cases studied:
* United States average - 0.01 aircraft per square mile
* Cases 1, 2, 6, and 8 - 1.0 aircraft per square mile
* Case 3 - 0.1 aircraft per square mile
* Cases 4 and 7 - 0.5 aircraft per square mile
* Case 5 - 0.0001 aircraft per square mile
* Case 9 - 0.5 aircraft per square mile
* Case 10 - 0.01 aircraft per square mile
These figures were arrived at by dividing the peak number of aircraft
estimated to be airborne in a given region (around 1990) by the area of
that region and multiplying by the fraction of aircraft that could be
expected to occupy the altitude band of interest.
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4. THE SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY/UPDATE RATE (SAUR) PROGRAM
The development of the SAUR Program began with an examination of some
of the existing models for theoretical ATC studies. These models had cer-
tain ideas in common, and these ideas were abstracted and generalized in
order to develop a more universal approach to the problem. The existing
models used very simplified assumptions about control laws and aircraft
performance. The SAUR approach uses more realistic assumptions and hence
more complex computations.
4.1 GENERAL MODEL
The model considers the interaction of two aircraft and a controller.
The basic inputs are the initial positions, speeds, and headings of the two
aircraft; the aircraft and pilot performance parameters; and the parameters
of the control law.
Consider two aircraft which are under surveillance. The current
estimates of position and/or velocity are known to a controller. (The con-
troller may be a man or a computer.) The measurements of position and
velocity are subject to error.
Consider what happens if the controller sends a separation maneuver
to one or both aircraft. Before the message is received by the aircraft,
the aircraft will fly a path which is not completely predictable. For
example, the turn rate of the aircraft is not known, but it is known (or
assumed) to satisfy certain limiting conditions. The limits may reflect
aircraft performance capability or, in the case of IFR traffic, procedural
rules. After the command is received at the aircraft and the pilot reacts,
there is a certain additional time required for the aircraft to react.
After the aircraft reacts, the turn rate of the aircraft will be
assumed to be the commanded turn rate.
The motion of each aircraft is described in three stages:
1) The time period required to perform the computations,
format and send the message, display it to the pilot
and for the pilot to react;
2) The time period for the aircraft to react; and
3) The time period during which the command is being obeyed.
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The motion of the aircraft would be completely predictable if all of
the parameters of flight were known. These parameters are divided into
three classes: 1) Constants; 2) Uncontrolled parameters (there are param-
eters which the controller can do nothing about, e.g., data errors, heading
before pilot reaction time); and 3) Controlled parameters (e. g., heading
after aircraft reaction time). The values of the constants are assumed
known and the values of the controlled and uncontrolled parameters are
assumed to fall within known limits.
Let D be the distance of closest approach between the two aircraft.
Let q be a vector whose components are all of the uncontrolled parameters.
Let p be a vector whose components are all of the controlled parameters.
Then D is a function of p and q: D = D(p,q).
If the controller knew the values of q, he would select p to maximize
D(-, 4). Unfortunately, he doesn't know q. Hence, consider what would
happen if he gives a particular command p. The worst thing that can
happen is that q happens to be such that D(p, q) is minimum. Let this
minimum be
H(p) = min D(p, q).
q
The controller can now choose 4 to make H(4) as large as possible. The
basic computation is, therefore
D* = max min D(p, q).
p q
The reasoning behind the basic formula is that one assumes the worst
about the uncontrolled parameters and the best about the controlled param-
eters. The controller gives commands (i. e., selects controlled parameters)
which will work even in the worst assumed set of circumstances - the
minimum over q. The controller is assumed to be rational and able to give
commands to assume maximum separation - the maximum over p.
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The formula is used in the following way. Let Do be the minimum
acceptable distance between the two aircraft (or between one aircraft and
a straight line). Let D* be the solution of the max-min problem above.
The value of D* is a function of total pilot reaction time T, or D* = D* (T).
D* (T) is a decreasing function of T. If D* (T) > D , a command given now
would assure sufficient separation of the two aircraft. To find whether it
is necessary to give a command now, consider what would happen if the
controller waits one surveillance cycle. This is done by computing D*
(T + At), where At is the data interval. If D* (T + At) < DO , it is not
wise to wait until the next cycle; it will be too late to provide the
required separation. The rule is: if D*(T+At) < DO, give a command
now-otherwise wait.
The SAUR program is designed to compute D*, i.e., to solve the max-
min problem.
4.2 GENERAL PROGRAM STRUCTURE1
The program starts with the initial position and velocity of the two
aircraft and a number of other parameters which are described in
Section 3.9.
The basic assumptions about the two aircraft trajectories are as
follows:
1) Speed
The initial speed is input. The speed increases or
decreases, with constant acceleration, until it
reaches a pilot selected value which is one of the
"uncontrolled parameters" described earlier. If
speed is a controlled parameter, i. e., if the con-
troller gives a speed command, then, at time T (the
total reaction time for that aircraft), the speed
begins changing, with constant acceleration, until
it reaches the controller selected value.
1A detailed description of the program equations and program input listing
is presented in Appendix A. Instructions for running the program 
are
included.
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2) Heading
The initial heading is input. The heading increases or
decreases, with constant turn rate, until it reaches a
pilot selected value, which is one of the "uncontrolled
parameters" described earlier. If heading is a control-
led parameter, i. e., if the controller gives a heading
command, then, at time T (the total reaction time for
that aircraft), the heading begins changing, with con-
stant turn rate, until it reaches the controller
selected value.
3) Altitude
The initial altitude is input. The altitude increases
or decreases, with constant climb (descent) rate until
it reaches a pilot selected value, which is one of the
"uncontrolled parameters" described earlier. If altitude
is a controlled parameter, i. e., if the controller given
an altitude command, then, at time T (the total reaction
time for that aircraft), the altitude begins changing,
with constant acceleration, until it reaches the control-
ler selected value.
The control law assumption is that the controller will give one com-
mand to each aircraft and the aircraft will start to respond to that com-
mand at the end of the system reaction time. The two commands may represent
different trajectory parameters; for example, the controller may tell one
aircraft to increase speed to 300 knots and tell the other aircraft to
descend to 2000 feet.
The program solves the max-min problem by trial and error, according
to instruction from the program user. For example, if the initial heading
of aircraft #1 is 100, the user may tell the program to try pilot selected
headings of 900, 950, 1000, 1050, and 1100. The program will fly the two
aircraft along each of the possible trajectories and choose the maximum
(for each controlled parameter) of the minimum (for each pilot parameter)
of the distance between the two aircraft.
4.3 ALTITUDE CALCULATIONS
The program calculations for altitude (Z) are handled differently
from the calculations for horizontal (X,Y) motion in that the altitude
part of the problem is solved directly and only the horizontal part of the
max-min problem is solved by trial and error.
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The various commands considered are divided into seven sets:
Set Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2
1 Climb Descend
2 Descend Climb
3 Climb Other
4 Descend Other
5 Other Climb
6 Other Descend
7 Other Other
In this table "other" means other than an altitude type of command (i.e.,
heading or speed). For each of the above seven sets, the altitude program
(routine ZHIST) computes upper and lower limits on the magnitude of the
altitude difference between the two aircraft.
Consider the first aircraft with a measured initial altitude Z(1) In
Figure 3 . The measured altitude is subject to an altitude error. This
error is assumed to be less than EZ. Hence the true altitude of the air-
craft is between ZO -EZ and ZO 1+EZ
- EZ -
LP (1 P (1) TRAJECTORY
L,C
Q (t) TRAJECTORY
FOR AIRCRAFT I Q(t) (t) P(t)
SIMILARLY S(t) 5 Z(2) (t) - R(t)
FOR AIRCRAFT 2
DZ(t ) = (Z
(  () - Z(2) (t) )MIN
Figure 3. Altitude Program
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Suppose for example the first aircraft is told to descend (case 2 or
4 above). Before time T1 (the system reaction time for aircraft 1) the
altitude history of the aircraft is not completely predictable. However,
the highest it can be at any time can be calculated by assuming that it
starts at the highest possible altitude ZO +EZ, and it climbs at its
maximum (uncontrolled parameter) rate ZU(1) until it reaches its maximum
(uncontrolled parameter) altitude ZU P. The superscript refers to theer r 1 the
aircraft, the U refers to the upper limit and the P refers to the fact that
these are limits on pilot-initiated maneuvers. After time T1 , the command
to descend takes effect. This means that the aircraft then descends at a
rate (1) until it reaches its minimum altitude Z (1). The subscript c
L,c L,c
refers to limits on controller-initiated maneuvers. This altitude tra-
jectory (start as high as possible, climb as fast as possible to the maxi-
mum altitude, then descends at the given rate to the commanded altitude)
defines the highest possible altitude. It is called P(t) in the program.
The maximum altitude function P(t), computed by a general routine
"WROUT," is a piecewise linear function. The values of the function P(t)
at each of the "break points" and the times of these points are output by
routine WROUT.
The minimum altitude Q(t) function for aircraft 1 is computed
similarly. This function is determined by considering an aircraft which
starts at Z ( 1 )-E , descends as quickly as allowed-i.e., at a rateS (1) 0 (Zz to a minimum allowed altitude Z . At time T1 it continues toL,p .(1) L,p The 1
descend at a rate ZL (1) until it reaches Z ). The subscript L means
L,c L,c
"lower" limit. Again the routine WROUT is used to compute Q(t).
Aircraft 1 is then known to be between P(t) and Q(t) at any time t:
Q(t)< M < Z( ) P(t),
where Z (t) is the true (unknown) altitude of aircraft 1 at time t.
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Using the same methods, the upper and lower limits or altitude func-
tions for aircraft 2 are determined. They are called R(t) and S(t):
S(t) < Z(2) (t) < R(t)
The program uses WROUT four times to compute P(t), Q(t), R(t), and
S(t). DZ(t) is then computed by routine ZHIST. The main property of
Dz(t) is that the altitude difference between the two aircraft at time
t is not less than DZ(t).
The function DZ(t) is computed for set 1 and then for set 2 of
Table 1. Denote the two functions by DZ (1) (t) and DZ(2 )(t). Routine MAX
DZ computes and outputs the maximum of these two functions:
D (M)(t) = max [DZ(1)(t), DZ(2)(t)1
The meaning of DZ(M)(t) is as follows. At any time t(M) , there is a pair
of altitude commands such that an altitude separation of DZ (t) can be
guaranteed.
4.4 HORIZONTAL MANEUVERS AND THE CALCULATION OF DISTANCE OF CLOSEST
APPROACH
Next the program considers horizontal maneuvers. The details of this
part of the program are described in Appendix A. The program tries a large
number of possible horizontal maneuvers on the part of both aircraft. For
example, one combination might involve aircraft one turning right 100 and
speeding up to 350 knots, while aircraft 2 turns left 30 and slows down to
250 knots. For each combination of maneuvers it calculates the distance of
closest approach (DCA) of the two aircraft, using the previous calculated
vertical separation. The program takes the minimum of all of these DCA's.
This minimum DCA is the separation which can be assured by using an altitude
maneuver. Denote this distance by D*.
The program searches over a number of specific new headings for each
aircraft, but the number of new headings is finite. Further, the program
does not search over all possible turn rates that could place an aircraft
on a new final heading. A single turn rate is used. As a result the loci
of possible positions of the two aircraft may be thought of as a continuum
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and the loci of calculated positions of the two aircraft as sets of paths
forming a screen or grid covering this continuum. This approximation
introduces noise into the calculations of DCA's and it usually prevents a
zero DCA from being calculated when actually one could occur; but in a
detailed or preliminary design phase, however, a more complex version of
the program should be used in order to provide higher fidelity data.
The program next considers set 3. The maximum and minimum altitudes
for aircraft 1 [P(t) and Q(t)]are the same as for set 1. The maximum and
minimum altitudes for aircraft 2 [R(t) and S(t)] are computed without any
altitude command being given. The maximum is computed by considering an
aircraft, initially at the nominal altitude plus the surveillance uncer-
tainty in altitude, which climbs at the pilot-initiated rate to the maximum
altitude and then stays at that altitude.
Once the functions P(t), Q(t), R(t), and S(t) are computed for set 3
the function DZ(t) is computed as before. The corresponding function for
set 4 is also computed. The maximum of these two functions is computed as
before. This is the altitude separation which can be guaranteed by giving
an altitude command to aircraft 1 while aircraft 2 is not given an
altitude command.
After computing Dz(M)(t), the program considers horizontal maneuvers
again. This time the horizontal calculations are more complex because a
horizontal command is given to aircraft 2.
The program first considers a particular horizontal command to air-
craft 2; for example, increase speed by 20 knots. Given this command, the
speed of aircraft 2 after T2 is determined, but there are a number of other
variables which are still undetermined - the speed of aircraft 2 before
time T2 , the heading of aircraft 2, the speed of aircraft 2, and the heading
of aircraft 1. The program tries all possible combinations of these unde-
termined parameters, computes a DCA for each combination, assuming that the
altitude separation is D7(M)(t), and computes the minimum of these DCA.
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This distance is the separation which can be assumed with an altitude com-
mand to aircraft 1 and a command to aircraft 2 to increase speed by 20
knots. This distance is compared with D* and the maximum of the two
replaces D*.
The program next considers another command to aircraft 2 (e.g., slow
down 20 knots). It again tries all possible combinations for the other
parameters, gets a DCA with each combination, and takes the minimum of
these DCAs. Again, this distance is compared with D* and the maximum of
these numbers replaces D*.
The process is repeated until all possible horizontal commands have
been considered for aircraft 2. After this is done, D* represents the
distance which can be guaranteed for all commands considered so far, i. e.,
for a vertical command to aircraft 1 and a horizontal or vertical command
to aircraft 2.
Next the program returns to sets 5 and 6 and computes DZ(M)(t) as
before, It then repeats the computations as in sets 3 and 4, but this time
considering horizontal commands for aircraft 1. When this is done, D*
represents the guaranteed separation for all commands considered so far,
i. e., for cases in which at least one aircraft is given an altitude
command.
The program then considers set 7. In this case, the functions P, Q,
R, and S are computed without any vertical maneuvers. The function DZ(t)
is computed as before. It is not necessary to use MAX DZ this time and the
program simply sets DZ(M)(t)=DZ (t).
Next, all possible pairs of horizontal commands are tried, e.g.,
aircraft 1 is told to turn right 900 and aircraft 2 is told to slow down 20
knots. For each pair of commands the program tries all possible combina-
tions of the free parameters and computes the minimum DCA for that pair of
commands. As each pair of commands is computed, the minimum DCA is com-
pared with D* and the maximum replaces D*.
Finally, at the end of the program, D*(t) is the separation which
can be guaranteed using the best of the commands which were tried.
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5. COLLISION WARNING COMMAND RATE ANALYSIS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
It became apparent early in the SAUR Program that in establishing
the relationship between surveillance accuracy and update rate requirements
we would arrive at a relationship such as that indicated in Figure 2.
Inspection of this figure reveals that a surveillance system designer would
not be able to prescribe a unique accuracy or update interval based on that
data unless he knew what the appropriate decision time (T) should be. For
this reason an attempt was made to develop quantitative relationships
between communications load or false alarm rate, decision time and system
reaction time to determine a preferred value of accuracy and update
interval.
Whereas the SAUR Program investigates the interaction of two aircraft
in specific circumstances, some control problems require the consideration
of whole aircraft populations. Problems related to estimation of communi-
cations loads are of this type. This section describes a method for the
application of a max/min control model to an aircraft population. The
purpose is to analyze conflicts, collision warning, command loads and
false alarm rates as a function of the quality of the surveillance system.
The qualitative relationship between surveillance accuracy, update
rate, collision warning, communications load and false alarm rate are
fairly well understood. For example, if everything is held constant except
that surveillance accuracy is degraded, the collision warning command com-
munications load will go up. Aircraft that are actually a safe distance
apart must be considered to be closer together than they actually are
(due to the increased uncertainty in their position), thus precipitating
collision warning commands when none may be necessary. This situation can
be considered a false alarm situation. A similar situation exists if the
surveillance update interval is increased, i.e., the alarm rate and false
alarm rate are both increased since the uncertainty in aircraft position
becomes greater and commands must be generated sooner.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FMD
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To quantitatively study this problem and estimate command loads for
particular aircraft population, it is necessary to assume an aircraft
population model and a controller model. The aircraft population model is
the set of assumptions about the density and uncontrolled motion of the
aircraft. Examples of such assumptions are:
1) Aircraft fly along known input flight paths with known
trajectories.
2) Aircraft fly along known paths with initial time of entry
into the paths being random.
3) Aircraft fly at random, i.e., at any time the location
and direction of any aircraft is random, but the aircraft
fly in straight lines (gas model).
4) Aircraft fly in random paths at random times and not
generally in straight lines.
The gas model has been used in previous studies to get an estimate
of conflicts and command loads and this model will be used here.
The controller model is the set of assumptions used to determine
whether commands have to be given to avoid a conflict between aircraft.
Controller models include:
1) The controller gives a command pair to any two aircraft
which get within a fixed distance of each other.
2) The controller gives a command pair to any two aircraft
when a conflict is possible within a fixed warning time.
3) The controller assumes that the aircraft can maneuver,
and gives the best command pair to assure separation when
and only when necessary. This is the max/min model
considered in the SAUR Program.
In summary, the models used in this study are a gas model population
model and a simplified max/min controller model.
5.2 THE METHOD
Consider a region R which contains a large number of aircraft with
random positions and headings. Choose one of the aircraft at random. The
first problem is to determine the number of times it is necessary to give
a command pair to avoid a conflict between the chosen aircraft and one of
the aircraft in R.
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Assuming that all aircraft fly in straight lines, it is fairly easy
to calculate the expected number of "conflicts" or times that the chosen
aircraft will come within a fixed distance of one of the aircraft in R.
This is done by first looking at the subset of aircraft in R which are
moving at a particular heading and counting the number of conflicts for
the aircraft in this subset. This is repeated for other subsets with other
headings and the results are integrated over all headings to get the total
number of conflicts with the chosen aircraft. This is the technique used
in a number of previous studies. The technique is valid (for the given
assumptions) for estimating the number of conflicts. The same technique
has been used to estimate the number of commands by making the approxima-
tion that two aircraft must be given commands if they fly within a certain
distance of each other. This latter approximation is not valid, and the
present study will not use it.
Consider a particular aircraft in the region R, and consider a subset
of aircraft in R which all have the same headings. The question is which
of these aircraft will require commands. In principle, the question can
be answered by repeatedly running the SAUR Program.
Consider an aircraft at a particular point in R with a particular
heading at the initial time. By running the SAUR Program it is possible
to determine whether a command is necessary for that aircraft and an air-
craft in the subset at that time. If the answer is "no", the time is
incremented and the question is asked again. By testing all the times
between the times of entering and leaving region R, it is possible to find
out whether there is any time at which a command is necessary. By repeat-
ing the process for other points in the region it would be possible to
find the set of points which result in a command being necessary. For
each of these points it is possible to determine whether the command pair
was a false alarm. A false alarm results when a command pair is given
but the straight line extrapolation of the two aircraft paths resulted in
a distance of closest approach greater than the conflict distance.
For the particular heading it is then possible to average over all
positions to get the expected number of command pairs, and the expected
number of false alarms. The process is repeated and results are averaged
over all headings.
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The above program is not practical in the simple "brute force" form
described above. The number of runs of the SAUR Program would be exces-
sive. It is therefore necessary to use special techniques to obtain the
boundary of the subregion in R which contains points which result in
command pairs.
In Figure 4 the region R contains aircraft at random position, all
with the same headings (indicated by the velocity vectors in the figure).
Select one particular aircraft and one particular time, say, t=O. Consider
another aircraft at an arbitrary position P inside the region R. Suppose
that all of the parameters required for the SAUR 2 Program have been
defined. It is possible to run the program to determine whether, for the
selected aircraft and the aircraft now at P, either a) it is not necessary
to give a command pair now to avoid a conflict, b) if a command pair is
given now the two aircraft will just barely avoid a conflict, or c) it is
too late to give a command pair to avoid a conflict. These three situations
define a region S. Points satisfying condition a), b), or c) are respec-
tively outside, on the boundary, and inside of region S.
R
VR= RELATIVE p
VELOCITY
VECTOR
SELECTED
AIRCRAFT W.
Figure 4. Command Load Calculations
40
Next consider the question of whether it is necessary to give a
command in the future. Consider an arbitrary time Ta . Consider the
selected aircraft as being fixed, and the other aircraft to be moving at
relative velocity IR . The region S is fixed to the selected aircraft.
For any other aircraft which flies into the region S a command pair must
be given. If W is the width of the region S in the direction perpendicular
to VR, the figure shows that the aircraft which result in command pairs
being given before time Ta are those aircraft in the shaded region. The
area of the shaded region is equal to the area of a rectangle of width W
and length IVRITa. The expected number of such aircraft is the density of
aircraft times and area of the rectangle, or pWIVRIT a , where p is the
density of aircraft with the given heading H.
Once the expected number of command pairs is computed for an entering
aircraft, the process is repeated for other values of heading and the
results are summed over all headings to get the total number of commands
for this entering aircraft. The result is multiplied by the number of
aircraft to get the total command load for the situation being studied.
The major task is to calculate the width W of the critical command region.
The following paragraphs outline a method for computing W.
Consider an aircraft which is heading, say, due East (Figure 5).
The system reaction time for the aircraft is T, the maximum pilot initiated
turn rate is ap, and the controller initiated turn rate is wc.
As in the SAUR Program, we don't know what the pilot will do before
time T, and we therefore must consider a whole family of possibilities.
Suppose, for example, the pilot turns to a heading H and maintains that
heading until time T, at which time he responds to a left turn command
from the controller. The trajectory will appear as in Figure 5. Since,
however, the value of H is not known, it is necessary to consider a whole
family of such trajectories, as in Figure 6. The outer envelope of these
trajectories is a curve CL. (The L subscript refers to left turn commands.)
The significance of the curve CL is that the controller can guarantee, by
giving a left turn command, that the aircraft will stay inside of the
shaded region SL bounded by CL.
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S p = PILOT TURN RATE
Q = CONTROLLER TURN RATE
r2 C
V = VELOCITY
r = V/Wp
r2 = V/ C
e = -H
b 2
D V (T-
P
H DT = SYSTEM REACTION TIME
P x (EAST)
Figure 5. Single Aircraft Turn Geometry
/L
Figure 6. Envelope of Left-Turn Command Trajectories
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By considering right turn commands, another curve CR and region SR '
are defined. Now consider the intersection (the common set of points) S of
the two regions SR and SL. The significance of the region S is that the
controller can guarantee, by a heading command, that the aircraft will stay
with the region S. (See Figure 7.)
Next consider an approaching aircraft with an initial heading HA.
The controller will give commands, if necessary, in order to ensure that
the aircraft will stay a distance DCA=GS+2SA apart. The distance GS is the
required "protected distance" and a safety factor is added, where the max-
imum surveillance position error is SA. This is the same relationship
derived in Section 2.
Consider the selected aircraft to be fixed and the approaching air-
craft to be flying by with velocity vector VR, the relative velocity vector.
(See Figure 8.) Consider a region S fixed to the selected aircraft and
another region SA attached to the approaching aircraft. In this case the
two aircraft are presumed to be identical so the region SAis exactly the
same size and shape as S. The lateral distance d1 and d2 are set such that
EAST
Figure 7. Intersection of CL and CR Envelopes
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NOTE: S-ESA
A S APPROACHING
VR
VR
AIRCRAFT EAST
Figure 8. Geometry of Passing Regions
the two regions will just graze. If the region SA "flies by" at a distance
greater than DCA, it will not be necessary to give commands to the two air-
craft to ensure separation. To determine whether the regions will remain
separated by DCA, it is necessary to compute the distances dI and d2, which
depend on the approach heading HA.
Summarizing, first the envelopes CR and CL are computed and the inter-
section envelope C is computed from these two curves. Next, the approach
heading is varied over all possible approach headings between -1800 and
1800. For each of these approach headings, the distances dI and d2 are
computed. The width W is computed from W=2(dl+d 2 ). The results are
averaged over all approach headings to get the average width. The result
is multiplied by pIVR I to get the total number of commands per hour.
The mathematics of these calculations are described in more detail
in Appendix A. A description of the inputs and the results of the calcu-
lations for the ten cases are in the following subsection.
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5.3 COMMAND RATE CALCULATIONS
The command rate calculations were made in the manner just described.
Inputs to the calculations, using values appropriate to the individual case,
are shown in Table 5. The CR relationships for Cases 1, 2, 6, and 8 are
shown in Figure 9. These following results are fairly typical:
* The rate of change of DCA or SA with a change in T is
large and negative for each value of CR. The CR lines
are essentially straight and parallel.
* The value of CR increases roughly linearly with T.
The actual values of CR are very scenario-dependent and the large
uncertainty in the values of some of the input parameters (e.g., aircraft
density) make it difficult to determine the absolute value of the command
rate even for any particular scenario. In spite of this, the relationships
established here are considered to be very useful and it does appear that
significant conclusions can be drawn that will help determine the accuracy
and update rate requirements. The method of determining this will be
described in the next section.
COMMANDS/HOUR
CR=2000 4000 6000 8000 10,000
20,000
10,000-0 -
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
TOTAL REACTION TIME (T, IN SEC)
Figure 9. Command Rate (Cases 1, 2, 6, and 8)
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Table 5. Inputs to Collision Warning Command Rate Analysis
Case 1,2,6,8 Case 4,7 Case 5 Case 3 Case 9 Case 10
Surveillance 100- 100- 100- 100- 100- 10-
Accuracy in 20,000 10,000 100,000 20,000 20,000 20,000
Feet 2 1 1, 20 2 2
Guaranteed 1,000 1,000 10,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Separation
in Feet
Density in 1.0 0.5 0.0001 0.1 0.5 0.01
Aircraft per
Cubic Mile
Total System 0-90 0-90 0-90 0-90 0-90 0-90
Reaction Time
in Seconds
Average Speed in 420 200 2,000 845 700 845
Feet Per Second
Pilot Initiated 6 6 3 4.5 6 4.5
Turn Rate in
Degrees Per
Second
Controller 3 3 0.5 3 3 3
Initiated Turn
Rate in Degrees
Per Second
Finally, it should be pointed out that "command rate" and "communi-
cations load" are closely related but not synonymous. For each "command"
at least two communications would probably take place (at least one message
to each aircraft). Also, the relationship between positive and negative
commands is not established here. Each command here is a positive command
(e.g., "turn left").
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6. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
The primary output of the Surveillance Accuracy Update Rate Study is
embodied in the SAUR/Communication Rate (SAUR/CR) analyses of the ten
specific cases selected for this purpose and described in Section 3.1.
From these case studies it is possible to establish quantitative relation-
ships between the surveillance accuracies, the update rates, and the 
com-
munications loads associated with the tactical control of aircraft for
conflict resolution for a wide range of circumstances covering various types
of aircraft, phases of flight, and types of airspace. The explicit results
of the ten cases are reported in Section 6.1. Special cases are discussed
in Section 6.2, and comparisons with other analyses are made in Section 6.3.
6.1 INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDY RESULTS
Each of the cases listed in Section 3.6 was examined in detail, using
the SAUR and CR analysis tools described in the previous sections. Cases 1
through 10 are discussed in detail in Section 6.1.1 and Cases 2 through 10
are discussed briefly in Sections 6.1.2 through 6.1.10. Section 6.1.11 
sum-
marizes the results of the ten case studies and contains a discussion of
the implications of these results.
6.1.1 Case 1 Analysis
This case represents a possible collision situation between an air
carrier descending toward an airport, which encounters a light general
aviation aircraft in a level turn (Figure 10). Assuming that this situa-
tion would probably occur in relatively busy airspace (e. g., an approach
into Friendship Airport, Baltimore, Maryland), the CR analysis was based
on a high aircraft density, resulting in a high communications loading.
The SAUR and CR curves are shown overlaid in Figure 11, together with
identification of six specific points labeled A through F:
* Point A is representative of an ATC system today wherein
radar provides accuracies on the order of a mile and the
ATC system as indicated in Section 3 involves a typical
reaction time of 25 seconds. This point will be a
starting point in the Surveillance Accuracy/Update
Interval selection process; and various design change
strategies will be employed to determine a recommended
air traffic control system capability.
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* Point B represents a decrease in total system reaction
time which could be obtained by decreasing the update
interval from 10 to 4 seconds or by decreasing pilot,
controller, and communication delays a similar amount.
* Point C represents a larger decrease in total system
reaction time, implying both shorter update interval
and reduced pilot, controller, and/or communications
delays.
* Points D, E, and F represent accuracies typical of
those which could be provided by a multilateration
system such as LIT and with the same total system
reaction times as discussed in Points A, B, and C.
These points are shown as examples of surveillance accuracy/reaction time
combinations. The selection process did not limit the choices to one of
these six points, but they were found to be helpful in comparing design
alternatives of strategies.
The SAUR reasoning and selection process is outlined in the first two
columns of Table 6. From Figure 11 the appropriate values of decision time
and the communications rate for Point A are extracted and logged in Block 1
for visibility. The minimum strategy (Block 2) is a reflection of the
tactical aspects of the SAUR problem. In this case, since tau is already
below 90 seconds, this block is not applicable. The first potential
strategy (Block 3a) is investigated in order to determine the impact of
reducing T on the communications load. In this case, if the reaction time
is reduced to 19 or 12 seconds, the command rate drops from 4200 to 3200
or 2400 commands per hour. These CR drops were considered significant.
Clearly, the decision as to what CR reduction is "significant" is a sub-
jective one. In those cases where a reduction in T (or in SA) could reduce
the communications rate by both a large percentage and an absolute value of
over a thousand commands per hour, the CR drop was considered significant.
If the CR drops was, say, 10 or 15%, or was small in absolute terms (e. g.,
from 22 commands per hour to 11 commands per hour), then this was not
considered a significant CR drop. Ultimately, of course, one would prefer
to do a direct cost trade of the communications and surveillance subsystems,
a necessary step in the preliminary design stage. The present approach,
however, does provide an indication of those cases which possess the
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Table 6. Surveillance Accuracy/Update Interval Selection
APPLICATION
RULE - REASONING TO CASE 1
1. Starting Point (Point A) This is representative T = 87
of the enroute ATC CR = 4200
SAR=5000 ft & T = 25 sec (radar/voice) systems
in use today.
2. Minimum Strategy
If r at the starting point If r is very large, the N/A
is greater than 90 sec, it case in point requires
will be necessary to use one better performance than
or more of the strategies radar provided in order
below to get down to 90 sec to provide tactical con-
or below. Pick lowest T trol for collision
if all are above 90 sec. avoidance ("Tactical/
Encounter Control")
3. Potential Strategies
a) Go to semi-automation Data link and/or Going to
and/or reduced update reduced update inter- Point B (or C)
interval (Points B, C) val will only be more drops CR to
only if 1) CR drops cost effective than 3200 (or 2400).
significantly; 2) it is voice under high CR The CR change
necessary to bring r conditions or unless is probably
down to 90 sec. it is necessary for significant.
tacti cal/encounter
control.
b) Drop down from starting Presumably more Dropping from
point to lower SAR(e. g., accuracy will require Point A to
Point D) only if 1) CR a more expensive sur- Point D causes
drops significantly; or veillance system. CR CR to drop to
2) it is necessary to must drop substantially 3,800. The CR
bring T down to 90 sec. in order to save com change is
munications system probably not
costs significant.
c) Allow larger values of Same as 3b N/A
SAR if possible, sub-
ject to T equal to or
less than 90 sec.
d) A combination of strate- The logic behind the At Point F
gies is allowed (e. g., moves is not mutually CR = 2,000.
Points E and F). exclusive. The CR change
is probably
significant
but not much
more than at
Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or SAR = 5,000 ft
indicated set of values T = 12 sec
of SAR/T/-, which is UI = 1 sec
equivalent to SAR/UI T = 66 sec
the desired product. CR = 2,400 comm/
hr
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greatest potential for payoff, and will provide the communications rate
versus accuracy/update interval relationships required when the quantitative
cost comparisons are made.
The potential strategies of Blocks 3b, 3c, and 3d likewise 
are measur-
ing the impact of more stringent or more relaxed SU/UI/T design 
parameters
or any combination thereof. In this case it is seen that the additional CR
reduction which could be achieved by going to Points D, E, and F, are much
smaller than the initial drop obtained by reducing T. Block 4 records the
values of SAR, T, UI, tau, and CR which result from this thought process;
and Block 5 shows the indicated ATC system implications. Summarizing this
case, it appears that the communication load (and also the false alarm rate)
can be dropped significantly by reduction in total system reaction time
from 25 to 12 seconds. On the other hand, a reduction in position deter-
mination uncertainty at any particular value of T does not appear 
to
appreciably reduce the communications load or false alarm rate. 
Thus, the
indicated surveillance accuracy requirement is 5000 feet; the update
interval is 1 second; and the resulting communications load is 2400 
com-
mands per hour.
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6.1.2 Case 2
It was not clear at the outset of the study whether or not minor
variations in a particular scenario would cause fairly large changes in the
surveillance accuracy, update rate, and communications requirements. There-
fore, Case 2 represents a fairly mild departure from Case 1 and involves a
number of similar sub-cases.
6.1.2.1 Case 2A
Description
This case concerns a general aviation piston aircraft (Cessna 172) in
a collision situation with a commercial jet (Boeing 737). The situation,
as indicated below, is very similar to Case 1 except that both aircraft
are'in stright and level flight.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 ft
250 Kt
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
3340
5,000 ft
100 kt
Level
Figure 12. Case 2A Encounter
Discussion
The results of Case 2A are virtually identical to Case 1. The com-
mand rate curves do not change at all since only minor changes in the air-
craft flinht naths are made. The rationale for selection of Point C was
again the same, namely a significant reduction in communication load with
a reduction in system reaction time, but not so much improvement by going
to a high accuracy surveillance system.
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TOTAL REACTION TIME (T, IN SEC)
Figure 13. Case 2A SAUR/CR Curves
Table 7. Case 2A SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1 Starting Point (Point A) = 90 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy N/A
Reduce T below 90 seconds
3. Potential Strategies Going to Point B (or C) drops CR toa) Semiautomati on and/or 3200 (or 2400). The R change is
reduced update interval probably significant.
(Points B, C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR to 3800.
CR change is probably no significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR=2000. The CR change is
(e. g., Points E and F) probably significant, but not much
more than at Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or SAR=5000 ft)Point C CR 654 secm/hr
indicated set of design T =12 sec )CR 2,400 comm/hr
UI =1 sec
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Case 6.1.2.2 Case 2B
Description
This case is identical to Case 2A except that the two aircraft flight
paths meet at right angles.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 ft
250 kt
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
0640
5,000 ft.
100 kt
Level
Figure 14. Case 2B Encounter
Discussion
The right angle case is slightly more difficult than the head-on
case from the air traffic controller's point of view. At any given point
in time the two aircraft are simply closer together. This causes the tau
curves to "droop" somewhat. Nevertheless, the preferred design point is
again Point C for the same reasons as before.
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Figure 15. Case 2B SAUR/CR Curves
Table 8. Case 2B SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) T = > 100 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Must reduce SA to 2600 to T to 
19
Reduce T below 90 sec. sec or an equivalent combination.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point B (or C) drops CR
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced to 3200 (or 2400). The CR change
update interval (Points B,C) is probably significant.
b) Better accuracy At Point D CR drops to 3800. TheCR change is probably not
significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR=2000. The CR change
(e. g., Points E and F). is probably significant but not
much more than Point C.
SAR=5000 ft)Point C
4. Product: A preferred or indicated T =12 sec ) nt C T =72 sec
set of design values. UI = 1 sec CR =2,400 comm/
hr
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6.1.2.3 Case 2C
Description
This case is identical to Case 2A except that the two aircraft are
in a tail-chase.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 ft.
250 kt
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
1540
5,000 ft.
100 kt
Level
Figure 16. Case 2C Encounter
Discussi on
Here for the first time the minimum strategy rule had to be invoked.
Point G brings tau down to about 85 seconds and it cuts CR in half at 2100.
Points H and F, however, do not improve CR significantly; so Point G was
selected as the preferred design point.
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Figure 17. Case 2C SAUR/CR Curves
Table 9. Case 2C SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) T = > 100 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T Must reduce SA to 3000 and T to 15
below 90 sec. sec, or SA to 2000 and T to 22 sec,
or an equivalent combination.
3. Potential Strategies: At SA=3000, if T drops to 12 (Point
a) Semiautomation and/or G), drops to 85 and CR drops to 2100.
reduced update interval The CR cahgne is probably significant.
(Points B, C) At SA-1000 and T=12 (Point H),
CR=2000. The change is probably
significant, but not a significant
improvement over Point G.
b) Better accuracy Dropping from Point G to Point D
causes significant CR increase.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR=2000. The CR change is
Points E and F). probably significant but not more
than Point G.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=3000 ft)point C T =85 sec
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) CR=2,100 comm/hr
UI =1 sec
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6.1.2.4 Case 2D
Des cription
This case is identical to Case 2A except that both aircraft are
Boeing 737's.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 ft.
250 kt
Level
AC#1 (Boeing 737)
3340
5,000 ft.
250 kt
Level
Figure 18. Case 2D Encounter
Discussion
The rationale for selection here is very similar to previous sub-
cases, and Point C was again selected. While it is not the intent of this
study to stress hardware implementation, it is worth pointing out that, in
terms of implementation, Point G is representative of a terminal radar/
voice system used today. Although the CR reduction going from Point A to
Point G is only half that associated with going to Point C, it might be
preferable from a total cost point of view to retain terminal radar in those
areas where it already provides an adequate capability.
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Figure 19. Case 2D SAUR/CR Curves
Table 10. Case 2D SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) r = 74 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce - N/A
below 90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point B (or C) drops CR to
a) Semiautomation and/or 3200 (or 2400). The CR change is
reduced update interval probably significant
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR to 3800.
The CR change is probably not
significant.
c) Reduced accuracy At T=25, if T is increased to 90, SA
is increased to 10,300, and CR goes up
to 4,600.
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR-1900. The CR change is
(e.g., Points E and F). probably significant but not much more
than Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5000 ft)Point C =58 sec
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) CR=2,400 comm/hr
UI =1 sec
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6.1.2.5 Case 2E
Description
This case is identical to Case 2A except that both aircraft are
Cessna 172's.
AC#2 (Cessna 172)
1540
5,000 ft.
100 kt
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
3340
5,000 ft.
100 kt
Level
Figure 20. Case 2E Encounter
Discussi on
The results here remain essentially identical to the previous cases.
Since the aircraft in this case are flying much slower, the selected
design Point C involves a significantly longer decision time.
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Figure 21. Case 2E SAUR/CR Curves
Table 11. Case 2E SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) = 100 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below Must reduce SA to 5000 and T to 12
90 sec. sec or SA to 2500 and T to 25 sec, or
an equivalent combination.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point B (or C) drops CR to
a) Semiautomation and/or 3200 (or 2400). The CR change is
reduced update interval probably significant.
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR to 3800.
The CR change is probably not
significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR=2400. The CR change is
(e. g., Points E and F) probably significant but not much more
than Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5000 ft)Point C T =90 sec
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) CR=2,400 comm/hr
UI =1 sec
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6.1.2.6 Case 2F
Description
This case is identical to Case ZA except that the Cessna 172 is dis-
placed 1000 feet north of a collision course.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 feet
250 knots
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
3340
5,000 feet
100 knots
Level
Figure 22. Case 2F Encounter
Discussion
This small perturbation on Case 2A caused virtually no change from
the previous results. See Section 6.2.5, however, for a more complete
discussion of the topic of offset flight paths as related to possible
heading errors. The results here are considered to be slightly
non-conservati ve.
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Figure 23. Case 2F SAUR/CR Curves
Table 12. Case 2F SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) I = 82 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=4200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce t N/A
below 90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point B (or C) drops CR to
a) Semiautomation and/or 3200 (or 2400). The CR change is
reduced update interval probably significant.
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR to 3800.
The CR change is probably not
signifi cant.
c) Reduced accuracy Starting point near T =90. No
significant change.
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR drops to 1900. CR
(e. g., Points E and F). change probably significant but not
much more than Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5000 ft)Point C c =75 sec
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) CR=2,400 comm/hr
UI =1 sec
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6.1.2.7 Case 2G
Description
This case is identical to Case 2A except that the Cessna 172 is in
level flight at an altitude of 4,000 feet, which is 1000 feet below a
collision course.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
1540
5,000 feet
250 knots
Level
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
3340
4,000 feet
100 knots
Level
Figure 24. Case 2G Encounter
Discussion
This small perturbation on Case 2A did not change the SAUR/CR results
at all. Obviously, if these two aircraft were flying under instrument
flight rules at these assigned altitudes, no intervention would be required
at all. The presumptions would be made that 1) the instrumentation in both
aircraft would be operating correctly; 2) the pilots would be flying at or
very close to their assigned altitudes; and 3) that neither would initiate
a vertical maneuver to cause a potential collision situation. However, in
the event that either aircraft were on a VFR/IPC clearance (or if the con-
troller had any other reason to believe that one of the foregoing conditions
might not be met), he would have to make a decision to intervene just about
a full minute prior to their point of close approach and would require a
short update interval and short system reaction time.
See Section 6.2.5.
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Figure 25. Case 2G SAUR/CR Curves
Table 13 Case 2G SAUR Selection
I• Starting Point (Point A) T 84 SEC
SAR=500 ft and T=25 sec CR= 4200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T N/A
below 90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Point to Point B (or C) drops CR toa) Semiautomation and/or 3200 (or 2200). The CR change is
reduced update interval probably significant.
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy At Point D CR drops to 3800. The CRchange is probably not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy Starting point near r =90. No
significant change.
d) Combination of strategies At Point F CR drops to 2000. CR
(e. g., Points E and F change is probably significant but not
more than Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or SAR=5000 ft)oint C = 63 sec
indicated set of design values. T =12 sec ) CR= 2,200 comm/hr
UI = 1 sec
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6.1.3 Case 3
Des cription
This case concerns an executive jet (Cessna Citation) in a collision
situation with a supersonic military jet (F-104). The Citation is in level
cruise on a flight from Los Angeles to Las Vegas. The F-104 has just taken
off from Palmdale and climbing at 24,000 feet/min toward the northwest.
0600 HEADING
30,000 ft. ALT
340 kt
Level FLIGHT
AC#2
(Cessna Citation)
3000 HEADING
5,000 ft. ALT
500 kt
24,000 FPM CLIMB
AC#1
(F-104)
Figure 26. Case 3 Encounter
Discussion
The SAUR CR curves are noticably different in this case because the
traffic density has been reduced. (The CR values are down by a factor of
3). Furthermore, the DCA's which the controller can generate are signifi-
cantly larger. Thus Points A through F appear to have dropped lower with
respect to the tau curves. In this case, there is again about a 50 per-
cent CR drop in going from Point A to Point C, but the absolute values are
smaller. Thus, it becomes difficult to pick a preferred point between A,
B and C. As before, however, there is little to be gained in terms of CR
drop by going from Point A to Point D. Conversely, there is not a great
deal to lose in going from Point A to Point G. Point H is of interest
because it represents today's terminal radar capability. Finally, Point B
was selected as a design point since the drop in going from B to C was
potentially less than that obtained in going from A to B and since the drop
from B to H produced a negligible CR drop.
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Figure 27. Case 3 SAUR/CR Curves
Table 14. Case 3 SAUR Selection
RULE APPLICATION
1. Starting Point (Point A) = 49 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR = 1,450 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce t N/A
below 90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point B (or C) drops CR to
a) Semiautomation and/or 1000 (or 700). CR change may be
reduced update interval significant.
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR to 1,350.
CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy If T is increased to 90 (Point G), SAincreases to 15,000, and CR goes up
to 1,600.
d) Combination of strategies Going to Point F drops CR to 605. CR
(e. g., Points E and F). drop may be significant but not much
more than Point C.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5,000 ft)Point B T =34 sec
cated set of design values. T =19 sec CR=1,000 comm/hr
UI =4 sec
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6.1.4 Case 4
Description
This concerns two light general aviation aircraft (Cessna 172 and
Evans Volksplane) in a VFR landing pattern encounter. The Cessna 172 is
proceeding on the downwind leg and the Evans Volksplane is entering down-
wind at an angle of 450.
AC#1 (Cessna 172)
0900
1000 ft.
70 kt
Level
AC#2 (Evans Volksplane)
0450
1000 ft.
70 kt
Level
Figure 28. Case 4 Encounter
Discussion
Figure 29 reveals immediately that separation cannot be guaranteed
according to the SAUR ground rules. Reducing the guaranteed separation
distance to 500 feet changes the required surveillance accuracies as
indicated in the lower right-hand corner of Figure 29. (See Section 6.2.4
for an explanation.) Even with this reduced guaranteed separation, a sur-
veillance accuracy of 100 feet allows a total system reaction time of only
7 seconds. The implications seem clear. If traffic patterns are to be
controlled in such a way as to guarantee the prevention of mid-air colli-
sions, then the airspace must be much more organized and all users operating
in a highly disciplined mode. Under these circumstances, shorter total
system reaction times might be considered realistic. (It would be very
beneficial to re-run case 4 with more restricted pilot-initiated maneuvers
as inputs consistent with a postulated set of traffic pattern guide rules
that would make the control at least partially strategic.) In addition to
improved safety of flight, it also appears that several hundred commands
per hour could be saved.
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,500 GS 1000 FT
3,000
CR = 400 600 800
COMMANDS/HR
-5,000 2,000
0 2 30
RULAF E DLCT
1. Starting Point (Point A) >>100 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR 540 comm/hr
2. Minimum StrateTgy: Reduce T 
SA and T must be reduced to very
below 90 sec. small values in order to get T 
= 90.
3. Potential Strategies: SA and T must be reduced to very
a) Semi-automation and/or small values in order to get T 
= 90.reduced update i terval
(Points B,C)
b) Better accuracy N/A
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combintial Stration of strategies Separation cannot be guaranteed
(e.g., Points E and F). according to SAUR ground rules.
4 Product: A preferred or For GS=500 ft, Will allow T=7
indicated set of design values. SA=100 ft (see discussion)
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6.1.5 Case 5
Cases 5A and 5B deal with possible problems associated with control
of supersonic aircraft.
6.1.5.1 Case 5A
This case concerns a very high performance military jet (YF-12) on
a collision course with a commercial jet (Boeing 747)
AC#2 (Boeing 747)
2250
43,000 ft
500 kt
Level
AC#1 (YF-12)
2700
43,000 ft
1200 kt
Level
Figure 30. Case 5 Encounter
Discussion
The most significant change during this and previous cases is the
very low command rate associated with this encounter at high altitudes and
low aircraft densities. Also, despite the fact that this is a quartering
tail chase, the controller can generate fairly large DCA's and therefore
points A, B and C once again fall within the SAUR curves. Because of the
low command rate, however, no combination of strategies will provide a
significantreduction in command rate. Therefore, Point A is a preferred
design point.
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Figure 31. Case 5 SAUR/CR Curves
Table 16. Case 5A SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) r =80 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=22 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below N/A
90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going to Point C drops CR to 9.
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced CR drop not significant.
update interval (Points B, C)
b) Better accuracy Going to Point D drops CR less than 1
comm/hr. CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy Starting point near T = 90. No
significant change.
d) Combination of strategies No combination of strategies will pro-
(e.g., Points E and F). vide a significant change in command
rate.
4. Product: A preferred or SAR=5,000 ft) Point A T =80 sec
indicated set of design values. T =25 sec ) CR=22 comm/hr
UI =10 sec
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6.1.5.2 Case 5B
Description
This case concerns two supersonic military aircraft (both YF-12's)
in a collision situation with each other.
AC#2 (YF-12)
1800
50,000 ft.
1200 kt
Level
AC#1 (YF-12)
0000
50,000 ft.
1200 kt
Level
Figure 32. Case 5B Encounter
Discussion
At first glance it might seem that two aircraft approaching each other
in a head-on collision situation at supersonic speeds might pose a difficult
collision avoidance problem. But precisely the opposite results evolve from
the SAUR formulation. With a decision time of 60 seconds, assuming a reaction
time of 25 seconds, an air traffic controller can generate a distance of
closest approach of about 30 miles. Because of the very low density of air-
craft at the assumed altitude, even the very high speeds involved produce
very modest command rates. Although not representative of any particular
surveillance concept, Point G was arbitrarily selected as a design point to
show that very relaxed accuracies up-date intervals in system reaction times
are possible for this case. Finally, because of the very low density at
that altitude and the very high speeds, the guaranteed separation was opened
up to 10,000 feet, although the res-lts for required surveillance accuracy
were virtually unaffected by this change.
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Figure 33. Case 5B SAUR/CR Curves
Table 17. Case 5B SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) T =31 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=23 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below N/A
90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going from Point A to Point C drops
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced CR to 10. CR change not significant.
update interval (Points B, C)
b) Better accuracy Going from Point A to Point drops CR
to 22. CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy If allow SA to go to 10 miles, this
allows r to go to 70 sec and CR goes
to 41. CR change not significant.
d) Combination of strategies No significant changes in CR for any
(e.g., Points E and F). combinations.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=50,000 ft) Point G =70 sec
cated set of design values. T =45 sec ) CR=41 comm/hr
UI =30 sec
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6.1.6 Case 6
Case 6 involves three parallel track situations: the first two at a
major airport and the third in controlled airways.
6.1.6.1 Cases 6A and 6B
Description
These cases deal with a parallel ILS approach situation involving two
air carrier jets (both Boeing 737's). The separation distance between the
ILS runways is 5,000 feet for Case 6A and 2,500 feet for Case 6B.
AC#2 (Boeing 737)
2700
2,000 ft.
150 kt
500 fpm
5,000 ft (Case 6A), 2,500 ft (Case 6B)
AC#1 (Boeing 737)
2700
2,000 ft.
150 kt
500 fpm
Figure 34. Case 6 Encounter
Discussion
As in Case 4, separation cannot be guaranteed according to the SAUR
formulation. A surveillance accuracy of 100 feet with an update interval
of one second and total system reaction time of 10.5 seconds (Point G) almost
makes the SAUR formulation. And considering the high quality of pilots and
controllers involved in all-weather instrument approaches to major airport
runways, the reduction of T from 12 to 10.5 seconds can probably be tolerated.
For Case 6B, however, the guaranteed separation must be reduced to 500 feet
and the system reaction time to 6 seconds. This is probably a questionable
design point. However, the SAUR analysis should probably be rerun with
reduced or restricted pilot-initiated maneuvers indicating more strategic
control.
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Figure 35. Case 6 SAUR/CR Curves
Table 18. Cases 6A and 6B SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) T =N/A (see discussion)
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=Approx. 4,000 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below N/A
90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Using a SAR of 300 ft allows T of only
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced 2 & 9 sec (cases A & B). Reduce T
update interval (Points B, C) (and update interval) not practical.CR changes with T are fairly large but
do not appear critical.
b) Better accuracy Going to a SAR of 100 ft allows T of
4 & 10.5 sec (cases A and B).
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies Allow GS to go to 500 ft. Allow a T
(e.g., Points E and F). of 6 sec. Then SAR must be 100 ft.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=100 ft ) T =N/A CASE 6A
cated set of design values. T =10.5 sec) CR=1,000 com/hr
UI =1 sec GS=1,000 ft
SAR=100 ft) P =N/A CASE 6B
T =6 sec ) CR=1,700 comm/hr
UI =1 sec GS=500 ft
75
6.1.6.3 Case 6C
Description
This case deals with two aircraft flying parallel tracks in any airway.
Their lateral separation is 5 miles. AC #1 (Boeing 737) is overtaking the
Citation.
AC#1 (Boeing 737)
0900
30,000 ft
500 kt
Level
5 n mi
AC#2 (Cessna Citation)
0900
30,000 ft
300 kt
Level
Figure 36. Case 6C Encounter
Discussion
The rationale and results of this parallel airway situation are very
similar to those in Case 1. The one-mile accuracy and one-second update
interval are again selected because shortening the reaction time greatly
reduces the communication load and improving the accuracy has a small
effect.
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Table 19. Case 6C SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) T =25 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=4,200 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below N/A
90 sec
3. Potential Strategies: Going from Point A to Point C drops
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced CR to 2,300. Change in CR is
update interval (Points B, C) significant.
b) Better accuracy Going from Point A drops CR to 3,700.
CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies Going to Point F, CR goes to 2,000.
(e.g., Points E and F). Change in CR over (3a) not significant.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5,000 ft) Point A
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) t =44 sec
UI =1 sec CR=2,300 comm/hr
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6.1.7 Case 7
Description
This case concerns a V-STOL aircraft (Twin Otter) and a helicopter
(Bell UH-1) on a collision course in a terminal area.
AC#2 (Bell UH-1)
2250
3,000 ft
90 kt
Level
AC#1 (Twin Otter)
00000
3,000 ft
150 kt
Level
Figure 38. Case 7 Encounter
Discussion
This case is somewhat different in that the slope of the CR curves
is less steep. The reduction in CR in going from Point A to Point D is
still less than going from Point A to Point C, but not by as large a factor
as in the earlier cases. Point G was selected because its CR penalty over
Point C was not very large and in recognition of the fact that today's
terminal radars do possess this capability.
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Figure 39. SAUR/CR Curves
Table 20. Case 7 SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) r =90 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=530 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below Going from Point A to Points B, C, D,
90 sec. or E reduces i to less than 90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going from Point A to Point D, CR
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced drops to 350. CR change not
update interval (Points B, C) significant.
b) Better accuracy Going from Point A to Point D, CR drops
to 420. CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies Going to T=19 sec, and SAR=2,500 ft
(e.g., Points E and F). drops CR to 400. CR improvement be-
tween 3a & 3b will less SAR & UI penalty.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=2,500 ft) Point G =73 sec
cates set of design values. T =19 sec ) CR=400 comm/hr
UI =4 sec
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6.1.8 Case 8
Description
This case considers an actual mid-air collision involving a Douglas
DC-9 and a Beechcraft Baron that took place near Urbana, Ohio on March 9,
1967. Details are available in the National Transportation Safety Board
Report (Reference 10).
AC#1 (DC-9)
2320
4,500 ft
323 kt
3,500 fpm descent
AC#2 (Beechcraft Baron)
1950
4,500 ft
170 kt
Level
Figure 40. Case Encounter
Discussion
Although this actual mid-air collision involved a tail case rather
than a near head-on case, the results are very similar. The rationale for
selection and the selected design point (5000-foot accuracy, one-second
update interval) are the same.
80
COMMANDS/HOUR
CR=2000 4000 6000 8000
20,000 -000
z z
co -
0 C B A S5,000 u
U
S10,000
u
.- z
0
"F E
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
TOTAL REACTION TIME (T, IN SEC)
Figure 41. SAUR/CR Curves
Table 21. Case 8 SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) T =100 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=4,300 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below It is necessary to reduce T to 12 sec,
90 sec. reduce SA below 2,000 ft, or some
suitable combination.
3. Potential Strategies: Going from Point A to Point C drops CR
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced to 2,400. CR change is significant.
update interval (Points B, C) T = 90.
b) Better accuracy Going from Point A to Point D drops CR
to 3,800. CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies Going to SAR of 2,500 ft and T=12 sec,
(e.g., Points E and F). CR drops to 2,000. CR change over 3a
is not significant.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5,000 ft) Point C
cated set of design values. T =12 sec ) =90 sec
UI =1 sec CR=2,400 comm/hr
81
6.1.9 Case 9
This case concerns an actual collision over Carmel, New York on
December 4, 1965 between Eastern Airlines Flight 843, a Lockheed Constel-
lation, and Trans World Airlines Flight 42, a Boeing 707. This case is
especially interesting in that the Lockheed Constellation was 1,000 feet
below the 707 but the pilot thought he was at the same altitude and pulled
up into the 707. Both aircraft were on IFR flight plans. Details are
available in the National Transportation Safety Board Report (Reference 8).
AC#1 (Boeing 707) AC#2 (Lockheed Constellation)
1050 2100
11,000 ft 10,000 ft (until pull-up)
450 kt 210 kt
Level Level (until pull-up)
Figure 42. Case Encounter
Discussion
The selection of the surveillance accuracy and update interval ration-
ale in Case 9 is very similar to Cases 1, 2 and 8; and the recommended design
point is also 5000 ft accuracy and one-second update interval. It should be
noted, however, in this particular case that the decision time of 61 seconds
is substantially larger than the amount of time the controller would have had
in order to avoid a collision in this case. The Constellation was not required
to have a flight recorder and was not carrying one. Therefore, the precise
time at which the Constellation pilot initiated his pullup is not clear.
Examination of the nominal Transportation Safety Board Report leads one to
believe that the Constellation initiated its collision causing maneuver
probably less than 30 seconds to impact. The SAUR parameters can be inferred
from the tau = 30 curve in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 43. The
unavoidable conclusion as applied here is that if two aircraft are allowed
to get fairly close together because it is assumed that they are going to
continue on their present flight paths, the pilots can then confound the
controller with surprise maneuver(s).
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Figure 43• SAURICR Curves
Table 22. Case 9 SAUR Selection
Rule Application
I. Starting Point (Point A) P =79 sec
*a-
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=5,900 comm/hr
90 sec.60 80
a) Semi automati on and/or reduced 3,200 CR change is significant
to 5,200. CR change not significant
significant.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5,000 ft) Point Ccated set of design values T =12 sec ) =61 sec
UI =1 sec CR=3,200 com /hr
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6.1.10 Case 10
Description
This case is an actual mid-air collision between a Hughes Air West
DC-9 and a Marine F-4 over Duarte, California on June 6, 1971. The collision
occurred at an altitude of 15,150 feet. The DC-9 was departing from Los
Angeles International Airport and the F-4 was descending to land at El Toro
MCAS. The F-4 transponder was inoperative. The National Transportation
Safety Board report on this accident has not been released as of the time
of this study. Data was taken primarily from the public media.
AC#2 (F-4)
1500
15,150 ft
420 kt
1,500 fpm (descent)
AC#1 (DC-9)
0410
15,150 ft
330 kt
2,000 fpm (climb)
Figure 44. Case Encounter
Discussion
Because this mid-air collision took place at an altitude of 15,000
feet, the assumed traffic density was fairly small and the resulting com-
mand communications load was fairly small. As a result, there was no strong
case for adopting Point C rather than Point A as the design point. However,
if this collision had occurred at, say, 9,000 feet near the Los Angeles
basin, the magnitude of the CR values would have been increased by a factor
of about 20. In this case, Point C would have been selected as the design
point, rather than Point A.
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Figure 45. SAUR/CR Curves
Table 23. Case 10 SAUR Selection
Rule Application
1. Starting Point (Point A) T =88 sec
SAR=5000 ft and T=25 sec CR=150 comm/hr
2. Minimum Strategy: Reduce T below N/A
90 sec.
3. Potential Strategies: Going from Point A to Point C, CR
a) Semiautomation and/or reduced drops to 66. CR change not
update interval (Points B, C) significant.
b) Better accuracy Going from Point A to Point D drops
CR to 52. CR change not significant.
c) Reduced accuracy N/A
d) Combination of strategies CR change is not significant for all
(e.g., Points E and F). strategies.
4. Product: A preferred or indi- SAR=5,000 ft) Point A
cated set of design values. T =25 sec ) =88 sec
UI =10 sec CR=150 comm/hr
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6.1.11 Case Study Summary
The results of the ten case studies are summarized in Table 24.
Examination of this table brings out the following points:
1. The cases span a broad range of aircraft types, phases
of flight, and types of airspace.
2. The indicated surveillance system accuracies span a wide
range, i.e., from less than 100 feet to greater than
10 miles.
3. The indicated surveillance system update interval does
not span such a large range; with one exception it varies
from 1 to 10 seconds.
4. A short update interval was indicated more often than was
high accuracy. Thus, methods of reducing total system
reaction time appear to be more important than increasing
surveillance accuracy.
6.2 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
6.2.1 Single Aircraft Response
There are several special cases that must be considered in the SAUR
analysis which involve limitations on the maneuvers of one or both aircraft.
The first important variation on the standard SAUR analysis is one in which
only one of the two aircraft maneuvers in response to a collision warning
command. This single aircraft response situation could result from the
fact that one pilot does not receive the message sent to him or is simply
unable to respond. It could also be the case if he were simply not equipped
to receive collision warning commands. The first case is obviously relevant
in a system failure mode analysis, whereas the second is relevant when
dealing with many aircraft types which may possess varying levels of capa-
bility and equipment. To investigate the effects of these single aircraft
response cases, the SAUR program is exercised using a reaction time greater
than the decision time for one of the two aircraft. Allowing the reaction
time of the other aircraft to vary as in the earlier cases. This had the
effect of not allowing the first aircraft to follow a commanded maneuver
at all. The results of this analysis for Cases 1, 2D, 3, and 10 are shown
in Figures 46 through 49. For simplicity, only the "tau equals 60" curves
(wich are representative of all tau curves) are plotted. Examination of
Figure 46 reveals that for the Boeing 737 air carrier descending toward a
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Table 24. Summary of Case Study Results
REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
CASE AIRCRAFT TYPES AIRSPACE TYPE(S) PARAMETERS
NUMBER DESCRIPTION NO. 1 NO. 2 AND PHASE(S) OF FLIGHT ACCURACY, FT. UPDATE INTERVAL, SEC.
1. AIR CARRIER DESCENDING TOWARD AIR- CESSNA BOEING MIXED OR CONTROLLED 5,000 1
PORT ENCOUNTERS LIGHT GENERAL 172 737 (SEE NOTE A)
AVIATION AIRCRAFT IN A LEVEL TURN 172=CRUISE
737=DESCENT/APPROACH
2. A NUMBER OF AIR CARRIER AND CESSNA BOEING MIXED OR CONTROLLED
LIGHT GENERAL AVIATION ENCOUNTERS a) 172 737 737-APPROACH OR DEPARTURE 5,000 1
INCLUDING CESNA 172/BOEING 737 b) 172 737 172-CRUISE 5,000 1
ENCOUNTERS FOR VARIOUS RELATIVE c) 172 737 3,000 1
BEARINGS; 737/737 AND 172/172 d) 737 737 5,000 1
HEAD-ON ENCOUNTERS; AND EN- e) 172 172 5,000 1
COUNTERS WHEREIN THE AIRCRAFT f) 172 737 5,000 1
ARE NOT INITIALLY ON A COLLISION g) 172 737 5,000 1
COURSE
3. MILITARY VERY HIGH PERFORMANCE LOCKHEED CESSNA MIXED OR CONTROLLED 5,000 4
JET IN A STEEP CLIMB FROM AIR- F-104 CITATION F-104=DEPARTURE
PORT ENCOUNTERS A GENERAL CITATION=CRUISE
AVIATION BUSINESS JET IN LEVEL
FLIGHT
4. TWO LIGHT GENERAL AVIATION AIR- CESNA EVANS . UNCONTROLLED, MIXED, OR 100 1
CRAFT IN VFR AIRPORT TRAFFIC 172 VOLKS- CONTROLLED (SEE NOTE B)
PATTERN ENCOUNTER PLANE LANDING/TAKEOFF
5.a) VERY HIGH PERFORMANCE (SUPER- BOEING LOCKHEED CONTROLLED 5,000 10
SONIC) MILITARY JET ENCOUNTERS 747 YF-12 CRUISE
AIR CARRIER IN LEVEL FLIGHT
b) A HIGH ALTITUDE ENCOUNTER BOEING LOCKHEED CONTROLLED 5,000 30
BETWEEN TWO SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT 747 YF-12 CRUISE
6. TWO AIRCRAFT IN PARALLEL TRACK BOEING BOEING CONTROLLED (RESULTS VALID 5,000
ENCOUNTER FOR MIXED)
a) PARALLEL RUNWAY (2500 FT. SEP.) a) 737 737 a) APPROACH/DEPARTURE a) 100(SEE NOTE C) 1
b) PARALLEL RUNWAY (5000 FT. SEP.) b) 737 737 b) APPROACH/DEPARTURE b) 100(SEE NOTE D) 1
c) PARALLEL AIRWAY (5 MILE SEP.) c) 737 CITATION c) CRUISE c) 5000 1
7. AN ENCOUNTER SITUATION SIMILAR TO DEHAVIL- BELL MIXED OR CONTROLLED 2,500 4
CASE 2, BUT INVOLVING A TWIN LAND UH-1 CRUISE, APPROACH,
OTTER AND A UH-1 BOTH MOVING AT TWIN DEPARTURE ON
SLOW SPEEDS AND IN RELATIVELY OTTER TRAFFIC PATTERN
CLOSE PROXIMITY
8. THE MARCH 1967 MID-AIR McDON- BEECH MIXED OR CONTROLLED 5,000 1
COLLISION BETWEEN A BEECH- NELL B-55 DC-9: ASCENT/APPROACH
CRAFT B-55 AND A McDONNELL DOUGLAS
DOUGLAS DC-9 NEAR URBANA DC-9 B-55: CRUISE
OHIO
9. THE 4 DECEMBER 1965 MID-AIR BOEING LOCKHEED MIXED OR CONTROLLED 5,000 1
COLLISION BETWEEN A BOEING 707 CONSTEL- CRUISE
707 AND A LOCKHEED CONSTEL- LATION
LATION NEAR CARMEL, NEW YORK
10. THE JUNE 1971 MID-AIR COLLISION McDON- McDON- MIXED OR CONTROLLED 5,000 10
BETWEEN A MARINE F-4 AND A NELL NELL F-4: CRUISE (OR APPROACH/
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9 NEAR DOUGLAS DOUGLAS DEPARTURE)
DUARTE, CALIFORNIA F-4 DC-9 DC-9: DEPARTURE (OR APPROACH
OR CRUISE)
NOTE A: "MIXED" AIRSPACE HERE IS EQUIVALENT TO THE FAA's "CONTROLLED" AIRSPACE. "CONTROLLED" AIRSPACE 
HERE IS EQUIVALENT
TO THE FAA's "POSITIVE CONTROL AIRSPACE (PCA)
NOTE B: SEPARATION CANNOT BE GUARANTEED ACCORDING TO SAUR GROUND RULES. FOR GS-500 
FEET, SA=100 FEET WILL ALLOW T=7 SEC.
NOTE C: SEPARATION CANNOT BE GUARANTEED ACCORDING TO SAUR GROUND RULES. FOR GS=1000 FEET, 
SA=100 FEET WILL ALLOW T=10.5 SEC.
FOR ALL T.
NOTE D: SEPARATION CANNOT BE GUARANTEED ACCORDING TO SAUR GROUND RULES. FOR 
GS=500 FEET, SA=100 FEET WILL ALLOW T=6 SEC.
FOR ALL T.
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Figure 47. Case 2D Single Aircraft Maneuvers
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general aviation Cessna 172, if the air traffic controller can get the 737
to respond, the.DCA he can provide is almost as large as when 
both aircraft
respond to his command. On the other hand, it does 
virtually no good to
have the 172 to maneuver if the 737 is still free to maneuver throughout
its much wider maneuvering envelope. This point arose consistently 
in
similar cases and agrees with one's intuition that the 
air traffic controller
has more control over the situation if he can get to the 
highest performance
aircraft and command that aircraft to maneuver. Since from the standpoint
of the aircraft ability to carry reliable and possibly redundant 
equipment,
the higher performance aircraft are more likely to be 
responsive to commands
than the low performance aircraft. Thus, the SAUR/CR results will probably
be valid even if an IPC concept is implemented involving a mix of 
fully and
partially equipped aircraft; the latter would possess 
only that equipment
required to make them visible to the system and 
not the equipment which
would allow them to receive collision warning commands.
Case 2D, shown in Figure 47 involves two high performance 
aircraft.
In fact, these are identical (Boeing 737) aircraft flying in a 
direct head-on
collision situation. In this case, because of the geometry of 
the situation,
it is almost mandatory that the controller be able to vector 
both aircraft.
The reason for this is that because of the symmetry of the situation, 
if
one aircraft is given a particular commanded maneuver in an attempt 
by the
controller to avoid a collision, it is possible for the other aircraft 
to,
in effect, fly the mirror image trajectory and still result in a mid-air
collision. Thus, the uncontrolled aircraft can "do enough 
mischief," even
with a single set of maneuvers, such that the maneuvers which can be per-
formed by the controlled aircraft during the escape time 
are not sufficient
to provide very large DCA's. Case 3, in Figure 48, is again 
a situation
involving two high performance aircraft. The performance difference 
between
the F-104 and the Citation is large enough however, such that the F-104 
is
clearly the preferred aircraft to command. As indicated in Figure 49, the
results for Case 10 are similar to those of Case 2D. Both aircraft are 
high
performance aircraft so that it doesn't matter 
which of the two aircraft
are controlled; but a substantial drop in DCA's occurs in 
the event that
either aircraft is not controllable.
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The foregoing results bring out three points:
* In the event that one aircraft is high performance and the
other is low performance, it is much more important to be
able to command the high performance aircraft. In fact,
from the standpoint of the SAUR formulation little is lost
if the low performance aircraft cannot be commanded.
* If both aircraft are high performance then the situation is
geometry-dependent. It may be necessary to be able to com-
mand both aircraft or it may be sufficient to command either.
In an operational situation, if the controller (or control
algorithm in the case of automatic control) were to make the
conservative assumption that only one aircraft would respond
to a command, then the situation such as the one indicated
in Case 2D could not be allowed to develop.
* If, in the course of more detailed analysis or in the pre-
liminary design phase of an advanced air traffic control
system, the decision is made to assume a single aircraft
response situation, then the surveillance accuracy and
update rate requirements could become more stringent. It
would appear that higher performance radar or LIT might
have to replace enroute radar unless control procedures
were altered. The question certainly warrants more analysis.
6.2.2 Different Reaction Times
The above case can be considered a special case of a more general
one wherein the two aircraft simply have different reaction times. Indeed,
it would be a coincidence in the real world situation if the two aircraft
did begin collision avoidance maneuvers at the same instant. The SAUR
Program was exercised in all ten cases allowing the two aircraft different
reaction times. The results may be summarized by comparing three
hypothetical cases:
* Case A: T1 = T2 = 30 seconds
* Case B: T1 = 40 seconds; T2 = 20 seconds
* Case C: T1 = 20 seconds; T2 = 40 seconds
* Aircraft 1 is high performance
e Aircraft 2 is low performance
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In cases such as this it was observed that the DCA's obtained in
Case B were smaller than for Case A since it took a longer time for the
higher performing aircraft to react, whereas Case C gave larger DCA's than
Case A since the higher performing aircraft had more time to maneuver.
These results were, of course, consistent with the case where one of the
two aircraft failed to maneuver at all.
6.2.3 Altitude-Only Maneuvers
Finally, as pointed out in Section 4 the SAUR Program in all cases
also computed DCA's where only altitude commands were allowed. The results
are shown in Table 25 and indicate quite clearly that much larger DCA's
are possible when horizontal commands can be used. Part b) of the list
shows as the reacton time becomes larger the difference bet ween the two
sets of DCA's becomes smaller. Finally, as T approaches tau the altitude
maneuvers become the preferred ones. In other words, if only a few seconds
are available for an escape maneuver the vertical maneuvers will provide a
larger DCA.
Clearly it would not be necessary to produce large DCA's in an
operational case. Sufficiency of DCA's and guaranteed separation associated
with a particular pair of commands is of most interest operationally. Thus,
it is recognized that there will be times when, for example, a vertical
maneuver will be preferable to a horizontal maneuver even though the latter
could guarantee a larger separation. The central point here, however, is
that increased DCA's and therefore relaxed surveillance accuracy require-
ments, larger update intervals, and larger total effective reaction times
can be allowed if horizontal as well vertical maneuvers are employed.
6.2.4 Effect of Variations in Guaranteed Separation Distance
In Section 2 it was pointed out that the assumed values of separation
distance used in deriving required surveillance accuracy from the distance
of closest approach were arbitrary. It is necessary at this point then to
evaiuat, L-he effect of variations in this input parameter. Recalling the
relationship:
SAR = 1 (DCA - GS)
2
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Table 25. Vertical Maneuvers
(a) All Cases (T=60, T1=T2=0
Case Horizontal Maneuvers Vertical Maneuvers Only
1 26,708 2.070
2A 25,280 1,540
3 57,650 29,950
4 5,010 10
5A 63,440 10,890
5B 447,300 1,830
6C 33,050 3,700
7 17,400 1,180
8 19,520 4,540
9 45,170 2,600
10 37,910 14,480
(b) Case 1 (Various T's, T's)
C172 B737 Vertical
THorizontal :Maneuvers
T T1  2 Maneuvers Only
40 0 0 15,425 1,383
20 20 1,363 728
30 30 621 394
35 35
40 40 412 344
60 0 0 26,708 2,070
10 10 6,948 1,404
20 20 2,598 786
30 30 1,708 465
60 60 465 465
80 0 0 37,443 3,772
20 20 13,318 2,885
30 30 8,138 2,609
40 40 2,743 2,266
60 60 2,069 976
80 80 912 524
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Various sets of SAR scales (consistent with various assumed values of GS)
can be shown on the DCA vs T vs T curves. Figure 50 shows the effect of
varying the guaranteed separation parameter for Case 2A. The right side of
Figure 50 shows four different scales of surveillance accuracy corresponding
to input values of GS of 0, 1,000 feet, 5,000 feet, and 10,000 feet. The
0 and 1,000 foot cases essentially look alike. At first glance it would
appear that as GS is increased from 1,000 to 5,000 and then to 10,000 feet,
since the resulting SAR is thereby decreased from 5,000 to 2,600 and then
to 500 feet, that the surveillance system choice might go from enroute radar
to terminal radar to LIT on that basis. Surprisingly, this does not turn
out to be the case. As GS is increased from 1,000 to 10,000 feet, point C
moves up to C prime and the other five points move up in the same fashion.
If one then goes through the same thought process as before, C prime is
preferable to A prime or F prime for the same reason that C was preferable
to A and F before, i.e., a significant decrease in CR for the introduction
of data link and an insignificant decrease in CR as a result of going to
higher accuracies. Although figures for the other nine cases are not shown,
this result is fairly typical. Cases 4 and 6 are obvious exceptions, since
separation could not be guaranteed under the SAUR ground rules in these
cases. An increase in GS will usually not change the recommended
surveillance/communication implementation. In Case 10, it does appear that
a change of recommended implementation from enroute radar to terminal radar
and/or data link would take place if GS were increased to 10,000 feet.
In summary, it does not appear that the effect of varying GS within
the ranges indicated is a major factor; but it probably should be given
some attention in the preliminary design phase.
6.2.5 Effect of Surveillance Errors
The SAUR Program defines what the surveillance system overall position
accuracy must be in order to guarantee a given separation distance. It is
conservative in the sense that the position errors for the two aircraft
(w..he.ther or not they are equal) are considered to be in the direction of
the position vectors from each aircraft to the other.
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On the other hand, the SAUR Program does not explicitly take into
account the velocity and acceleration errors which exist at the I epoch.
The question is whether these errors for a given set of parameters (i.e.,
surveillance system type, filter type and pre-r aircraft dynamics) as
propagated throughout the decision time are significant with respect to
range of values in the uncontrolled and controlled parameters used in SAUR.
Section 7 describes what the surveillance errors are likely to be
for four different aircraft types on four types of trajectories. The
results for two different surveillance systems using varying levels of
filter sophistication are shown. The errors listed are the RSS of ortho-
gonal components carried in the filter program.
Regarding the nature and the effect of these errors the following
points are relevant:
I. The surveillance accuracy in general will be different
for the two aircraft.
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2. The position uncertainty for the two aircraft will
increase with time following the decision epoch.
3. The relative magnitude of the components of initial
surveillance error can influence the determination of
which maneuvers result in the estimated* DCA.
If the results of runs 6 and 23 of Section 7 (shown in Table 25) are
applied to the nominal positions and velocities at the T epoch, it is pos-
sible to determine how position uncertainty increases with time from the
decision epoch. Only the horizontal components of the average position and
velocity from these cases errors are shown in Table 25, but the vertical
case will be considered here. If the speed or velocity and acceleration
uncertainties of Table 25 were allowed to propagate over 60 seconds accord-
into the formula
P + Vt + 1/2 At
2
the resulting position determination uncertainty would be over 20,000 feet
for both runs 23 and 6. Fortunately, the actual aircraft dynamics will
almost invariably prevent such very large propagated position errors.
Each of the surveillance error types will now be discussed. It will be
seen that with one exception the SAUR Program already assumes the worst
situation that is physically possible, and is therefore conservative.
Speed or Linear Velocity Uncertainty
In this case the SAUR Program is slightly non-conservative. For
example, a Cessna 172 presumably traveling at 170 feet per second is made
by the SAUR Program to accelerate to its maximum speed at its maximum
acceleration capability. Given the velocity uncertainty shown on Line 2,
....im. . is used here t o include the effct of propagated surveil-
lance errors.
These runs are roughly comparable to the aircraft types and trajectories
for the SAUR Case 1 exemplified in Section 6.1.1. Both runs reflect a
radar type surveillance system using 6-state variable Kalman filter.
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Run 23 Run 6
1. Position Uncertainty 2 2 (52)22
at T.(ft) J(493)2+(468) =679 /( 5 2 7 ) 2 +(2836) =2884
2. Velocity Uncertainty 2
at T.(ft/sec) V(56)2+(76)2=94 (68) (144)2=159
3. Acceleration 2 2 2
Uncertainty at (7.4)2+(7.4) =10.5 (8.5) (8.2) =11.8
. (ft/sec 2 )
it actually could have been at V max already. Comparing the linear
distances traveled in 60 seconds:
* Nominal: 170(60) = 10,200 feet
* SAUR: 1/2 (170+220) (25) + 220(35) = 12,575 feet
* Possible: 220(60) = 13,200 feet
It is seen that the SAUR Program in allowing for aircraft maneuvers, also
very nearly allows for velocity uncertainty. In the case of high perform-
ance aircraft the ratio of velocity uncertainty to velocity should probably
be smaller producing an even more favorable situation. A SAUR run was made
using Case 1, which verifies this analysis.
Acceleration Uncertainty
The SAUR Program already allows an instantaneous change to the max
acceleration capability of the aircraft. Larger acceleration uncertainties
which might be obtained from the filter mechanization analysis would not
be physically possible.
Heading Errors
Here the SAUR Program again assumes the worst situation but in a
different way. Consider the two aircraft shown in Figure 51. The air
traffic controller assumes that the aircraft have velocity vectors V1 and
V2 respectively. If they have heading (or velocity) uncertainty as
represented by El and e2 (or U 1 and U2), they could actually be on a
direct collision course, with velocity vectors Wl and W2. But the col-
lision situation is precisely what the SAUR Program is already set up to
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investigate. From an operational standpoint the controller would tend to
treat the V /V2 case as though it were the head-on Wl/W2 case, which makes
an assessment of velocity and acceleration errors for any surveillance
system vital to the system design process. In this case, however, the
W1/W2 case was the one which was visually examined. The W1/W 2 case can
be non-conservative. For example, suppose the controller assumed on the
basis of his surveillance data that the W1/W 2 case existed and commanded
aircraft #1 to turn left, and aircraft #2 to turn right. If they were
actually on flight paths V1/V2 they would not be turning toward each other,
thus reducing the DCA and SAR. This phenomenon was investigated briefly
in Cases 2F and 2G and changes appeared to be insignificant. In retro-
spect, however, it is felt that the subject needs to be quantitatively
investigated further in order to establish adequate confidence in these
results, because they do lie on the non-conservative side of the truth.
AIRCRAFT # 1
W1
V
U
U2
V 2
E2
AIRCRAFT #2
Figure 51. Effect of Heading Errors
Vertical Errors
The SAUR altitude program likewise allows the maximum climb rate and
descent rate physically possible. Therefore, any uncertainties in vertical
speed which are physically realizable can be analyzed by the SAUR Program.
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6.3 COMPARISON OF SAUR WITH OTHER ATC ANALYSES
It is of interest to compare SAUR with other ATC studies dealing with
the subject of aircraft separation hazards and conflict resolution. Three
such studies are: "Separation Hazard Criteria," by Holt and Marner
(Volume II of Reference 1), "Data Acquisition System Design Considerations,"
by Blake and Smith, (Volume II of Reference 1) and "Navigation/Traffic
Control Satellite Mission Study," by Craigie, et al (Reference 33). The
results of these studies are compared with SAUR. Although each study
contains unique constraints or assumptions, quantitative differences still
provide an insight into the effect of these assumptions on particular
aircraft situations.
6.3.1 "Separation Hazard Criteria" -- Holt and Marner
This analysis is similar to SAUR in several respects. It seeks to
define a horizontal and vertical hazard region R* (t)=R 2(t)-R 1(t) and z*(t)=
z2(t)-zl(t) and to predict the hazard region (under certain assumptions over
a period of time, called the total escape time, te If the region satis-
fies given safe passage criteria, i.e., IR(t)l > p and Iz(t)l > h, (where p
and h are selected constants), then intervention can be deferred until the
next decision time.
The predicted hazard region takes into account: t2
1. Intended flight path of the aircraft [R(o ) , R ()t , R() - ]
2. Surveillance position and velocity measurement errors
(AR,A ).
3. Deviation from intended flight path, including flight
technical errors and "freedom of choice afforded to the
pilot," which can include position, velocity and accel-
eration terms [F(t)].
*The notation of the reference is used here where capital letters denote
vectors and small letters scalars.
te is equivalent to T used in this report.
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For the situation where there are no intended accelerations, it is sufficient
to show for safe passage that
R + R)(o)t > at 2 + bt + c over the predicted interval where
a = acceleration included in item 3, above;
b = the velocity term in 3. above + the surveillance error in
velocity;
c = the position term in 3. above + surveillance position
error + p.
Numerical examples for several different ground-based surveillance systems
are given using this approach. Within these examples, one type represents
a fairly well defined flight corridor situation (A + 0.1g); another type
defines a "considerable freedom" case (a = 0.5g). The latter is chosen for
comparison with SAUR.
First, however, the expected surveillance accuracy for the enroute
ATCRBS is compared from the reference and from Section 7 of the report.
The reference gives, over the prediction interval, a position error of
JAR + ARtel total 32,700 feet (3a). This includes smoothed position and
derived velocity errors using an cB filter and the lag errors associated
with 0.5g accelerations. From Section 7, Run Number 3 (737 aircraft, same
surveillance system, a- filter, and moderate turn trajectory), a position
error of 31,500 feet over the same time interval is indicated.
Comparing hazard results, it is seen that for a delay time of 18 sec-
onds and a total escape time of 37 seconds, the reference shows a half-width
hazard or alarm region of 47,300 feet, which includes the above surveillance
error, 13,900 feet for 0.5g freedom and 600 feet minimum passing distance.
SAUR (Figure 11) indicates that it would be barely possible to guarantee
600 feet separatiod for a delay time of 18 seconds and a T of 40 seconds
even with a perfectly accurate surveillance system giving data at 10 second
intervals. Another way of regarding Figure 11 is that for a (roughly)
2500 foot surveillance it would require a T of about 70 seconds to guarantee
the separation for the same delay time. The difference in results would
have to be attributed to what the definition of "considerable freedom" is
in the two methods.
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6.3.2 "Data Acquisition System Design Considerations" -- Neal 
A. Blake
and Edward E. Smith
This approach is a deterministic model which treats the particular
problems of required runway or airway separation distances 
in the face of
navigation or flight technical error, data acquisition error, 
and update
rate. The models are based on the concept of normal operating zones 
(NOZ)
or lane width, and a buffer zone between lanes. The relationships 
are
developed under the constraint that an aircraft will be given 
a command at
some point which will prevent him from entering the buffer 
zone. Figure 52
was reproduced from the reference to aid the reader in visualizing the
situation.
By definition, the above buffer zone width is essentially 
equivalent
to the GS of this study. For one set of results the reference 
used the
following parameters:
Aircraft Velocity 150 knots
Maximum turn-away rate 1.5
0/second
Response time 5 seconds
Recovery maneuver rate 3
0/second
Width of buffer zone 500 feet
Update interval 4 seconds
SAUR was run with similar parameters except for the maximum turnaway 
(or
pilot-initiated maneuver), which was 5
0/sec in SAUR. To get a better
comparison, the Blake-Smith method was used to 
compute NOZ for 2500 feet
runway separation and a turnaway rate of 5
0/sec. The results indicate
that to achieve the runway separation of 2500 feet, a NOZ of approximately
100 feet would be required and the equivalent delay would 
be abut 10 sec-
onds. Figure (Case 6A) indicates that to achieve runway separation 
and
guaranteed separation of 500 feet at the given surveillance 
accuracy and
update rate, the reaction time would have to 
be about 7 seconds. These
results are reasonably close considering some of the subtleties 
involved.
For example, SAUR starts the aircraft 100 feet closer together; 
also,
Equivalent delay was computed from the 5-second response 
time, 4-second
update interval and the time required to cross the DAS 
error -- to obtain
equivalence with SAUR delay time, T.
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Figure 52. Turnoff and Recovery Geometry - Position Only
Case (Taken from Reference 1)
since it was found in this example that it takes only 3 seconds to traverse
the NOZ, it is probable (see Figure 2) that a DA sample for action would
show the aircraft already outside the NOZ. An interesting observation is
that the reference uses a NOZ to determine the initiation of the action;
SAUR essentially creates an equivalent NOZ depending on the circumstances.
At 5000 feet runway separation and a realistic (commensurate with
navigation accuracy) NOZ of 600 feet, the reference indicates a required
surveillance accuracy of about 720 feet and an equivalent delay of 9.7 sec-
onds. (Figure (Case 6B) shows good agreement with these parameters, show-
ing a required delay time of about 10 seconds for a similar data acquisition
accurancy.
6.3.3 "Navigation Traffic Control Satellite Mission Study" -Craigie, et al
The mission study also used a deterministic model (similar to Blake
and Smith) designed to analyze relationships between surveillance accuracy,
update interval and separation standards for IFR traffic such as the North
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Atlantic routes. Using the mission study surveillance model and the
appropriate data from Case 6C in the SAUR analysis yields update 
interval
requirements of 0.2 to 1.0 sec-nds for the Boeing 737 and 3 to 15 
seconds
for the Citation, as compared with the one second figure obtained here.
This assumes a surveillance accuracy of 300 feet and heading errors of 30 ,
which is the case most comparable to the SAUR analysis. Different update
intervals were obtained for the two aircraft since, in the Reference 27
formulation, each aircraft is controlled individually in the event it deviates
from its assigned flight path. The difference between the results of the two
studies can be attributed directly to the difference in the assumed pertur-
bation maneuvers by the two aircraft.
6.3.4 Comparison with Probabalistic Analyses
By its deterministic nature, SAUR is difficult to compare directly
with techniques which employ pro-abilistic estimates of collision risk,
maneuver dynamics, navigation accuracy, and other parameters, as, for
example, in References 34 and 35. This is not to say that 
comparisons are
not ultimately possible since certainly probabilities can be assigned 
to
the parameters used in SAUR. As pointed out by Dr. Koenke in Reference 
34,
"....prediction of potential threats could be quite tedious and time-
consuming....if maneuvers are limited to standard maneuvers within 
a
control region, then calculations for potential threat evaluation are
very straightforward.... ." The need for answers encompassing large 
air-
craft populations is recognized. Nevertheless, under circumstances 
where
the number of aircraft is limited, such as in parallel approach and 
land-
ing, it is found that comparable results occur. A final example, 
in
Reference 35, the relationship between surveillance accuracy, update 
rate
and runway separation shows that 5000 feet runway separation and an update
interval of 4 seconds require a surveillance accuracy of about 700 
feet.
Dr. Koenke also brings out a point that is quite relevant in evaluat-
ing the validity of the SAUR/CR results. This point has to 
do with the
application of a 2-body formulation such as SAUR to 
the n-body problem
which is the "real world". The present aircraft-pair capability may
appear as a serious limitation. It would be desirable to 
increase the
capability to include large numbers of aircraft but this 
would be prohib-
itive in computation time. It is not unreasonable to increase 
the
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capacity to three or perhaps four aircraft. However, as pointed out in
Reference 34 the probability of simultaneous threats is small. Koenke's
analysis shows that the probability of encountering one intruder and then
encountering a second intruder while the system is resolving the first
conflict is 1 part in 106 for the New York terminal area, using 1968
statistics, a terminal flight time of 20 minutes and a system warning time
of 30 seconds. In future efforts this type of analysis should be applied
to the given scenarios to determine if the surveillance capability must
be increased beyond that indicated by the SAUR Program.
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7. FILTER MECHANIZATION STUDY
The objective of the filter mechanization portion of the SAUR study
was to determine the accuracy with which the state (i.e., the position and
velocity of the various aircraft) can be estimated and how this accuracy
depends on the surveillance system, aircraft dynamics, and data processing
(filtering) procedure.
7.1 METHODOLOGY
The performance of the separation assurance function is dependent 
on
the accuracy with which the state (i.e., the position and velocity) of the
various aircraft can be estimated. The accuracy of the state estimate
depends on three major factors - surveillance accuracy and update rate, air-
craft dynamics, and the data processing (filtering) procedure. The problem
is complicated by the fact that there are several types of surveillance
systems, a wide variety of aircraft with differing dynamics, and many fil-
tering techniques. Just as in the accuracy/update rate analysis an ade-
quate cross-section of the various possibilities must be examined 
in suffi-
cient detail to allow meaningful conclusions to be reached.
This is accomplished in the following manner. The two types of air-
craft surveillance systems which seem most representative of systems likely
to be used in ATC applications over the next two decades are the presently
existing ATCRBS (Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System) and a proposed
multi-lateration system similar to the LIT concept developed in Reference
2. Since they also essentially span the performance spectrum likely in this
time span, both are considered in this study. First, the wide range of air-
craft that will use domestic airspace are broken down into five classes. In
this analysis, aircraft considered to be representative of this spectrum are
used - although only four cases will be required. Four different filters of
varying levels of complexity are considered and the tradeoffs between 
filter
performance and filter complexity are examined. In this manner, 
the various
relevant possibilities are considered and their performance compared.
7.2 AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Two substantially different types of aircraft surveillance systems
have been proposed for application to the air traffic control problem.
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The first is an extension of the presently existing Air Traffic Control
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS); the second is a multilateration system using
either satellites or ground stations. Since the characteristics of these
systems differ considerably, both are considered in this study.
The ATCRBS concept, commonly referred to as secondary radar, was
established as the National Standard in 1961 and its mandatory use in posi-
tive control airspace was required. As of January 1968, the system was
being used in 89 civil ground stations in enroute areas and by 109 stations
in terminal areas. The FAA has established the ATCRBS system as the primary
source of identity, altitude, and position information in the presently
evolving semi-automated ATC system, scheduled to be completed in 1973.
Three separate measurements are made by the ATCRBS system: range,
azimuth, and altitude. The range and azimuth measurements are made by the
radar itself, while the altitude measurements is made by the aircraft alti-
meter and is transmitted to the ground station by the aircraft transponder
as part of the radar ranging signal.
The National Standard (Reference 36) has specified that the ATCRBS
systems must have a range accuracy of +1000 feet and an azimuth accuracy of
+1.00 (at the display). However, observations of existing operational ground
stations indicate a somewhat better performance than that dictated by the
National Standard. The average observed accuracy of the ATCRBS (Reference
37) was found to be:
Range Bias: 380 feet (1 sigma)
Azimuth Bias: 0.25 degrees (1 sigma)
The ATCRBS ground stations utilize a directional antenna having a typical
beamwidth of 40. The sweep period (time to rotate 3600) is 10 seconds.
While in the beam, each aircraft can be interrogated at a rate of 1200
times per second. The average time duration in the beam (per sweep) is
approximately 0.11 seconds; hence, 132 samples can be obtained. The noise
on each range measurement (due to transponder reply jitter and variations
in pulse rise times) is approximately 110 feet. Since changes in the air-
craft-radar geometry will be small during each 0.11 second interrogation
interval, we shall assume that all of the 132 measurements will be averaged
and only this average used for updating the filter. Then, the equivalent
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data rate provided by the ATCRBS system is 1 sample per 10 seconds and the
equivalent measurement noise is 10 feet (i.e., 10=110/ 132).
The accuracy of the altitude measurement will depend on the aircraft
instrumentation, installation error (which includes effects of aircraft
airspeed, altitude, mach number, and configuration), and flight technical
error. Munnikhuysen, in Reference 1, indicates that typical figures for
general aviation and newer types of transports should exhibit 3a errors 
of
665 feet and 420 feet respectively. He also projects a "possible" error of
260 to 285 feet (3a). Since the horizontal errors will normally be much
larger, for simplicity this analysis assumes an altitude bias error 
of 100
feet (la) and noise intensity of 25 feet (1a).
A rough indication of the level of accuracy which can be obtained from
the ATCRBS system is provided by the following analysis. The error in
measured aircraft position, AP, due to the range, azimuth, and altitude
biases is given by the expression
AP = L r + (380.) + (100.) 1/2
where r denotes the aircraft range. The position error, AP varies with
range as indicated below:
Range Position Error
0. n.miles 393. feet
25. n.miles 763. feet
100. n.miles 2647. feet
Thus, while the accuracy of the ATCRBS system is acceptable close in, it
degrades rapidly with increasing range.
The ATCRBS surveillance model is summarized in the table below.
ATCRBS Surveillance Model
Measurement Bias (la) Noise (II)
Altitude 380. feet 10. feet
Azimuth .25 degree .10 degree
Altitude 100. feet 25. feet
Surveillance Data Rate: 1 measurement every 10 seconds
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A number of multilateration techniques have been proposed for ATC
applications. One such system has been studied extensively (Reference 2)
for NASA. This system would provide position updates about every 1.0 to
1.3 seconds. The accuracy of the surveillance system varies somewhat
(+25%) with position; hence, average values for the continental United
States will be used. The multilateration surveillance model is summarized
in the table below.
Multilateration Surveillance Model
Measurement Bias (lI) Noise (la)
Lateral Position 180. feet 15. feet
Longitudinal Position 180. feet 15. feet
Vertical Position 300. feet 15. feet
Surveillance Data Rate: 1 measurement per second
7.3 FLIGHT ERROR MECHANISMS
The three major factors which cause an aircraft to deviate from its
intended trajectory are 1) navigation errors, 2) flight technical errors,
and 3) environmental effects. Navigation errors; which might be simply.
the result of limitations in the design of the Navigation System or caused
by pilot error, are of such long term that they may be neglected in the
filter mechanization evaluation. Flight technical errors are those devia-
tions which result from errors by either the pilot or aircraft (including
its instruments, etc.). Environmental effects include all errors which
arise from sources external to the aircraft (e.g., atmospheric turbulence)
and are considered in this study.
The flight technical errors were modeled as deviations from the in-
tended nominal in the speed, altitude, heading, and rate-of-climb (or
descent) of the aircraft. Each of these errors was represented as a zero
mean gaussian random variable which was added directly to the aircraft
dynamics as perturbing state noise. These error sources were modeled as
ueIng mutlually unco,,rrelated. It was assumed that during nominally level
flight the pilot would attempt to hold a constant altitude and that during
ascending or descending flight he would attempt to hold some specified rate
of descent. Therefore, altitude variations were modeled by using the
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altitude error source during nominally level flight and by using the rate
of ascent (descent) error source during ascending or descending portions 
of
flight. The standard deviations for each of these gaussian 
variables was
obtained from the data in the track-keeping portion of the aircraft 
perform-
ance characteristics.
The problem of accurately characterizing the environmental 
effects
(turbulence, wind gusts, etc.) which perturb the motion of aircraft 
is
difficult because of the wide variety of possible atmospheric conditions.
Nevertheless, a considerable amount of research has been conducted 
on the
subject in recent years. The work which seems most relevant to this study
is contained in References 38, 39, and 40.
Four significant facts are evident.
1) Significant air turbulence occurs rather infrequently.
The probability that turbulence of "moderate" or "severe"
intensity (as evaluated by pilots) will be encountered
during a 100-mile segment of a flight is less than 5%.
2) When turbulence occurs, the correlation between the verti-
cal, longitudinal, and lateral components of gust velocity
is high. Measurements show correlations varying from a
low of .793 to a high of .971.
3) Turbulence tends to increase with altitude up to the
tropopause.
4) Although the distribution of gust velocities is
probably not truly gaussian (probability densities
from experimental data are somewhat broader than
that of a gaussian density), a gaussian distri-
bution will serve as an adequate model.
The turbulence model which was adopted for this study was derived
from that developed in Reference 39. The turbulence is modeled as a highly
correlated random gaussian vector which exerts velocity increments 
to the
vertical, longitudinal, and lateral components of the aircraft velocity.
This is equivalent to state noise on the velocity components 
of the state
vector. The values which were used for the standard deviations 
of this
gaussian vector - 2.3 ft/sec vertical, and 3.0 ft/sec lateral 
and longi-
tudinal - were taken directly from Table XIII of Reference 
39.
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These values were derived (in Reference 39) from a vast quantity of
experimental data taken in the 30,000 to 70,000 foot altitude range. They
represent the "average" amount of turbulence in this region. As noted pre-
viously, however, the intensity of turbulence may vary widely and the
"average" value may be completely unrepresentative of a "worst case" situ-
ation. Therefore, simulations will be performed with the above values in-
creased by a factor of five to simulate "worst case" turbulence conditions.
7.4 AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORIES
The set of aircraft trajectories which will be used to evaluate the
performance of the various filters will now be defined. The basic require-
ment on this set is that it should represent a reasonable range of aircraft
maneuvers which the ATC surveillance system is likely to encounter. Five
trajectories appear to be sufficient to accomplish this:
Trajectory A: Straight and Level Flight
T = 0 to T = 120 seconds: Straight and level flight
Trajectory B: Level Turn (Standard to Moderate Rate)_
T = 0 to T = 30 seconds: Straight and level flight
T = 30 to T = 90 seconds: Level Turn (standard to moderate rate)
T = 90 to T = 120 seconds: Straight and level flight
Trajectory C: Level Turn (High Rate)
T = 0 to T = 30 seconds: Straight and level flight
T = 30 to T = 90: Level Turn (high rate)
T = 90 to T = 120 seconds: Straight and level flight
Trajectory D: Descent with Turn (Standard to Moderate Rate)
T = 0 to T = 30 seconds: Straight and level flight
T = 30 to T = 90 seconds: Steep Descent with Turn (standard
to moderate rate)
T = 90 to T = 120 seconds: Straight and level flight
Trajectory E: Stop and Hover (Helicopter only)
T = 0 to T = 30 seconds: Straight and level flight
T = 30 to T = 90 seconds: Stop and hover
T = 90 to T = 120 seconds: Straight and level flight
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The specific values of the various parameters used in the trajectory
description will depend on the particular aircraft involved. A table
listing the values of these parameters for each of the classes of aircraft
under consideration is presented in Table 26.
Table 26. Aircraft Parameters used in Filter
Mechanization Trajectories
Class I Class II Class III Class IV
Parameter YF-12 B737 Citation UH-1
Airspeed (ft/sec) 2,533.3 760.0 422.2 
168.9
Low-Moderate Turn Rate 1.5 1.5 3.0 6.0
(deg/sec)
Rapid Turn Rate (deg/sec) 2.83 2.42 4.48 
10.91
Descent Rate (ft/sec) 83.33 16.66 16.66 40.00
Altitude (ft) 60,000. 40,000. 25,000. 10,000.
Range to ATCRBS Radar (ft) 608,000. 608,000. 152,000. 60,800.
At T = 0 the aircraft is located at the specified distance from the
ATCRBS radar and is flying directly toward it at the indicated airspeed.
Then, the appropriate maneuver described in the trajectory scenario is
executed.
7.5 DESCRIPTION OF FILTERS
One of the principal objectives of this study is to examine the
tradeoff between filter performance and filter complexity. This type of
analysis is useful from two standpoints. First, it will provide qualita-
tive insight into the relative importance of various aspects of the air-
craft dynamics (for example, it would answer questions such as: "How much
is the filter performance degraded by assuming that the aircraft's velocity
is constant between updates?") Second, it would provide a quantitative
basis for making a detailed optimal tradeoff in the allocation of available
computer space between the filter and the separation assurance algorithm.
The above-stated objective will be accomplished by considering a
sequence of four filters arranged in an ascending order of complexity.
The first is an extremely simple constant coefficient filter. The second
is a substantially more complex six state variable (position, velocity)
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Kalman filter; its computer requirements (memory and computational time)
are approximately five times those of the first filter. The third and
fourth are even more complex nine state variable [(position, velocity,
acceleration) and (position, velocity, measurement bias)] Kalman filters
whose computational requirements are approximately ten times those of the
first filter. Each will be described in detail in subsequent portions of
this section.
The following formulation will provide a convenient representation
for defining the filters. The aircraft dynamics will be expressed in
state variable form as
x w.
1
where
: denotes the system state vector at ti
li: denotes the state transition matrix from ti to ti+1
wi: denotes the random gaussian vector of state noise
representing the flight technical errors and
environmental effects
The relationship between the surveillance measurements and the state
vector is
Y Mi xi +vi
where
Yi: denotes the vector of surveillance measurements at ti
M: denotes the measurement matrix
vi: denotes the random gaussian vector representing the
noise on each of the surveillance measurements
The following notation will be adopted and used in the subsequent
filter descriptions.
E : denotes the expectation operator
i=  E I w
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= E v ]
w. E w.
xi: denotes the state estimate at ti prior to update
-1x.: denotes the 
state estimate at ti after update
= E i - x i) -i x)-i
7.5.1 Simple a-B Constant Coefficient Filter
This filter is the simplest of the four filters and has the least
demanding computational requirements. In its basic form, it consists of
two prespecified gains which are used to update the state. It does not
require the computation of any covariance matrices.
This filter uses a 6-element state vector. The first three components
are the position coordinates; the last three are the velocity components.
The filter equations are given below
xi = i +Ki (Yi- M -)
where
1 0 0 T 0 0
0 1 0 0 T 0
0 0 1 0 0 T
-i 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
_0 0 0 0 0 1
with T being the sample interval.
Although this filter can be constructed in an arbitrary coordinate
system, the complexity of the expression for the gain matrix Ki 
is
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significantly reduced if the coordinates of the filter and surveillance
system are coincident. We shall assume this to be the case. Then, the
expression for the gain matrix Ki is simply
a 0 0
0 a 0
0 0 a
K. =
-1 B/T 0 0
0 /T 0
0 0 B/T
for the cases of interest in this study where the measurement vector con-
sists of a position measurement along each of the three coordinates. Note
that Ki does not change with time and that it is completely specified by
the constants a and B along with the sample interval T.
If a and B are appropriately selected, the performance of this filter
in steady state situations can be extremely good. However, its transient
behavior is less impressive.
7.5.2 Six State Kalman Filter
This filter is a classical 6 state variable Kalman filter which pro-
duces a minimum variance state estimate. It has an intermediate degree of
complexity. As with the a-B filter, the first three components of the
state vector are the position coordinates; the last three are the velocity
components. The filter equations are given below
T
+1  i 1 i + i
1 = ( )T T -1
x. = .+ K. -M.
L -1 I -1 -i -1
= Li + Ki -i i
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where the transition matrix i. is identical to that used with the a-
filter.
The performance of this filter should show a moderate improvement
over that of the a-a filter under steady state conditions and a substantial
improvement in transient situations. The two major limitations on its per-
formance which result from the limited size of the state vector are
1) The acceleration vector is not estimated and is assumed
to be zero.
2) Biases in the surveillance system are not estimated
and likewise assumed to be zero.
These defects should not produce a significant degradation in performance
when used with the satellite-based multilateration system due to its high
accuracy and rapid data rate. However, their effect should be considerably
more pronounced when used with the ATCRBS system.
7.5.3 Nine State Kalman Filter (Pos., Vel., and Acc.)
This filter, the most complex of those under consideration, is an
extension of the preceeding filter; it was formed by adding the three
components of acceleration to the state vector. The filter equations
are identical to those given for the six state variable Kalman filter.
Of course, the vectors and matrices have dimension nine instead of six.
For this case the state transition matrix becomes
1 0 0 T 0 0 T2/2 0 0
0 1 0 0 T 0 0 T2/2 0
0 0 1 0 0 T 0 0 T2 /2
0 0 0 1 0 0 T 0 0
i 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 T 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 T
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
The addition of the three acceleration components to the state vector should
produce an improvement in the performance during transient situations 
in-
volving large accelerations (rapid turns, etc.) if the update rate is
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sufficiently rapid so that the acceleration does not change significantly
between updates. If this condition is violated, the performance of this
filter may be worse than that of the simpler filters considered previously.
For "normal" low acceleration flight, all three filters should produce
essentially the same results.
7.5.4 Nine State Kalman Filter (Pos., Vel., and Meas. Biases)
This filter has the same level of complexity as the previous one;
in fact, it was formed by merely replacing the three components of accele-
ration in the state vector with the three measurement biases. For this
case the state transition matrix becomes.
1 0 0 T 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 T 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 T 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
The motivation for considering this type of filter was the belief
that the biases in the surveillance systems would be a dominant factor
limiting system performance. If these biases could be accurately esti-
mated, the performance should be substantially improved.
7.6 SIMULATION DESCRIPTION
In evaluating the performance of a filter, one must consider both
the "real world" and the "filter world." The "real world" is a model
which represents all of the significant error sources which influence the
performance of the system; it represents reality. The "filter world" con-
sists of those error sources which the filter models and represents.
Thus, the "filter world" is the filter's simplified model of the "real
world" and is determined by the filter design. If one were to evaluate
a given filter in its own "filter world" (i.e., consider only those error
sources which the filter modeled), one would obtain an overly optimistic
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prediction of the filter's actual performance because many of the actual
error sources would be omitted. To obtain an accurate indication of the
operational performance of a given filter, one must evaluate this filter
in a "real world" environment. For the purpose of this study the "real
world" error model was defined to consist of the following four error
sources.
1) Flight technical errors
2) Environmental effects
3) Noise on the surveillance measurements
4) Biases on the surveillance measurements
A 15 state filter was constructed which correctly modeled all of the error
terms in the "real world" model.
Surveillance noise was the only one of the "real world" error sources
which was correctly modeled by all four filters under evaluation. Sur-
veillance bias was correctly modeled by the fourth filter only. State
noise was used by all four to approximate error sources one and two, but
the modeling was inexact.
A block diagram of the computer program is presented in Figure 53.
The input parameters control the selection of which trajectory, aircraft,
filter, and surveillance system will be used as well as specifying the
numerical values of the various system parameters (noise level, biases,
intensity of atmospheric turbulence, etc.). The operation of the program
can be described as follows. First, the trajectory generator writes the
entire trajectory profile (position, velocity, and acceleration) on tape.
Then, the desired filter is selected and the flight of the aircraft along
the given trajectory is simulated using the selected filter to update the
state. The value of the filter gain matrix Kf is stored on tape. Then,
the flight of the aircraft is repeated along the same trajectory. This
time the "real world" filter model is used. However, the general update
equation valid for both optimal and suboptimal updates
= - KM) (I_-K M) + KR KT
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INPUT
PARAMETERS
TRAJECTORY
DRIVER GENERATOR
FILTYPE
6 STATE 9 STATE "REAL WORLD"
a- KALMAN KALMAN EVALUATOR
FILTER FILTER FILTER
PROP. PROP. PROP. I- - PROP.
UPDATE UPDATE IUPDATE --- UPDATE
PRINT
TRAJECTORY PROFILE (POS.,VEL, ACC.) I
I I I
I I I
FILTER GAIN MATRIX (K ) END
Figure 53. Block Diagram of Computer Program
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is used with K set equal to the previously computed filter gain matrix Kf.
In this manner one can evaluate the performance of any given filter in a
"real world" environment. The relevant statistics are printed out at each
time point along the trajectory. The program automatically terminates
when the end of the trajectory is reached.
7.7 SIMULATION RESULTS
The various simulations which were performed are described in this
section and their results presented and compared. Altogether, a total of
34 simulations were made.
7.7.1 State Noise
Prior to performing these simulations, it was necessary to specify
the state noise matrix (required by the six and nine state variable Kalman
filters) as well as the two coefficients of the a-8 filter. The perfor-
mance of the filters will depend in a significant manner on the values
selected for these quantities since they determine the relative importance
which the filter will assign to the surveillance measurements with respect
to the projected state estimate. Therefore, care must be exercised to
select appropriate values for these quantities.
This problem is complicated by the fact that the best or "optimal"
set of values for these parameters depends on the specific application
(i.e., aircraft characteristics and trajectory). For the purposes of this
study, the average position error was selected as the appropriate 
criterion
for evaluating filter performance; hence, all references of "best" or
"optimal" are with respect to this criterion. In an actual operational
situation neither the specific aircraft characteristics nor its future
trajectory will be known; therefore, the values selected for the state
noise and the coefficients a and B must produce acceptable performance
over the entire spectrum of possible situations.
The specification of these parameters was accomplished in the following
manner. Initially, a variety of computer runs was made using various para-
meter values, aircraftitypes, and trajectories. The results indicated that
small values of these"parameters (i.e., a = 8 = 0.3 or 0.4) were optimal in
low dynamic situations (i.e., straight and level trajectories with low per-
formance aircraft). Large values (a = a 
= 0.85 or 0.90) were optimal in
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high dynamic situations (i.e., turns with high performance aircraft).
However, the most significant result provided by these runs was that the
large parameter values also provided excellent performance (approximately
5% suboptimal) in low dynamic situations while the performance of the low
parameter values in high dynamic situations was unsatisfactory - producing
errors which were 200% to 300% above optimal. Thus, the obvious conclusion
is that the parameters should be selected to produce optimal performance in
high dynamic situations. This not only guarantees optimal performance in
the most critical situations, but also guarantees satisfactory performance
in all situations.
Based on these results, the scenario involving aircraft type II and
trajectory D was utilized to determine the state noise matrix and the co-
efficients a and 0. These values were used in all of the simulations.
The optimal values of a and a for this scenario using the ATCRBS Surveil-
lance system are:
S= 0.85
8 = 0.85
The optimal state noise matrix for the 6-state variable Kalman filter and
the 9-state variable Kalman filter modeling measurement biases was:
2000. 0. 0. 2000. 0. 0.
0. 4000. 0. 0. 4000. 0.
0. 0. 200. 0. 0. 200.
2000. 0. 0. 2000. 0. 0.
0. 4000. 0. 0. 4000. 0.
0. 0. 200. 0. 0. 200.
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The optimal state noise matrix for the 9-state variable Kalman filter
modeling acceleration components was:
5. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. O 0
0. 5. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 5. 0 0. 0.
5. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
q= 0. 5. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
The large values of a and B and the large values appearing in the
state noise matrix for the 6-state variable filter both indicate that the
filter will weight the measurement very heavily with respect to the propa-
gated state estimate. The small values appearing in the state noise
matrix for the 9-state variable filter were initially surprising because
of the six state variable noise matrix. However, a careful analysis in-
dicates that this difference is more apparent than real. The explanation
is that when the three acceleration components are included in the state
vector, the acceleration errors propagate into position and velocity errors
and have essentially the same effect as state noise; hence, the much smaller
values in the optimal 9-state variable state noise matrix.
The performance of the filters with the multilateration system was
found to be relatively insensitive to the state noise matrix, or the coef-
ficients a and B, as long as they were reasonably large. This behavior is
due to the rapid update available with this system. Hence, the values used
for the ATCRBS system were also used for the multilateration system.
The parameters used in each simulation, the purpose of each simula-
tion, and the corresponding results are tabulated in Table 27; the average
and worst-case values of the errors in the position, velocity, and accele-
ration are tabulated.
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Table 27. Simulation Description and Results
Sur- Position Velocity Acceleration
Air- vel- Error Error Error
craft Filter lance
Run Traj Class type type Av. W.C. Av. W.C. Av. W.C. Purpose
1 A II 1 1 2750. 3120. 120.. 135. 0.1 0.1
2 C II 1 1 3225. 4640. 265. 491. 21.4 32.1
3 D II 1 1 2970. 3803. 198. 334. 13.4 26.0
4 A II 2 1 2727. 3040. 104. 114. 0.1 0.1
5 C II 2 1 3082. 4539. 238. 482. 21.4 32.1 
Comparison of
Filters
6 D II 2 1 2910. 3809. 181. 341. 13.4 26.0
7 A II 3,4 1 2751. 3129. 129. 176. 4.4 5.0
8 C II 3,4 1 3178. 5077. 259. 577. 24.4 40.8
9 D II 3,4 1 2927. 3715. 193. 341. 16.7 25.5
10 A III 2 1 747. 915. 54.3 71.9 0.1 0.1
11 C III 2 1 1622. 4810. 242.7 550.2 22.0 33.0
12 D III 2 1 1291. 2747. 179. 355. 14.8 27.7
13 A III 2 2 394. 394. 17.8 22.3 0.1 0.1 Comparison of
14 C III 2 2 395. 395. 38.4 52.0 22.0 33.0 
Surveillance
15 D III 2 2 394. 395. 31.9 40.8 14.8 27.7
16 A I 2 1 2987. 3694. 108. 133. 0.1 0.1
17 B I 2 1 3303. 7650. 438. 1013. 44.6 83.3
18 C I 2 1 4901. 12167. 799. 1792. 83.4 125.
19 D I 2 1 3312. 7666. 422. 1017. 45.1 107.
20 B II 2 1 2902. 2775. 175. 333. 13.3 19.9 Comparison of
21 B III 2 1 1038. 1995. 143. 297. 14.8 22.1 Aircraft and
22 A IV 2 1 532. 749. 54.1 79.7 0.1 0.1 Trajectories
23 B IV 2 1 748. 1693. 122. 248. 12.1 40.0
24 C IV 2 1 947. 2537. 183. 361. 21.7 40.0
25 D IV 2 1 823. 1914. 54.0 284. 12.4 43.7
26 E IV 2 1 545. 749. 54.0 80.0 0.45 40.0
27 D III 2 1 1912. 4241. 383. 610. 14.8 27.7 Pilot Error X5
28 D III 2 1 1230. 2815. 187. 365. 14.8 27.7 Environ. Error X5
29 D III 2 1 1851. 3013. 180. 355. 14.8 27.7 Bias and Noise X2 Sensi-
30 D III 2 2 788. 788. 33.9 42.2 14.8 27.7 Bias and Noise X3 tivity
31 D III 2 1 909. 1401. 117. 246. 14.8 27.7 Update Rate =4 sec Analysis
32 D III 2 2 399. 400. 32.0 41.0 14.9 27.7 Pilot Error X5
33 D III 2 2 395. 396. 31.9 40.8 14.9 27.7 Environ. Error X5
34 X III 2 2 416 480. 65.7 122.5 14.8 27.7 Update Rate = 4
The units of the above quantities are feet, feet/sec, and feet/sec
2
Nomenclature:
Trajectory Types A : Straight and Level
B : Level Turn (Standard to Moderate)
C : Level Turn (High Rate)
D : Descending Turn (Standard to Moderate)
E : Stop and Hover (Class IV Only)
Aircraft Classes I : YF-12
II : B-737
IT!: Citation
IV : UH-1
Filter Types 1 : Constant Coefficient
2 : 6-State Kalman (Positive, Velocity)
3 : 9-State Kalman (Positive, Velocity, Acceleration)
4 : 9-State Kalman (Positive, Velocity, Measurement Bias)
Surveillance Types 1 : ATCRBS
2 : LIT
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7.7.2 Results
A comparison of the performance (i.e., the average position errors)
of the four filters was conducted for both surveillance systems. The
results showed that the performance of the multilateration system was
essentially independent of the filter used. The variation in performance
among the four filters was less than 1%. This result is due 
to the com-
bined effect of the rapid update rate and the unmodeled measurement biases
of this surveillance system. This filter must weigh each measurement very
heavily relative to its projected state estimate. Hence, the sophistication
of the more complex filters is of little utility with the multilateration
surveillance systems.
A similar comparison was conducted with the ATCRBS surveillance system
and the results are presented in Table 28; a Class II aircraft was used 
in
all runs.
Table 28. Comparison of Filters
Trajectory a-B Filter 6-State Filter (Pos., Vel., and Acc.)
A. Straight and level 2750. ft 2727. ft 2751. ft
C. High rate turn 3225. ft 3082. ft 3178. ft
D. Descending turn 2970. ft 2910. ft 2927. ft
Again, the major conclusion to be drawn from the above table is that 
the
performance of all three filters is essentially equivalent. 
The 6-state
variable filter does produce slightly better results (particularly in high
dynamic situations), but is maximum improvement is less than 
5% over that
of the or- filter. This small improvement in performance hardly 
seems to
justify its greater complexity.
The performance of the 9-state variable Kalman filter which 
estimates
measurement biases (Runs 7, 8, 9,) is precisely identical to the 6-state
variable Kalman filter and it was unable to improve on the a priori 
estimates
of the measurement biases. This was due to two factors:
1. Since the aircraft's initial position was completely
unknown, the filter was unable to differentiate between
the aircraft's position and the measurement biases.
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2. The large amount of state noise required to force the
filter to track the aircraft acceptably during higher
rate maneuvers "washed out" the past history of the
aircraft trajectory and precludes the possibility of
varying geometry helping the estimation process.
Therefore, the procedure of estimating the measurement biases with a 9-state
variable Kalman filter does not appear useful and should not be pursued.
A comparison of the performance (i. e., the average position errors)
of the two surveillance systems is presented in Table 29. A Class III air-
craft and the 6-state variable Kalman filter were used.
Table 29. Comparison of Surveillance Systems
Trajectory ATCRBS Multi 1 aterati on
A 747. ft 394. ft
C 1622. ft 395. ft
D 1291. ft 394. ft
The performance of the multilateration system was significantly better than
that of the ATCRBS over all trajectories. Furthermore, the multilateration
error was consistently in the range of 390-400 feet; it was almost completely
independent of the aircraft and trajectory. In contradistinction, the error
produced by the ATCRBS system was very sensitive to the aircraft type and
trajectory.
The variation in the performance (i. e., the average position error)
of the ATCRBS system with trajectory and aircraft type is shown in Table 30.
Table 30. Comparison of Trajectories and Aircraft Type
Aircraft Class
Trajectory I II III IV
A 2987. ft 2727. ft 747. ft 532. ft
B 3303. ft 2902. ft 1038. ft 748. ft
C 4901. ft 3082. ft 1622. ft 947. ft
D 3312. ft 2910. ft 1291. ft 823. ft
E -- -- -- 545. ft
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The sensitivity of the performance (i. e., the average position error)
to certain factors is presented in Table 31. Class III aircraft, trajectory
D, and filter II were used.
Table 31. Sensitivity Analysis
Simulation Condition ATCRBS Multilateration
Nominal 1291. ft 394. ft
Pilot Error X5 1912. ft 399. ft
Environ. Eff. X5 1320. ft 395. ft
Surveillance Bias X2 1851. ft 788. ft
Sample period = 4 Sec 909. ft 416. 
ft
These results show that pilot error, surveillance errors (biases, etc.),
and the surveillance update rate have a critical effect on the ATCRBS
system performance.
On the other hand, only the biases in the surveillance system have
an appreciable effect on the performance of the multilateration system. 
In
particular, note that decreasing the surveillance time from 1 second 
to 4
seconds degrades performance only 5%. The effects of the environment
(atmospheric turbulence, etc.) were completely negligible.
For a system with serially uncorrelated (white) noise and no biases,
the estimation of position and velocity would be expected to improve by a
factor proportional to the square root of the ratio of sample intervals.
With bias, and sample intervals close to the correlation time constants, the
improvement would be less. As the sample interval become very short 
com-
pared to thetime constant, the error in state estimate 
begins to look like
bias and the measurement bias becomes more significant.
For the ATCRBS, although there appears to be an appreciable improve-
ment in going from one sample per 10 seconds to one sample per 4 seconds,
a similar improvement with shorter sample intervals would not be expected
since the biases would become more prominent.
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For the multilateration system, going from sample intervals of 4
seconds to 1 second, the small improvement in state estimate achieved would
indicate that the measurement biases are already dominating and even smaller
-improvements would be achieved by a further decrease in sample interval.
7.8 SUMMARY DISCUSSION
The objective of this portion of the study was to determine the accur-
acy with which the state (i. e., the position and velocity of the various
aircraft) can be estimated and how this accuracy depends on the surveillance
system, aircraft dynamics, and data processing (filtering) procedure. The
results of this analysis have led to the following observations:
1. The accuracy with which the position and velocity of the
aircraft can be specified depends strongly on the char-
acteristics of the surveillance system, aircraft, and
trajectory; however, the accuracy is relatively indepen-
dent of the type of filter used. This indicates that in
this application (tracking and anomaly detection)
sophisticated data processing is unable to compensate for
poor data (i. e., noisy data containing large biases gener-
ated at a slow data rate). Hence, it should prove more
profitable to concentrate on improving the surveillance
system rather than the data processing scheme.
2. The existing ATCRBS system with 10 seconds surveillance
intervals is incapable of tracking many types of currently
operational aircraft (executing maneuvers within their
allowed dynamic constraints) with an error of less than
2500 feet irrespective of the degree of sophistication of
the data processing used. This is mainly due to the length
of time between surveillance updates (not measurement
inaccuracy) - an aircraft can be perfectly on course at
one surveillance time, then execute a 1.5 or 3 g maneuver
and be 2000-3000 feet off its origional 10 seconds later
just before the next measurement occurs.
3. The performance of the multilateration system with 1
second surveillance intervals is totally determined by and
directly proportional to the bias errors in the range
measurements. Nominal values for these bias errors in a
typical* satellite system produce a maximum error of 400
feet.
Not optimized for accuracy. See Reference 22.
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4. There are two possibilities for improving an ATCRBS-
based system; first, decrease the measurement, biases;
and second, either increase the surveillance rate or
incorporate on-board data (i. e., the measured accelera-
tion and orientation of the aircraft) intothe data
processing scheme. The former will reduce the steady-
state errors while the latter will improve the detection
and tracking of transient maneuvers.
5. The same two possibilities exist for improving a multilat-
eration system. The measurement bias could be reduced by
establishing several precisely located calibration sta-
tions which would continuously estimate the bias at their
location. TRW has performed an extensive analysis
(Reference 9) on the navigation accuracy obtainable by
combining multilateration surveillance with low-cost on-
board inertial instruments; the general result is that the
aircraft's position can be continuously determined to
within 50-75 feet.
6. One of the questions posed at the outset of the study was
"If studies indicate that, for a particular case, a posi-
tion accuracy of, say, 1000 feet is required, could this
accuracy be obtained with a filtering technique applied
to a system with raw surveillance accuracy of, say, 5000
feet?" As stated previously, the accuracy with which the
position and velocity of the aircraft can be specified
depends on the characteristics of the surveillance system,
aircraft, and trajectory. If the aircraft flies a straight
line trajectory with a constant velocity, the filter may
reduce the position uncertainty by a factor of from 5 to
10 below that of the raw surveillance data; however, in
high dynamic situations the improvement is minimal.
7. Another question posed in the study was "For cases in
which the control law uses velocity data, how accurately
can one obtain this velocity through the application of
an 'optimal" filter process?" Again, this depends
strongly on the particular surveillance system, aircraft,
and trajectory under consideration as shown in Table II.
The average error in the velocity estimate varies from a
low of 17.8 ft/sec to a high of 38.4 ft/sec for the
multilateration system and from a low of 54.0 ft/sec to
a high of 799. ft/sec for the ATCRBS system. The lower
errors occur in constant velocity trajectories while the
large errors result from high dynamic situations.
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8. The surveillance data rate is a very sensitive parameter
in the ATCRBS system, but rather insignificant in the
multilateration system. An increase in the ATCRBS sur-
veillance data rate from 1 measurement every 10 seconds
to 1 measurement every 4 seconds produced a 37% reduction
in the position estimation error. A decrease in the
multilateration surveillance data rate from 1 measure-
ment every second to 1 measurement every 4 seconds only
produced a 5% increase in the position estimation error.
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8. SPECIAL STUDIES
This Section contains two special studies performed as part of the
Surveillance Accuracy/Update Rate analysis. The first is an investigation
of a number of actual mid-air collisions and the second is a brief analysis
of Remote Area ATC communications.
8.1 MID-AIR COLLISION STUDY
8.1.1 Background
The mid-air collision in September 1969 between an Allegheny DC-9
and a corporate PA-28 (Reference 18) prompted the National Transportation
Safety Board to review the entire collision problem to determine its magni-
tude, what actions were being taken to solve the problem, additional
research required, and state-of-the-art in collision avoidance systems.
The report of those proceedings (Reference 22) contains the following
indictment of the see and be seen concept:
"For many years it has become increasingly apparent that condi-
tions other than weather conditions are being encountered which
directly affect aircraft separation and of which account must be
taken in the continued development of the air traffice rules.
For instance, it appears that under certain circumstances the
rate of closure of very high-speed aircraft is such that the
total time in which an aircraft may be visible to a pilot of
another aircraft is so short that pilots cannot be expected to
insure separation between aircraft irrespective of the weather
conditions in which they are flying. It is also apparent that
the density of air traffic, particularly in the vicinity of cer-
tain major air terminals, has approahced or is approaching
serious proportions. Obviously, the greater the number of air-
craft movements within a given airspace the more difficult it is
for a pilot to separate himself adequately from other aircraft
regardless of the vigilance exercised."
It is even more tragic to realize that that statement was made by the
deputy director of the Bureau of Safety Regulation of the Civil Aeronautics
Board - not in 1969, but in 1956!
Another insidious aspect of visual flight rules is the concept of
mixed airspace. Ironically, it is formally called "controlled airspace."
Aircraft flying in mixed airspace may be on instrument flight rules,
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perhaps going in and out of clouds such that the pilot on board is flying
primarily on instruments. He is in communication with an air traffic
controller who is giving him advisories on other traffic in the area. Thus,
he naturally and inevitably develops a frame of mind wherein he feels
"protected." Another aircraft can be flying quite legally under visual flight
rules in this same area. Because flying VFR he does not need to have an
ATC transponder, or, if he has one, he is not required to turn it on. Thus,
the VFR pilot may be exercising proper vigilance and the IFR pilot may
also be performing his normal IFR flight taks diligently, but may be con-
centrating more on his flight instruments than looking outside, especially
if he is flying in and out of clouds. A dangerous situation could develop
even though the VFR pilot, the IFR pilot and the air traffic controller are
all performing their individual tasks competently and diligently. The
probability of a mid-air collision could actually be increased by giving
pilots on instrument clearances periodic advisories on the VFR traffic.
Another aspect of the problem is speed itself. Two turbo-jet aircraft in
a head-on or right-angle encounter close on each other so fast that a threat
aircraft can loom from a tiny, almost invisible speck on the windscreen to
a real threat in a matter of seconds. Furthermore, even after one pilot
spots the other aircraft approaching him at a relative speed of 800 to
1000 knots, it is often difficult to guage what the correct maneuver should
be in time to perform it.
Of course, the question of prevention of mid-air collision goes
beyond the deficiencies of mixed airspace and the see-and-avoid concept.
The preponderance of loss of life associated with mid-air collisions
involving air air carrier aircraft indicates the importance of an examina-
tion of mid-air collisions involving air carriers in all types of airspace.
Because of the similar characteristics of air carrier and military aircraft,
and because of the importance of the military/civil interface itself, a
large number of mid-air collisions involving both air carrier/general
aviation and military/civil encounters were examined. Furthermore, since
the numberical preponderance of mid-air collisions occurs between general
aviation aircraft at or near an airport, this area, too, was examined
carefully.
See the narrative of MAC #10 in Table 32.
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Fifty-five major accidents spanning the years from 1949 to 1971 were
evaluated, first to determine if general patterns or trends existed, as
part of the control philosophy analysis; second, to aid in 
the selection of
the cases used in the SAUR analysis. The first thirty-five cases treat
mid-air collisions involving military/civil and air carrier/general 
aviation
mid-air collisions. The next twenty cases treat mid-air collisions 
that
occurred in airport traffic patterns during 1968.
8.1.2 Results
The results for the first thirty-five are tabulated by individual 
case
in Table 32, and the next twenty cases are shown in Figure 54. Although 
it
is not evident from Table 32, the amount of data available 
on the various
accidents (References 3-21) varied a great deal. Those accidents of 
major
importance (e. g., MAC's #20, 22, 26, 31, and 35) were documented exten-
sively. Others are documented only in annual National 
Transportation
Safety Board (formerly Civil Aeronautics Board) briefs. Prior to 1960 the
briefs were quite short and the "indicated cause" was inferred 
herein. In
addition, even for the more recent and more complete 
reports this author
occasionally added "indicated causes" to the "probable cause" determined 
by
the National Transportation Safety Board (e. g., transponder 
item, MAC #22).
8.1.3 Discussion
Examination of a large set of mid-air collision reports 
makes evident
the point that the "see-and-avoid" concept requires:
* The undivided attention of all pilots,
* Favorable weather, lighting, and geometry, and
e Low aircraft density.
It is quite clear that all of the above conditions 
simply will not prevail
all of the time. When they do not it is a certainty 
that a number of mid-
air collisions will take place.
Pilots cannot be expected to give their undivided attention to looking
for other aircraft when they are preoccuppied with 
tasks such as:
a Instrument flying (regardless of weather conditions),
* Taking off, landing (including approach/departure transition),
* Participating in aircrew instruction.
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Table 32. Mid-Air Collision Evaluation
MAC Date and Aircraft Indicated
Number Location Involved Brief Narrative Cause
1. 7/30/49 F-6F-5, The DC-3 was in cruising flight * Violation of procedures.
Chesterfield DC-3 under VFR condi:tions. The F-6
New Jersey was engaged fn illegal high- * High speed differential
speed acrobatics on a civil
airway.
2. 10/24/56 T-33, The T-33 was in a climb over- * T-33 pilot FTSA
Midland, Cessna 170 taking the Cessna from the rear.
Texas The T-33 was observed to roll . High-speed differential
just prior to impact.
3. 5/29/57 C-45, Under VFR conditions, both air- * Both pilots FTSA
Baltimore, Cessna 182 craft were practicing IFR ap-
Maryland proaches. Mid-air collision
occurred just after they passed
the radio range.
4. 9/9/57 S-2F, The PA-22 was on a simulated * Both pilots FTSA
Fullerton, PA-22 instrument approach to the air-
California port. Both aircraft made sharp a Probable wrong evasive
diving turns just prior to maneuver
impact.
5. 10/17/57 F-86, A mid-air collision occurred at a Both pilots FTSA
Barrington, PA-23 night at 2000 feet 10 miles from
Illinois an airport.
6. 11/14/57 F-84, The F-84 was landing at one air- * Both pilot FTSA
Sioux City, Beech G-35 port and the Beech had just taken
S. Dakota off from another
7. 4/5/58 Navy T-34, The T-34 rapidly overtook the e T-34 pilot FTSA
Huntington Cessna 170 Cessna 170. No evasive maneu-
Beach, Calif. vers by either aircraft. * High speed differential
8. 4/21/58 F-100F, The F-1OOF was on an instrument a High rate of closure
Las Vegas, DC-8 training flight from Nellis AFB. * Human and clock limitations
Nevada The mid-air collision occurred at * USAF and CAA procedural
a very high rate of closure with defficiencies
with aircraft approaching at * Probable wrong escape maneu-
approximately right angles. The ver by F-100 pilot
F-100 pilot rolled just prior to
impact.
9. 5/20/58 T-33 Under VFR conditions the T-33 T-33 pilot FTSA
Brunswick, Viscount on a local flight, overtook the
Maryland Viscount (290 knots versus 235
knots). No evasive maneuvers.
10. 8/24/59 Two A-4D's, The PA-18 was on a commercial * Regulatory deficiencies
Morehead City PA-18 fish spotting flight flying in
N. Carolina a restricted area. The flight a Possible violation of
of two A-4's while on a radar procedures by the PA-18
approach came out of clouds and
hit the PA-18 10 seconds after
leaving the clouds.
11. 11/7/59 Four A flight of four F-84F's were * F-84 lead pilot and PA-22
Mansfield, F-84F's, making a pass at Mansfield pilot - FTSA*
Ohio PA-22 Airport when the No. 4 air-
craft in the flight struck the @ High speed differential
PA-22. The PA-22 was flying in
the airport control zone without * Possible violation of
having contacted the tower. The procedures by the PA-22
CAB placed about equal blame on pilot
the F-84 lead pilot, the PA-22
pilot and the tower operator.
All were considered to have been
deficient in not spotting all
aircraft involved.
FTSA - Failed to See and Avoid
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Table 32. Mid-Air Collision Evaluation (Continued)
MAC Date and Aircraft Indicated
Number Location Involved Brief Narrative Cause
12. Two F-86L's The Beech was flying VFR in an * F-86 flight lead - FTSA
Cheyenne, Beech C-35 airport control zone. The F-86
Wyoming flight overtook the Beech at a * High rate of 
closure
high rate of closure and the
No. 2 aircraft struck the Beech.
13. 1-27-60 AD-5, The Cessna 182 was on an instru- * Both pilots - FTSA
El Cajon, Cessna 182 ment training flight and was in
California a turn when the AD-5 who was
starting a turn collided with
the 182.
14. 4/20/60 Piedmont The Cessna 310 overtook the F-27 Cessna pilot - FTSA
Hickory, Cessna 310 on final approach to the Hickory
N. Carolina Airport. The Cessna 310 was on
the flight service station fre-
quency while the F-27 was on the
airline company frequency. There
was no tower at the airport.
15. 5/27/60 F-4D, The Cessna 172 was on an instru- Both pilots - FTSA
Pt. Mugu, Cessna 172 ment navigation flight (dual).
California The F-4D accelerating after the
GCA collided with the 172 on
climb-out. The F-4D pilot tried
to nose-down just prior to
collision.
16. 11/17/60 UAL DC-6, This mid-air collision occur- * DC-6 pilot - FTSA due
Denver, Beechcraft red during heavy traffic condi- to sun glare
Colorado tions at Stapleton Field, Denver,
Colorado. Many aircraft and very * Beechcraft pilot failed
heavy voice traffic existed, to follow procedures
e Heavy traffic
17. 12/16/60 TWA L-1049, Both aircraft were approach- Violation of procedures
Staten UAL DC-8 ing New York airports under by DC-8 pilots
Island, instrument flight rule condi-
New York tions. The DC-8 exceeded its
clearance limits, causing the
mid-air collision which appar-
ently took place in the clouds.
18. 5/16/64 I A-4, The Ercoupe was in cruising Both pilots - FTSA
Westminister, Ercoupe flight, the A-4 was descending
California to land when the collision took
place under IFR conditions.
19. 10/12/65 T-33, The T-33 was on an instructional T-33 pilot - FTSA
Montgomery, PA-28 flight, the PA-28 was in normal
Alabama cruise, when the collision
occurred.
20. 12/4/65 Lockheed The two aircraft were flying e Human error
Carmel, 1049, under VFR conditions. As the
New York Boeing 707 Lockheed 1049 approached a radio * No ATC assistance or
fix, the first officer saw the advisories
747 at his 2 o'clock position.
Because he believed the jet was at
his altitude and on a collis'ion
course, he called "look out!" and
grasped the control wheel to
assist the captain in a pull-up.
At about the same time the
captain of the other aircraft
saw the 1049 at his 10 o'clock
position. He rolled into a right
turn and pulled back or: the yoke.
*FTSA - Failed to See and Avoid
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Table 32. Mid-Air Collision Evaluation (Continued)
MAC Date and Aircraft Brief Narrative Indicated
Number Location Involved Cause
20. (Continued)
He then decided this maneuver
would not clear the other aircraft
and, assisted by his first officer,
attempted to reverse and turn by
rolling to the left and pushing
on the yoke. The aircraft col-
lided at an altitude of about
11,000 feet. The CAB found that
mis-judgement of altitude separa-
tion by the 1049 PLM because of an
optical illusion created by the
upslope effect of cloud tops led
to this collision.
21. 11/6/66 C-141, The C-141 was holding in a turn C-141 pilot - FTSA
Merced, Cessna 150 when it struck the Cessna which
California was in cruising flight.
22. 3/9/67 DC-9, The DC-9 was under positive con- a DC-9 pilot - FTSA
Urbana, Ohio Beech B-55 trol by an Air Force radar approach
control facility. 18 seconds prior * B-55 operating with
to the collision the RAPCON issued with transponder
a traffic advisory to the DC-9. turned off
The Beechcraft was operating under
VFR and was not in contact with any
FAA facility, nor was its trans-
ponder operating.
23. 4/28/67 RF-101 Both aircraft were cruising Both pilots - FTSA
Anderson- Beech B-55 under VFR conditions.
ville, Tenn.
24. 5/30/67 T-33, Both aircraft were in crusing T-33 pilot - FTSA
Phoenix, Cessna 182 flight under VFR conditions.
Arizona
25. 6/22/67 RF-4C, This was a night mid-air colli- Special conditions
Saigon, Lockheed sion involving aircraft operating
Vietnam 1049 without running lights due to a
combat situation.
26. 7/19/67 Boeing 727 This mid-air collision occurred a Cessna 310 pilot devi-
Henderson- Cessna 310 shortly after the Boeing 727 ated from IFR instructions
ville, N. lifted off from runway 16 at
Carolina the Ashville Municipal Airport.
The 727 was proceeding according
to clearance when it collided
with the Cessna 310. Apparently
the pilot of the 310 had become
confused and was making the wrong
approach to the Ashville Airport.
27. 6/20/68 F-105, This collision occurred under VFR F-105 pilot - FTSA
Indian Mooney conditions. Both aircraft in
Springs,. M-20A normal cruise.
Nevada
28. 3/5/69 F-8J, Both aircraft were under normal F-8 pilot - FTSA
Julian, PA-28 cruise, but were not under radar
California control. The F-8 apparently at-
tempted some unknown evasive action
just prior to the collision.
29. 4/20/69 T-37, The T-37 was descending and the 9 T-37 pilot - FTSA
El Paso, PA-23 PA-23 in cruise flight when the
Texas collision occurred. The PA-23 a PA-23 pilot inadequate
attempted some evasive action. planning and failed to
There was no radar service not follow procedures.**
ATC advisories.
30. 8/3/69 Boeing 707, Both aircraft were reported to be Both pilots - FTSA
Ft. Worth, Cesmda 172 ifl nuorml L.ruise, dl though the 707
Texas was under approach control and in
radar contact. The radar operator
did not see the 172. Neither air-
craft had warning and no evasive
action was taken.
FTSA - Failed to see and Avoid
**
Not explained in accident brief.
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Table 32. Mid-Air Collision Evaluation (Continued)
MAC Date and Aircraft Indicated
Number Location Involved Brief Narrative Cause
31. 9/9/69 DC-9, The PA-29 was on a solo VFR ATC deficiencies, i. e.,
Fairland, PA-29 cross-counter. The aircraft mixed airspace
Indiana did not have a transponder.
The DC-9 was in and out of
clouds on a radar approach.
32. 3/18/70 A-7B, Both aircraft were in normal High rate of closure pre-
Lakeland, PA-18 cruise under VFR conditions vented successful evasive
Florida and not under control of ATC. action
The A-7 tried evasive action.
33. 5/25/70 F-102, The F-102 was on a scramble F-102 pilot - FTSA
LaPorte, PA-28 climb under radar control and
did not see the PA-28. The
accident brief notes that the
PA-28 executed improper evasive
maneuvers but did not explain.
The brief also points out that
the radar controller didn't
observe the return from the
PA-28.
34. 6/19/70 T-33, The T-33 was operating on tower a Both pilots - FTSA
Myrtle Beach, PA-24 frequency with an operative
S. Carolina transponder which was turned off. a T-33 operative trans-
The PA-24 was operating under ponder turns off
sender frequency, was under radar
surveillance but the T-33 was not
visible to the radar.
35. 6/6/71 F-4 A hughes Air West DC-9 which had a Both pilots - FTSA
Duarte, DC-9 departed from Los Angeles Inter- * Very high rate of closure
California national Airport on a flight to * F-4 transponder inoperative
Salt Lake City was reported on * Regulatory deficiencies
course and climbing at 12,000 * Probable wrong evasive
feet when the collision occurred, maneuver by the F-4 pilot.
The Marine F-4 was enroute from
Fallon Naval Air Station, east of
Reno, to El Toro Marine Corps
station in Orange County, Calif.
and was in a descent, apparently,
at the time of the collision. The
National Transportation Safety
Board's findings have not been pub-
lished. Most of the data available
on this accident was taken from the
public media.
FTSA - Failed to See and Avoid.
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.2, 6 31394,155 b1,3
b.
Indicated / Probable Cause
36. One Pilot FTSA, violation 46. Two Pilots FTSA, violation
37. One Pilot FTSA, possible violation 47. Two Polots FTSA
38. One Pilot FTSA 48. Two Pilots FTSA
39. Two Pilots FTSA, violation 49. One pilot FTSA, traffic controller
40. One Pilot FTSA, violation improper performance
41. Two Pilots FTSA, weather factor 50. One Pilot FTSA
42. Two pilots FTSA 51. One Pilot FTSA
43. One Pilot FTSA, weather 52. Not determined
44. Two Pilots FTSA 53. Not determined
45. One Pilot FTSA, possible violation 54. Not determined
55. Not determined
Figure 54. Airport Traffic Pattern Mid-Air
Collisions, 1968 (Cases 36-55)
1 36
It seems loqic then to "protect" pilots engaged in these activities by
placing them under some form of active air traffic control. Similarly, it
seems logical to control aircraft flying in poor flight conditions and in
high density regions. The weather problem has, of course, been addressed
by instrument flight rules for decades. The high density regions are now
beginning proposed or controlled areas. It now seems prudent to address
the item of pilot activity and preoccupation.
From the tabulation of indicated causes (Table 33) the most obvious
point is that in the majority of cases the indicated cause was simply that
one or both pilots failed to see and avoid (noted as "FTSA" in the table)
the other aircraft. It is likely that in most cases the "FTSA," "high rate
of closure," and "equipment not activated" causes can be equated with
regulatory deficiencies. For example, Cases 3, 8, and 15 indicate that
regulations might be altered to insure that aircraft practicing instrument
flying in fairly dense regions operate either under positive control or
some form of observation and advisory (e. g., Intermittent Positive Control)
conditions. Regulations have already been changed to alleviate the high
rate of closure problem which was noted in 8 of the 35 mid-air collisions.
Table 33. Tabulation of Indicated Causes
MAC #1-35 MAC #36-55 TOTAL
A. Failed to See and Avoid Other
Aircraft (FTSA) 26 16 42
B. High Rate of Closure 8 0 8
C. Regulatory Deficiencies 3 0 3
D. In-Flight Equipment Failures 0 0 0
E. Equipment not Activated 3 0 3
F. Violations or Failures to
Follow Procedures (including
possible violations) 8 6 14
G. Wrong Evasive Maneuver 4 0 4
H. Other Human Error 2 1 3
I. Other/Not Determined 4 6 10
58 29 87
Note: Sum of causes exceeds the number of MAC's because some accidents
involved multiple causes.
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Of course, it is not reasonable to expect that mid-air collisions
will cease to exist. The violations and human errors (Causes F, G, and H)
simply reflect the human element in the air transportation equation. 
The
negative effects of this element can be reduced with sufficient effort,
however. Civil and military flying safety programs stressing the human
element have been shown to be beneficial. For example, pilots could be
made aware of an observation concerning wrong evasive maneuvers on the
part of the pilot (Item G. of Table 33). Specifically, there are a number
of documented cases where a pilot would see another aircraft just prior to
a mid-air collision and then roll his aircraft in order to avoid a colli-
sion. This is precisely the wrong maneuver. Almost invariably the optimum
maneuver would be a pull-up. Assuming that the two aircraft trajectories
would result in a collision, the pilot must change his flight path as much
and as fast as possible without doing structural damage to the aircraft.
A rolling maneuver - for the first few seconds - normally changes the
flight path little if at all. The reason is that in executing a turn a
pilot first rolls or banks the aircraft and then pulls back on the control
column to cause the aircraft to turn. The banking maneuver takes up that
valuable 1 to 4 seconds that it is not until the elevator is raised, start-'
ing a turn, that the flight path changes at all. Simply put then, the
quickest way to apply the most acceleration and therefore change flight
path by the greatest number of feet in a given amount of time is to pull
back on the elevator. Assuming that most of the time only one pilot will
see the other aircraft and attempt a maneuver (Reference 41), this would
increase the probability of avoiding a collision. It could, for example,
have prevented the loss of 50 lives in the Duarte collision (Case 35).
Attacking the human element is not central to this study, but understand-
ing its relationship to terminology factors is important.
During the period in which this SAUR study was performed for NASA,
the MITRE Corporation conducted an extensive Civil Aviation Collisions
Analysis for the Office of Systems Engineering Management, Federal Avia-
tion Administration (Reference 42). An overview of the highlights and
conclusions of the MITRE study became available at the conclusion of this
SAUR STUDY. The MITRE effort involved determining the statistics of actual
mid-air collisions; assessing the effectiveness of the present ATC system
in preventing collisions; and comparing proposed solutions with actual
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mid-air collisions data. Although it was not possible to evaluate
Reference 42 in detail, it does appear that the results of the two efforts
(in those areas where a particular topic was addressed in both studies) are
in agreement. For example, the two services agreed on the implications 
of
the mid-air collisions that occurred at Carmel, New York October 19, 1965.
We also agree with the MITRE concerning the advisability of pursuing
cost-effective delivery of traffic advisory and control services, e.g.,
IPC.
In conclusion it is significant - and ironic - to note that none of
the mid-air collisions studied here had as even a secondary cause in-flight
equipment failures. In the final analysis, however, over half 
the indi-
cated causes are "fail to see and avoid" and it is that cause which must
be attacked if the nation is serious about resolving the mid-air collision
problem. The answer appears to lie in a higher degree of control, recog-
nizing that the task must be one that is manageable and the cost must be
acceptable to participating parties. The SAUR study is designed 
to
examine some of the key parameters of this control function.
8.2 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS
8.2.1 Introduction
As pointed out in Section 1.1, NASA initiated this study in 
order to
establish a substantial basis for the performance capability than an air
traffic control satellite system would be required to provide. Although
the primary emphasis on the study has been on the surveillance 
aspects of
the problem, it was also recognized at the outset that the possibility
existed that the communications function, especially as it related to
remote area communications could be a pacing factor. The FAA has pointed
out (Reference 43) that there are towers at less than one-half the airports.
As a result, service to the second and third level carriers is less than
satisfactory. FAA further stated that they need relatively inexpensive
surveillance and communications in these areas. The average communica-
tions load would not be great but the need for traffic control to notify
the aircraft involved is immediate when a collision situation developes.
Accordingly, TRW did a rough order of magnitude communications load
estimate for collision warning communications as part of Reference 2. The
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remainder of the remote area ATC communications was not investigated,
however, and it was recognized that if this load were quite heavy it would
greatly influence the design and even the viability of a satellite-based
ATC system. Accordingly, this brief remote area communications load
analysis was undertaken. The results of this analysis indicate that if
data link is used, the communications load which might be imposed on a
satellite-based ATC system (about nine 1200 bit-per-second data channels
in 1980 and fifteen such data channels in 1995) poses no difficult design
or technology problems. Attempting to handle the same communications load
using satellite-relayed voice communications, however, appears to be out of
the question.
The problem of ATC communications to and from remote areas can be
separated from the general problem of ATC communications. In this context,
the term "remote area" shall refer to a civil airport which fulfills the
following two conditions: is non-controlled (i. e., has no FAA tower),
and is not in a hub area. Since the remote area traffic is much less than
the airway or terminal traffic, its communication load is much lighter.
For this reason, the remote area problem can be handled as a special case.
The importance of making this distinction arises since the use of
satellites is not considered practical for the general case. It is still
possible that satellite communication could be used for remote area com-
munication at a lower price than establishing remote area communication
facilities; and the purpose of this analysis is to establish the associated
communications load.
Both general aviation and air carrier traffic is considered, but not
military since military flights seldom go into civil remote airports.
(Military Air Bases may be in a remote area but they have their own towers,
and, in any case, they represent only a small portion of traffic in the
remote areas.) Although general aviation air carriers operate under dif-
ferent regulations, they are handled the same by the ATC system.
The discussion covers the present situation, the future situation,
and the conclusion. The present situation is discussed from the viewpoint
of how remote area ATC communications function now, whereas the future
situration is discussed from the viewpoint of the requirements imposed
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upon the remote area ATC communications. The results of both the present
and future situation sections are discussed along with the communication
load based on mission analysis and traffic densities.
8.2.2 Current Scenario
8.2.2.1 Mission Analysis
A mission analysis is done for both to and from a remote area for
both a typical VFR flight and an IFR flight. The origion (on flights to a
remote area) or destination (on flights from a remote area) is not impor-
tant so the flight is analyzed only between the airways and the remote
area. The scenario concerns the flight of Cessna 60615 between Los Angeles,
and Bishop, California.
8.2.2.1.1 VFR Missions
The basic function performed by ATC for VFR aircraft which file
flight plans is flight following. If requested and possible, traffic
reporting is also done. The mission analyses consider only VFR aircraft
on a flight plan and do not consider traffic advising.
On a flight to a remote area there is no contact with ATC until the
flight is complete or irtually complete, at which time the aircraft closes
its flight plan and receives the local weather from a Flight Service
Station. A typical conversation is shown in Table 34.
On a flight from a remote area the only contact with ATC is filing
and opening the flight plan. The filing is done on the ground in person
or by telephone with a flight service station. The flight plan is opened
by radio once under way. T typical message sequence is given in Table 
1.
Using Table 1, and averaging the to and from trips, results in an
average communication load of 80 words per flight.
8.2.2.1.2 IFR Missions
The flight is assumed to be in controlled airspace but it is not
assumed that there is an approach/departure control, tower, radar coverage
or even ARTCC the entire way. The FSS relays communications to and from
ARTCC through a remote facility. The functions of approach/departure
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Table 34. VFR Communications
To Remote Area
FSS AIRCRAFT
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615,
on 123.6; over."
"Cessna 60615, go ahead."
"Would like to close VFR flight plan
from Los Angeles to Bishop and also
get the Bishop weather; over."
"Cessna 60615, your flight plan
from Los Angeles to Bishop is
closed. The weather at Bishop
is scattered clouds at 7000,
winds out of 330 at 20 knots,
and the altimeter setting is
29.98; over."
"Cessna 60615; thank you."
Total communication requriements
of 91 words.
From Remote Area
FSS AIRCRAFT
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615
on 123.6; over."
"Cessna 60615, go ahead."
"Would like to open VFR flight plan
from Bishop to Los Angeles. Time
off 1:25; over."
"Cessna 60615, your flight plan
from Bishop to Los Angeles is
opened. Close with Los Angeles
Radio; over."
"Cessna 60615; roger thank you."
Total communication requirement of 76
words.
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control and ARTCC are performed through this facility. In general, the
following services would be performed by ATC.
Departure Control - originates departure clearance to provide
separation between departing and arriving IFR flights.
Approach Control - formulates and issues approach clearances
and instruction to provide separation between arriving IFR
aircraft.
ARTCC
1. Control of aircraft operating under IFR in controlled
airspace.
2. Air traffic advisories. to aircraft concerning potential
hazards to flight, anticipated delays, and any other
data of importance to the pilot for the safe conduct of
the flight.
3. Navigation assistance by radar vectors for detouring
thunderstorm and expediting routing.
4. Transmission of pilot reports and weather advisories
to enroute aircraft.
5. Flight assistance to aircraft in distress.
The pilot is required to report to ATC at the following times:
ARTCC (Continued)
1. On request of ATC
2. Compulsory reporting points
3. Malfunction of required equipment
4. Time and altitude/FL reaching a holding fix or point
to which cleared
5. When vacating any previously assigned altitude/FL for
a newly assigned altitude/FL
6. When leaving any assigned holding fix or point
7. When leaving final approach fix inbound on final
approach
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8. When an approach has been missed (request clearance
for specific action, i. e., to alternate airport,
another approach, etc.).
9, A corrected estimate any time it becomes apparent that
a previously submitted estimate to a reporting point
will be in error in excess of three minutes.
10. That an altitude change will be made if operating on
a clearance specifying "VFR conditions on top."
IFR position reports should include the following:
1. Identification
2. Position
3. Time
4. Altitude
5. ETA over next reporting point
6. Name of next reporting point
7. Remarks if necessary
The aircraft considered is a hypothetical 200K commuter-type aircraft
and the flight distance will be 300 nautical miles resulting in an approxi-
mate duration of 1.5 hours.
Typical to/from missions can now be constructed using the above
information. Tables 35 and 36 contain the text for each type of message
chosen.
To Remote Area Mission
The scenario for the flight to a remote area consists of the
following:
1. One transmission of weather report
2. Position report at each of two reporting points
3. One altitude change request to climb clear of clouds
4. Time and altitude reaching a holding fix
5. Leaving above holding fix
6. Leaving final approach fix inbound on final
7. Closing flight plan
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Table 35. IFR Communications to Remote Area
ATC AIRCRAFT
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615. What is the Bishop weather/
Over."
"Cessna 60615, the Bishop weather
is scattered 6000 feet with visi-
bility 15 miles. The surface winds
are 10 knots out of 330. The alti-
meter setting is 29.99; over."
"Thank you."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615 at intersection.
Time is 9:45; altitude is 8000 feet.
Expect intersection at 10:24;
over."
"Thank you, Cessna 60615. Report
intersection."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615. Over."
"Go ahead, Cessna 60615."
"Request 10,000 feet to avoid clouds.
Over."
"Cessna 60615, climb and maintain
10,000 feet; over."
"Climb 10,000 Cessna 60615."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615 at intersection. Time
is 10:25. Altitude is 16,000 feet.
Expect intersection at 10:25.
Over."
"Thank you, Cessna 60615."
"Cessna 60615, hold south at
intersection, right
turn. Over."
"Cessna 60615, hold south
intersection, right turn."
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615,
holding at intersection at
13,000 feet. Time 11:00."
"Thank you, Cessna 60615."
"Cessna 60615 leaving inter-
section."
"Cessna 60615, inbound from
intersection."
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615.
Wish to close flight plan. Over."
"Flight plan closed, Cessna 60615."
Total communication requirement of 287 words.
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Table 36. IFR Communications from Remote Area
ATC AI RCRAFT
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615
on Over."
"This is Bishop Radio; go ahead.
Over."
"Opening flight plan, Bishop to Los
Angeles. Time off 8:22. Over."
"Cessna 60615, your flight plan
is opened." Report
intersection. Over.
"Report intersection. Roger."
"Bishop Radio, this is Cessna 60615.
What is the Los Angeles weather?
Over."
"Cessna 60615, Los Angeles weather
is broken 2000, haze and smoke,
visiblity 5 miles. The surface
winds are 270 at 10 knots. The
altimeter setting is 30.01. Over."
"Thank you."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessan
60615 at intersection. Time is
8:45. Altitude is 9000 feet. Exepct
intersection at 9:21. Over."
"Thank you, Cessna 60615. Re-
port intersection."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615. Over."
"Cessna 60615, go ahead. Over."
"Request 11,000 feet to clear clouds
ahead. Over."
"Cessna 60615, climb and maintain
11,000 feet. Over."
"Leaving 9000 for 11000."
"Los Angeles Center, this is Cessna
60615 at intersection. Time is
9:23. Altitude is 11,000. Expect
intersection at 10:01. Over."
"Thank you, Cessna 60615."
Total communication requirement is 233 words.
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The required verbal communications appear in Table 35. Summing
yields a total of 287 words for the mission.
From Remote Area Mission
The scenario for the flight from a remote area consists of the
following:
1. File flight plan by telephone (mandatory if IFR
conditions)
2. Open flight plan by radio once airborne
3. One transmission of weather report
4. Position report at each of two reporting points
5. An altitude change request to climb to altitude clear of
clouds
The required verbal communications appear in Table 36. Summing
yields a total of 239 words for the mission.
Averaging the to and from mission yields an average communication
load of 263 words for the 1-1/2 hour flight.
8.2.2.2 Traffic Density
In 1968 there were an estimated 12,800 aircraft airborne over the
United States at a peak instant. About two-fifths of all operations were
conducted at non-tower airports in 1968. It is calculated that 3/4 of all
flights into uncontrolled airports are in remote areas yields a peak 
figure
of 3,840 aircraft airborne in remote areas. Assuming that one-fourth 
are
IFR yields 960 IFR and 2,880 VFR (not all necessarily on a VFR flight 
plan).
8.2.2.3 Communication Load
VFR
Using the mission communications loads from Subsection 8.2.2.1 
and
the peak traffic density from Subsection 8.2.2.2 yields:
(80 words)
communication load =  (90 min) (2880)
= 2560 words peak load
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IFR
As for VFR:
communication load = 63 (960)
90
= 2800 words peak load
min
Total Communication Load in Units if Messages
Communication load = 5360 words min
The average length of the messages in Tables 1-3 is:
30 messages )-- 22.3 words/message
684 total words)
Using this figure with the above communications yields:
communication load = 235 msg/min
8.2.3 Future Scenario
8.2.3.1 Mission Analysis
It will be assumed that the basic ATC procedures will be the same as
now (as in Subsection 8.2.2.1). The main difference considered is that no
position reporting will be required as this study presupposes a satellite
surveillance system.
The communications are then basically the same with only the IFR
position reports deleted. The figures are below.
VFR Mission
To remote area -- 91 words
From remote area--68 words average=80 words
IFR Mission
To remote area -- 211 words
From remote area --163 words average = 187 words
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8.2.3.2 Traffic Density
In order to extrapolate traffic into the future the change in three
parameters must be determined: fraction of flights that are IFR, peak
total aircraft airborne, and fraction of total flights that are into
uncontrolled airports.
The fraction of flights that are IFR is extrapolated by using the
extrapolation of IFR iterant flights. This yields:
Fraction of flights that are IFR: 1980--.37
1995--.42
The peak total aircraft airborne will be as follows:
1980--22,220
1995--54,400
The fraction of flights into non-controlled airports will be
approximately:
1980--1/4
1995--1/6
Combining these parameters yields a peak aircraft airborne in remote
areas count of (based on the assumption that 3/4 of all flights into
uncontrolled airports are into remote airports):
1980 1995
VFR 2620 3960
IFR 1540 2910
8.2.3.3 Communication Load
Using the mission communications load from Subsection 8.2.3.1 and the
traffic density from Subsection 8.2.3.2 yields:
VFR
1980 communication load = 90wods (2620)
= 23 min
From Reference 1
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VFR (Continued)
80 words (3960)
1995 communication load = 90 min (3960)
= 3520 words peak load
min peak
IFR
187 words
1980 communication load = 10 min (1540)
= 3200 words peak load
min
1995 communication load = 90 min
6040 words peak load
6040
Total Communication Load in Units of Messages
communication load-- 1980--5530 words/min
1995--9560 words/min
The average message length of the messages in Tables 33-35 is 22.8
words/min.
Using this figure with above communication load yields:
communication load--1980--242 msg/min
1995--420 msg/min
8.2.3.4 Queueing Analysis
This analysis (based on a method used in Reference 33) first considers
voice channel solutions to the problem of remote communication. In this
analysis the following factors are of interest:
* Probability of communication saturation
* Utilization rate
* Expected number of messages in the system
* Expected message time.
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The following assumptions are made in the following analysis:
* Messages arrive at a satellite according to a Poisson
distribution with an average arrival rate of x message
per minute. Since the Poisson distribution corresponds
to random arrivals of messages at the satellite for a
small time interval, this assumptions appears to be
quite reasonable for this situation.
* The distribution of the length of aircraft messages in
remote areas has not been investigated in this analysis.
It is assumed that the length of aircraft and marine
messages will follow an expoential distribution with an
average length of 1/I words per message.
* The queue discipline assumed in this model is a first-
in-first-out discipline.
* The system has N voice channels with a transmission 
rate
of C words per minute.
Each aircraft will communicate on an assigned channel. 
The problem
then is determining how many channels (N) are required and what 
their
waiting times are. The system utilization rate, pS, 
is defined as:
PS C
Dividing the message traffic by the number of channels yields 
the channel
utilization rate, PC, of each channel:
C NC
or,
N = C
From Reference 33, a utilization factor of 50% is chosen. 
A transmission
rate of 100 words/minute is assumed. This yields channel 
requirement of:
1980 - 110 channels
1995 - 191 channels
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The voice channel requirement is prohibitive, but using a ratio of 13
voice channels for 1 - 1200 bit data channel (from Reference 33), this
yields a data channel of:
1980 5 data channels
1995 8 data channels
This does appear to be readily achievable from a satellite design point of
view. Although it should be pointed out that the cost of data link equip-
ment may be too high to warrant its use in many aircraft.
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10. NEW TECHNOLOGY
After a diligent review of the work performed under this contract,
it was determined that no new innovation, discovery, improvement or
invention was made.
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APPENDIX A
SAUR PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
This appendix contains a description of the detailed equations of the
SAUR Program together with a program listing and instructions for its use.
Altitude History (Routine WROUT)
This routine is used to calculate the upper and lower bounds on the
altitude history of each aircraft. It is also used to compute the heading
and speed history of both aircraft.
The output of this routine is a piecewise linear function w(t).
Depending on which part of the program is called the routine, w may repre-
sent altitude, heading, or speed.
There are two options of the program, depending on whether the
particular function is subject to a command. The commanded option will be
described first.
The input to the routine consists of:
w = initial value of the function
T = system reaction time
wp = upper bound on the value of w before time T.
u'P (Must be positive.)
= lower bound on the value of w before time T.
l'p (Must be negative.)
w = upper bound on the value of w after time T
u'c (positive)
wc = lower bound on the value of w after time T
1W,c (negative)
w(1) = the value of w toards which w is to move
(and perhaps reach) before time T
w( 2 ) = the value of w towards which w is to move
after time T.
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The computations are as follows:
The routine sets W1 =Wo and tI = 0.
if w() > w o, it sets w = w u p
If w( ) < w 
, it sets w = wl, p.
Next the program computes the time at which the function will reach w(l)
This time is T = (w -wo)/W.
If this time is earlier than T, the program sets
w2 =w3 =w and t 2=T , t 3=T.
In this case w reaches the value w(1) and stays there until T. Next
w(2) is compared with w(l)
If w( 2 ) < w(l), w = wl ,c.
If w(2) J w( ) , w = wc.
The time T at which w reaches w(2) is calculated. This time is
= T + (w (2)-w )/T.
The program sets w4  (2) and t 4 = . There are four "break points" in this
function.
The calculations are similar in the case where T>T - - i.e., if the
value w( I ) is not reached before time T. In this case only three break
points result.
If the variable being considered is not being commanded, part of the
above computations are left out. In this case the program sets w = w
t1 = 0, and then:
If w( ) > w , then the program sets vw = W Ip
If w(O) < w, then = w ( )
0 1,p
In either case t2 and w2 are calculated from
t2 = (w - Wo)/w and w2 = w )
In this case there are only two break points in the function.
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The routine outputs the number of break points and the value wi , t i at
each of these break points. The times are given by t i and the value of the
function w(t) at those times are given by wi .
Trajectory Calculations
Because the program must calculate the positions of both aircraft a
very large number of times, it is important to calculate these 
positions as
rapidly as possible. This section describes the methods for performing
these calculations. Since the relative altitudes of the two aircraft are
considered in another part of the program, this section describes only the
calculations for the (x,y) motion of the aircraft.
In the next few paragraphs, consider one of the two aircraft. 
The
first step is to compute the piecewise linear functions which describe 
the
velocity (v) and heading (H) history of the aircraft. These functions 
are
computed with the routine WROUT. The history of heading is given by pairs
of numbers (H1 ,t1H), (H t 2 H), etc. The history of velocity is given by
pairs of numbers (vl,t 1 ), (v 2 ,t 2 v), etc.
The next step is to merge the two time lists tl
v
, t2 v , . and
tl H , t 2H . and obtain a common list of times 
and calculate the values
of H and v on the merged list. For example, if t2 v is not equal to any of
the times tlH t2 H, etc. the value of H at the time t2
v is calculated by
linear interpolation. The result of this merging is a single 
list of times
t l (c), t 2 (c), . . . and corresponding lists H1 c, H2 (, . .
and v (c)
v2 (c), . of values of H and v at these times. The superscript 
c means
a "combined" list has been formed. In the program these quantities 
are
called CT, CH, and CV. The superscript c will be dropped 
in the discussion
below.
Turning Aircraft
The motion of an aircraft which is turning at a rate w and 
which has
a linear acceleration a is described by the following 
equations:
t = current time (arbitrary)
to = some fixed time
H° = heading at time to
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vo = velocity at time to
H = Ho + w(t-t ) = current heading
v = v0 + a(t-to) = current velocity
x = A - cos H + sin H
w
y = B + sin H + 1 cos H
w 2
v0
A = constant = x + -- cos H - sin
B = constant = y - - sin + cos H
S = x at time t
Yo = x at time to
Yo = y at time t0
To show that the formulas for x and y are correct, note that
x(t ) = x0 and y(t ) =  o. Also, differentiating x and y with respect to
t gives
= w sin H - a cos H + a cos H = v sin H
w w w
= w cos H + sin H - sin H = v cos H.
The formulas x= v sin H and y= v cos H are consistent with the definitions
of v and H. The heading H is the angle measured clockwise from the y axis.
The calculation of x and y requires the sine and cosine of the current
heading angle. These calculations are very expensive in terms of computing
time. To avoid trigonometric calculations, the program is constructed to
take advantage of the fact that the calculations are performed at equally
spaced times. That is, x and y are calculated at times to , to +h, to + 2h,
etc. If the sine and cosine are known at a time t, the next value of sin
H is calculated from
sin H (t+h) = sin [H(t) + wh]
= sin H(t) cos wh + cos H(t) sin wh
cos H(t+h) = cos H(t) cos wh - sin w(t) sin wh
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The value of cos wh and sin wh are precomputed by the program at the
start. The values of sin H and cos H at the starting time are also pre-
computed. Then successive values of sin H and cos H are computed by the
above formulas for successive values of time. Whenever the value of changes
(e.g., when the aircraft stops a 30 /sec turn and starts a 20 /sec turn) the
formulas are reinitialized by calculation of the sine and cosine of the
heading at the first time point past the change.
The calculations of position in the case of a turning aircraft are
summarized as follows. Let
h = time increment
c = cos wh
s = sin wh
tk = most recent break point
t = current time
tk < t <tk+ l
xk'YkHk, etc. = values of x, y, H, etc.. at time tk.
Vk Vk
Ak = xk + cos Hk - - sin HkH Hk
Vk kBk k " -- sin Hk  cos Hk
vk - Vktk
H Hk
Svk 
v k
Hk
k H 2
k
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Suppose that the trajectory has just been computed at time t. This
means that the values of cos H and sin H are available. Call these values
C(OLD) and S(OLD) . The time is incremented by an amount h and the corres-
ponding values of cos H and sin H are called C and S. The 
computations are
as follows:
C = C- C(OLD) - S(OLD)
s = S (OLD) + C(
OLD )
= Ck + Dkt
x = Ak - p C + EkS
y = Bk + i C + EkS
Note that the current aircraft position (x,y) is computed with only nine
multiplication and seven additions.
Non-Turning Aircraft
Unfortunately, it is not possible to set the turn rate to zero in the
above equations to get the motion of an aircraft travelling in a straight
line. The turn rate appears in the denominator. It is possible to rewrite
the equations in such a form that it is possible to set the turn rate to
zero. However, these equations are more complicated than those above In
order to keep the equations as simple as possible, it was decided to make
a special case of non-turhing aircraft.
The equations in this case are as follows:
to = some fixed time
vo = speed at time to
a = acceleration
v = current velocity = vo+a(t-t 0 )
Ho = heading at time to
(x,y) = current aircraft position
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(xo,yo) = aircraft position at time to
x = A+p sin Ho
y = B+ i cos Ho
= vo(t-t) + (t-to)2
A = x
B = Y
The equations can be checked by noting that i=v sin Ho , y= v cos Ho ,
x(t o) xo , and y(t o ) = Yo,
In the trajectory calculation in the program the equations are used
in the following form:
t = current time
tk = most recent break point
tk < t < tk+1
Xk' Yk'vk, etc. = values of x, y, v, etc. at time tk
Ak = xk
Bk =Yk
Ck = sin Hk
Dk = cos Hk
At = t-tk
= (vk + vk At/2) At
x = Ak + ~Ck
y = Bk + Dk.
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Note that the constants Ak,Bk,Ck,Dk, mean something different than they did
in the case of a turning aircraft.
To compute the trajectory of an aircraft the constants Ak, Bk, etc.
are computed first according to the above formulas for k=l, 2, 3, . . . . .
If the aircraft is turning (HkfO), the turning equations are used. If the
aircraft is not turning (Hk=O), the non-turning equations are used.
After the constants are computed, the values of x and y at any time
t can be computed. First, it is necessary to determine which time interval
contains the time t, i.e., determine the value of k such that tk< tk+l.
Then Hk is examined. If Hk is not zero, the turning formulas are used to
compute x and y. If Hk is zero, the non-turning formulas are used.
DCA Calculation
The calculations of the DCA of two aircraft are described below.
a) Compute the heading history of aircraft 1.
b) Compute the velocity history of aircraft 1.
c) Combine the above histories.
d) Compute the values of Ak,Bk,Ck,Dk, Ek at each of the
break points.
e) Save the values of Ak , Bk, etc. by setting Ak( 1 )=Ak,
Bk(1) = Bk, etc.
f) Repeat a) - e) for aircraft 2.
g) Start with an initial time t = min(T 1,T2).
h) Determine the (x,y) portions of both aircraft at time t,
using the trajectory formulas above. Denote these by
(xl,y 1 ) and (x2 ', 2 ). Determine the value of AZ(= altitude
separation at time t) from the table of values DZM. Com-
pute the distance at the current time by
D2 = (xl-x22 + (yl-Y2 ) 2 + (AZ)
2
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i) Increment the time: t+h t and repeat step h). In general
one will see the distances decrease and then start to
increase. As soon as the increase is noted, the program
assumes that the current time is an approximate DCA.
j) Refine the time of closest approach by passing a parabola
through the last three points and computing the time at
which the parabola is minimized.
k) Using this refined time, recompute the distance. This is
taken to be the DCA between the two aircraft.
Program Inputs
Table 36 is the standard input sheet for the program. There are two
options for initial conditions. The initial conditions (XO(1), YO(1),
XO(2), etc.) may be specified, or they may be determined by the "flyback"
option. In the latter case, the initial conditions are determined by 
start-
ing at a collision point, flying the aircraft back for some time T (TAUB),
then turning the aircraft around (by adding 1800 to the heading) to get the
initial conditions. The second option is assumed if TAUB f 0.
Table 37. SAUR Input Sheet
Initial Conditions
x XO(1) =
y Y0(1)
A/C #1 z 
ZOl =
heading HNOTI =
velocity VNT1l =
XO(2) =
YO(2) =
A/C #2 
202
HNOT2 =
VNOT2 =
Errors (altitude)
A/C #1 EZ1
A/C #2 EZ2 =
Reaction Times
A/C #1 TONE
A/C #2 TTWB
Print Control
Case Selector for Trajectory Print FIP
FJP
Increment for Trajectory Print DTP
Final Time for Trajectory Print TE
Increment for DCA Calculation DT
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Table 37. SAUR Input Sheet (Continued)
Performance Parameters
pilot i upper bound ZUPI
altitude )lower bound ZLPI
upper bound ZUC1
controller lower bound ZLCI
oilot upper bound 
ZDUP1
lower bound ZDLP
z co l upper bound ZDUCI
controller lower bound ZDLCI
A/C #1 lot upper bound HDUP
turn ratelower bound HDLPI
turn rate upper bound HDUC1
upper bound HDUCI =
controller lower bound HDLCI =
pilot upper bound 
VDUPl
lower bound VDLPl1
Acceleration upper bound VDUCI
controller lower bound VDLCl
ZUP2
ZLP2
ZUC2
ZLC2
ZDUP2
ZDLP2
ZDUC2 =
ZDLC2
A/C #2
HOUP2
HDLP2 =
HDUC2
HDLC2
VDUP2
VDLP2 =
VDUC2
VDLC2
Search Parameters
smallest HMPI
heading delta DMPI
pilot number -1 FIM(1)
A/C #1 smallest VMP1
velocity delta DVPI =
number -I FIM(2)=
smallest HMC1
heading delta OHC1
controller number -1 FJM(1)=
A/C #1 ) smallest VMCI =
velocity delta DVC1 =
number -1 FJM(2)
=
HMP2
DHP2
FIM(3)=
VMP2
DVP2 =
FIM(4)=
A/C #2 HMC2
DHC2
FJM(3)=
VMC2
DVC2
FJM(4).
Flyback Option
TAUB
i.itial heading HBRI
initial heading VBRI
initial z ZDBR1
initial . WBR1
HBR2
VBR2
A/C #2 ZDBR2
WBR2
initial x EXB =
initial y EYB =
initial z EZB =
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The input list contains brief descriptions of all the parameters
except for the "print control" and "miscellaneous" parameters 
which are
used for special debug and test runs.
The program can be run from the time share terminal. 
Because of the
large number of inputs required to generate a single case, 
however, it is
not convenient to input all of the data from the time share terminal.
Therefore, the standard mode of operation is to key punch the basic data
for a case on cards, submit the cards to create an input file, and 
then
call the file from the time share terminal. At the terminal it is possible
to change any of the inputs in order to modify the basic case.
The input and output units will be consistent, e.g., if the input 
is
feet, second and feed per second, the output will be in feet. If the input
uses meters, the output will be in meters. All of the inputs must 
be in
consistent units (i.e., one cannot input speed in knots and altitude in
feet). All angles are measured in degrees and heading is measured 
from
north (the Y axis).
SAUR Program Operation
Figure 55 gives a listing of the inputs for the case. 
The initial
conditions for the case are found by starting with the two aircraft 
at the
same point, flying them for TAUB=40 seconds, and turning them around 
(i.e.,
increasing heading by 1800). Aircraft 1 is flown back with a heading of
HBRI=154 0 , a velocity VBRI=169 ft/sec, and a zero climb rate (ZDBRI=O).
Aircraft 2 has parameters HBR2=334° , VBR= 422 ft/sec, ZDBR2=8.33 ft/sec.
Figure 56 shows the first output of the program. It 
consists of a
listing of the trajectory trials which the program will attempt. For
example, for aircraft 1, the program will try trajectories with pilot
initiated maneuvers to headings of 2440, 2890, 3340, 3790, and 
4240. Also
for aircraft 1, the program will try controller commanded headings 
of 2440
and 4240. The trajectories to be tried are controlled by the inputs - for
example the pilot initiated headings were input by the parameters
HMP1 = 244, DPHl = 450, and FIM(.1) = 4. The determined that the heading
values to be tried are 2440, 2440 + 450, 2440 +2(450), 2440 + 3(450),
2440 + 4(450).
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MAXD=6000. '.,VP' 1 =4 0,
EZ 1=3 00 F I r (2:: =2
EZ2=:3 i 0I HMC1=244
TONE=20 D HC1 = 1I:
TTI.,O=2 I F JM( 1 ::'=1
TAUB=40l V, C 1 = 13
HER1 =1 0 Di'.,' : 1=60C
VE. 1 =1 9 F (:: =
ZD R1 UPI 1 =2 I Il 0
W R1=-1 ZLP2=
HBR2=:334 :UC2=2 0
VER2=422 ZLC2= I
ZDER2=8.33 ZDUP2=50
JBRE2= 0 ZDLP2=- I -.6667
E':-'B= E'fB=c q EZE=5000 1i Z L 2 = :
ZUPF = 0:,'0 ZriLC 2 =- . :_::3:3::L' 1 2 c c cFi 5 -
ZLP1=0 HDUP2=5
ZLP1= HDLPF 2=-5
Z IC 1 =2 0 i 00i ii HDUC 2=3
ZLC1 = I H ILC2=-
ZDUIP1=11 ',TiLIP2=4
ZDLPF' 1=-16. 6667 'VDLP2=- 1
ZDIJC:1=. :3 'DUC2=3
ZDLC L1=- ;.:: :3: 3 -:' VDLC: 2=-0.6
HDIF'P 1= HMP2 =94
HDLP 1 =-S DHP2=
HDUCI 1 = 3 FI 3:-= 4
HDLC 1 =-3.,MP242
VDU1=2Pl D'. 2=2-..
VDLP 1 =-2 FM(42
VDUC1=2 HMC2=,4
VDLC1=- 2 DHC2=1: i
H P1 =244 FJi r (::
DHP1=45 C2 =362
FIM(1::' =4 DC'.,--2= 12 0
VMP = 129 FM (4:: =
Figure 55. Input Listing (On Line)
1 PILOT MANEUV 'EF COtiTROLLE' COi:MDrAIi::
0 A./i: 1 I11 HEADIIN iG 1 J1 HEAD IrNGi
0 244. 0 0 244. CI:'
1 289. 0 Ci 1 424.0 1-i
2 334.0 . OC0
3 379 Cn 3 . 00
4 424. 00 4 Ci.
2 A.' : 1 I , E CLO I T' A.. iC: 1 .12 'ELOC I T'Y
0 129 . 1 :9.0
1 169. 0 1 199. 00
2 2.9 . C 0. 0
0 F..C 2 I:3 HEADIiNG AJC 2 HEDIrNG
0 94 - f ii 64.00
1 124.00 1 244.0ii
154. I00 " I I
3 184.00 C3 0ii . i
4 214. O 0 4 0 . i0:
0 A.. C: 2 14 V ELO: I T Y AC : 2 14 V'E LOC: I T'Y
0 342 . i I0i 3 : 62 . Ci
1 422 . 00 1 42 0
2 I502. CCi 2 . IO
Figure 56. Trajectory Trial Listing (On Line)
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Figure 57 is an off-line program output which gives the results of the
trajectories flown. The first two columns of this output can be ignored.
For the remaining columns a typical output consist of the numbers
0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 99, 99, 1, 1.7011162E+08
Each such line represents a trajectory pair which the program ran to calcu-
late a distance of closest approach. The first set of integers identifies
the trajectory by referring back to Figure 56. The example trajectory pair
is given by:
0: pilot heading 2440, aircraft 1
1: pilot velocity 169 ft/sec, aircraft 1
1: pilot heading 1240, aircraft 2
2: pilot velocity 502 ft/sec, aircraft 2
1: commanded heading 4240, aircraft 1
99: no velocity command given for aircraft 1
99: no heading command given for aircraft 2
1: commanded velocity 482 ft/sec, aircraft 2.
Note that "99" is a special code for "no command" for that particular
component.
The last number 1.7011162E+08 is the square of the distance of closest
approach for that particular trajectory.
The program first considers altitude commands to both aircraft. For
the first lines of the output the heading and velocity command columns are
99, i.e., no heading or velocity commands are given to either aircraft.
For each command set, note that the program tries all the possible
combinations of pilot maneuvers which the input specified should be tried.
It determines which of these trajectories give the smallest distance. The
minimum for the altitude only commands is for the trajectory 4,2,1,1,99,99,
99,99.
This result is also printed on line, as shown in Figure 58. (It
would be too expensive and slow to print all of the intermediate results 
on
line, so only the winning trajectory data is printed on line.) The on line
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PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASEI PHASE2
S:1 R H V H V H V H V DCA
.
0 0 99 99 99 99 3.1821723E+08
3.12i7?30E+ '. 0C 0 0 1 99 99 99 99 3.1632218E+08
3.1632216 +093 J. U 0 0 2 99 99 99 99 
3.0940588E+08
j.0340588~ +0~ . 0 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.8352643E+08
1.3j5( 3E+085 . O 0 1 1 99 99 99 99 1.7917834E+08
1.7l11o4E+J 3. 0 0 1 2 99 99 99 99 
1.6789075E+08
1.67,315E+Do ". 0 0 2 0 99 99 
99 99 2.7753142E+07
2.75314ZE+u7 j. 0 0 2 1 99 99 99 99 2.3815788E+07
,.o77 Io+,07 - 0 2 2 99 99 99 99 1.5374026E+07
1.537401Z7:+07 u. 0 0 3 0 99 99 99 99 3.3064987E+07
1.574Zb7 +07 2. 0 3 1 99 99 99 99 3.9707405E+07
1.5I74026+G07 . O 0 3 2 99 99 99 99 
5.1696945E+07
1.51740 2- +7 3. O 0 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.4006493E+08
1.5374F2:+07 ). 0 4 1 99 99 99 99 
2.4668295E+08
1.537,6t2 +07 J. 0 0 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.5724243E+08
i.)37,02 -+ 7 . 3 1 0 0 99 99 99 99 3.2400495E+08
i. 537,N02 +C7 J. 3 1 0 1 99 99 99 99 3.2205353E+08
1. 5 3J/0.:*C7 J. 0 1 0 2 99 99 99 99 3.1482778E+08
1.5-74064 +7 J . 1 1 0 99 99 99 99 2.0328874E+08
1.537402V+07 J. 0 1 1 1 99 99 99 99 
1.98537d9E+08
1.5 35726 +,7 D. 0 1 1 2 99 99 99 99 
1.8527235E+08
1.537,0C6 + - 7 J. 0 1 2 0 99 99 99 99 
4.5413088E+07
1.5374 6tb+)7 J. 0 1 2 1 99 99 99 99 3.9372528E+07
1.5374V :+7 . 0 1 2 2 99 99 99 99 2.7267897E+07
1.537401Z +1 JC. 0 1 3 0 99 99 99 99 1.3230184E+07
1.3231 18--* 7 0. 0 1 3 1 99 99 99 
99 1.9436922E+07
1.323vaI,+J7 0. 1 3 2 99 99 99 99 3.1898849E+07
1.323019-* +7 0. 1 4 C 99 99 99 99 2.0041997E+08
1.3?3014:' +7 0. C 1 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.1441043E+08
1.32?0184 +1 . I 1 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.3372242E+08
1.3230184-+u 0. O 2 6 0 99 99 99 99 3.2865179E+08
1.2I3018r +07 0. 3 2 0 1 99 99 99 99 3.2668816E+08
1.3Z30184 +2'7 . 2 C 2 99 99 99 99 3.1933772E+08
I.32301.':-+7 . 0 2 1 0 99 99 99 99 2.205J308E+08
1.3Z301i8 +7 0. 2 L 1 99 99 99 99 
2.1560O544E+08
1.3 Z "O8 +"7 0. 0 2 1 2 99 99 99 99 2.0099958E+08
1.3Z3184:+7 5. 2 2 0 99 99 99 99 6.5213223E+07
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)"
PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASE1 PHASE 2
DNOT DSTR H V H V H V H V 
DCA
1.3230)14++07 0. 0 2 2 1 99 99 99 99 5.7431776E+07
1.323U184E+U7 0. 0 2 2 2 99 99 99 
99 4.1420004E+07
1.323cl94-+07 0. 0 2 3 0 99 99 99 99 2.7088048E+06
2.70~U6846+U6 J. 0 2 3 1 99 
99 99 99 6.0992830E+06
2.7088048F+0O 9. 0 2 3 2 99 99 
99 99 1.6134061E+07
2.7088C48F+06 0. 0 2 4 0 99 99 99 99 
1.4798303E+08
2.I08z048E+0 0. 0 2 4 1 99 99 99 99 
1.7450986E+08
2.T2-804E+06 0. 0 2 4 2 99 99 99 
99 2.0505656E+08
2.7(d804d8+b . 1 0 0 0 99 99 99 
99 2.3919756E+08
2.7088C4o+06 O. I 0 0 1 99 99 99 99 
2.3919583E+08
2.7088048.+C6 0. 1 0 0 2 99 99 99 99 2.3848481E+08
2.70604HE+06 0. 1 0 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.0701217E+08
2.70dOC48+06 0. 1 0 1 1 99 99 99 
99 1.0602467E+08
2.7U08048K+06 0. 1 0 1 2 99 99 99 99 1.0341206E+08
2.7063046dE+f6 0. 1 0 2 0 99 99 99 
99 5.8036107E+06
2.7J06048E+06 0. 1 0 2 1 99 99 
99 99 5.1614416E+06
2.7083au4s+06 0. L 0 2 2 99 99 99 99 2.6460335E+06
2.b4u0335r+06 0. 1 0 3 0 99 99 99 99 4.5724407E+07
2.6400335E+3
6 J. 1 0 3 1 99 99 99 99 4.9832917E+07
2.646335'+6 0. 1 0 3 2 99 
99 99 99 5.9015538E+07
2.0400335E+6 0. 1 0 4 0 99 99 99 99 1.9610927E+082.60o0335E+06 U. 1 0 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.0262475E+08
2.64o0335 +0b C. 1 0 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.1612892E+08
2.6460335Z+06 G. 1 1 0 0 99 99 99 99 2.3506971E+08
2.6460335E+06 2. 1 1 0 1 99 99 99 99 2.3517392E+08
2.64603359+06 1.  1 0 2 99 99 99 99 2.3485503E+08
2.6460335F+06 . 1 1 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.1127175E+08
2.6460355+06 . 1 1 1 1 99 99 99 
99 1.1018867E+08
2.6460335+06 0. 1 1 1 2 99 99 99 
99 1.0719041E+08
2.640335E~+0b . 1 1 2 0 99 
99 99 99 9.4234693E+06
.6460335+06 3. 1 1 2 1 99 99 99 99 8.3645272E+06
2.6460335[+06 C. 1 1 2 2 99 99 99 99 
5.2213683E+06
2.o460335E+06 U. 1 1 3 0 99 99 
99 99 3.0319417E+07
2.6400335+06 0. 1 1 3 1 99 
99 99 99 3.4424066E+07
2.6460335t+06 C. 1 1 3 2 99 99 
99 99 4.4159881E+07
2.6wbJ335 +0 6 0. 1 1 4 0 99 99 99 99 1.6086219E+082.6400335F+0b O0. 1 4 1 99 99 99 99 1.7016866E+08
2.6460335E+06 0. 1 1 4 2 99 99 99 99 1.8932858E+08
2.6460335+0Ob C. 1 2 0 0 99 99 99 99 2.3143680E+08
2.640335~+0b 0. 1 2 0 1 99 
99 99 99 2.3161401E+08
2.64bJ335+0u1 O. 1 2 0 2 99 99 99 99 2.3159155E+082.b640335+Ob i *. 1 2 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.1500107E+08
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)" (Continued)
PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASE1 PHASE 2
DNOT DSTR H V H. V H V H V DCA
2.646U3351+Ub 0. 1 2 1 1 99 99 99 99 1.1386182E+08
2 .6460335E+06 0. 1 2 
1 2 99 99 99 99 1.1057749E+08
2.o4b6335E+U6 0. 1 2 2 0 99 99 99 99 
1.3514834E+07
2.b400335t+06 0. 2 2 1 99 99 99 99 
1.2117368E+07
2.b460335E+06 0. 1 2 2 2 99 99 99 99 8.2671786E+062.6460335E+O6 0. 1 2 3 0 99 99 99 99 1.8901919E+07
2.64bO035E+06 0O 1 2 3 1 99 99 99 99 2.2593534E+07
2.6460335E+06 0. 1 2 3 2 99 99 99 99 3.2024388E+07
2.6460335E+06 J. 1 2 4 0 99 99 99 99 1.2712842E+08
2.6460335E+J6 0. 1 2 4 1 99 99 99 99 1.3854881E+08
2.64oC335F+06 0. 1 2 4 2 99 99 99 99 1.6228023E+08
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 0 0 99 99 99 99 1.5985130E+08
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.6293263E+08
2.646C335E+06 0. 2 0 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.7006966E+08
2.6460335E+6 0. 2 0 1 0 99 99 
99 99 4.0309066E+07
2.o460335E+06 0. 2 0 1 1 99 99 99 99 
4.1624827E+07
2.b460335E+06 0. 2 0 1 2 99 99 99 99 
4.4798739E+07
2.6460335E+0 6 0. 2 0 2 0 99 99 99 
99 4.6953106E+06
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 2 1 99 99 99 
99 4.8071602E+06
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 2 2 99 99 
99 99 3.9517171E+06
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 3 0 99 99 
99 99 1.0039991E+08
2.646335E+06 0. 2 0 3 1 99 99 99 99 1.0218000E+082.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 3 2 99 99 99 99 1.0661049E+08
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 4 0 99 99 99 
99 2.3707777E+08
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 0 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.3940067E+08
2.6c63335E+0b 0. 2 0 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.4515987E+08
2.6460335'+06 0. 2 1 0 U 99 99 99 
99 1.4188731E+08
2.646335+06 0. 2 1 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.4561516E+08
2.6460335F+06 0. 2 1 0 2 99 
99 99 99 1.5468167E+08
2.64b~635E+0b 0. 2 1 1 0 99 99 99 
99 3.4707401E+07
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 1 1 1 99 99 99 99 3.6087403E+07
2.6460335E+06 u. 2 1 1 2 99 99 99 99 3.9584497E+07
2.6460335E+Ob 0. 2 1 2 0 99 99 99 
99 4.5214458E+06
2.6460335E+J6 U. 2 1 2 1 99 99 99 99 
4.6156187E+06
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 1 2 2 99 99 99 99 3.9291763E+06
2.6460335E+C6 0. 2 1 3 0 99 99 99 
99 9.2046240E+07
2.6460335E+06 0. 2 1 3 1 99 99 99 
99 9.3988151E+07
2.6460335+06 0. 2 1 3 2 99 99 99 
99 9.9048275E+07
2.b46033 5E+06 J. 2 1 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.1963723E+08
2.b4bC33N5+06 C. 2 1 4 1 99 99 99 
99 2.2274098E+08
2.b4o0335E+Ub J. 2 1 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.3078520E+08
2.b460335t+0b J. 2 2 0 0 99 99 
99 99 1.2608830E+08
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)" (Continued)
PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASE1 PHASE2
DNOT DSTR H V H V H. V H V DCA
L.0q335-+0 o. 2 2 0 1 99 99 99 
99 1.3021044E+08
2.o46.335+6 0 2 2 3 2 99 99 99 99 1.4065712E+08
2.6406335?+06 . 2 2 1 0 99 99 99 99 3.0144681E+07
*.40335?+06 J. 2 2 1 1 99 99 99 99 3.1516578E+07
2.o46JC35F+-6 0. 2 2 1 2 99 99 99 99 3.5168932E+07
2.646033"'2+0 0. 2 2 0 99 99 99 99 4.3940217E+06
2.64b'3;~'+ ) . 2 "2 2 1 99 99 99 99 4.4640518E+06
2.6J4033350b r+0 . 2 -2 2 2 99 99 99 99 3.9066999E+06
Z.6 ,03b-35+6 U. 2 2 3 O 99 99 99 99 8.4935016E+07
C.64u03o 1. 2 2 3  99 99 99 99 8.6949120E+07
2.64Uz33-+J6 0. 2 2 3 2 99 99 99 99 9.2416635E+07
2.b4003530+36 '. 2 2 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.0346556E+08
2.646033~5+o 0. 2 2 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.0716214E+08
Z.o43J35 +J6 '). 2 2 4 2 99 99 99 
99 2.1705823E+08
. b40335,+jo 0- 3 0 0 0 99 99 99 99 I.2544815E+08
2.64Lc0As3+J6 0. 3 0 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.3227484E+082.646033tc+J6 0. 3 C 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.4573759E+08
2.646r335+0.6 0 3 0 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.1570917E+07
2.64b033 5E+0o j. 3 0 1 1 99 99 99 99 1.3736898E+07
2 *.646 3 35+3 0. 3 0 1 2 99 99 99 99 1.8882600E+07
2.64,U335 +06 0. 3 0 2 0 99 99 99 99 3.0642147E+07
4 2.64t,6335;+6 0. 3 0 2 1 99 99 99 99 2.8936108E+07
2.646'335+16 0. 3 0 2 2 99 99 99 99 2.4211301E+07
2.6460335)-+6 (. 3 0 3 0 99 99 99 99 1.6824041E+08
2.64b6335e+J . 3 0 3 1 99 99 99 99 1.6724200E+08
2.64t033+36 U. 3 0 3 2 99 99 99 99 1.b6438294E+08
*6.406J033 +0 . 3 0 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.9103920E+08
2.6,)'4t335b +06 '. 3 0 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.9U73479E+08
2 .646C335r+9h J. 5 0 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.8915304E+08
2.6460335'+0U 0. 3 1 0 0 99 99 99 99 9.4388040E+07
2 .64603355+06 0. 3 1 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.0314285E+08
02. 4o0335 +6 . 3 1 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.2067348E+08
2.t~04j33+06 u. 3 1 1 0 99 99 99 99 4.7130381E+06
2.646~35c:+06 0. 3 1 1 1 99 99 99 99 6.3991311E+06
2.6400335)+J06 U. 3 1 1 2 99 99 99 99 1.0998796E+07
2.6b461355i+0 U- 3 1 2 3 99 99 99 99 3.7942557E+07
2.460335?+U5 U. 3 1 2 1 99 99 99 99 3.5825377E+07
2.c4o6335)+0b U. 3 1 2 2 99 99 99 99 3.0168951E+07
2.4bC 3354-+b6 0. 3 1 3 0 99 99 99 99 1.7139366E+08
2..400335 +0 L +3 * I .99 99 99 99 1.7030996E+08
2.6463350 . 3 1 3 2 99 99 99 99 1.6707770E+08
2.046,0 i3+U u. 3 1 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.8634951E+08
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)" (Continued)
PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASE1 PHASE2
DNOT DSTR H V H V H. V H V DCA
2. o4u335 J o). 3 1 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.813788E+08
2. 0335c., U. 3 1 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.8488971E+08
2.646335 +' O.. 3 2 0 0 99 99 99 99 6.7146134E+07
.640 33 57+6 .. 3 2 J 1 99 99 99 99 7.6842142E+07
2.0o6V335r+o0 u. 3 2 0 2 99 99 99 99 9.6972904E+07
2.040035+&+J, 0. 3 2 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.1328339E+06
1.132339t+6 U. 3 2 1 1 99 99 99 99 2.1087525E+06
1.1318339[+L6 C. 3 2 1 2 99 99 99 99 5.5499185E+06
1.13-3309 + 0. i 2 2 u 99 99 99 99 4.4859662E+07
1.13633' +UO J. 3 2 2 1 99 99 99 99 4.2439615E+07
1.132j39~0+ 0. 3 2 2 2 99 99 99 99 3.5944271E+07
1.132833941+U6 J. 3 2 3 0 99 99 99 99 1.7392651E+08
1.1323339+CO 0. 3 2 3 1 99 99 99 99 1.7279576E+08
1.13 23397+U O. 3 2 3 2 99 99 99 99 1.6930028E+08
1.1 34339, +06 .. 3 2 4 0 99 99 99 99 2.8198844E+08
1.132 j39F+C6 3. 3 2 4 1 99 99 99 99 2.8184751E+08
1.132339-+70 u. 3 2 4 2 99 99 99 99 2.8086364E+08
1.132dd3-'S 0. 4 0 0 0 99 99 99 99 1.5495415E+08
1l.i130 33U+ o . 4 0 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.6134779E+08
1.1323539~+o 0. 4 0 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.7122296E+08
1.1i2d33)*+Co C. 4 0 1 0 99 99 99 99 7.2150804E+06
1.132d339-+06 J. 4 0 1 1 99 99 99 99 9.9586555E+06
1.13io+3 + 3. 4 0 1 2 99 99 99 99 1.5895509E+07
1.132"33 +0c . t 0 2 0 99 99 99 99 5.6133676E+07
1. 132,-33, +0 3 4 0 2 1 99 99 99 99 5.1377679E+07
1.143o33c+J . 0 2 2 99 99 99 99 4.1027597E+07
1.J132339 +Jo J. 4 0 3 0 99 99 99 99 2.1559156E+08
1.132,3+b C. 4 0 3 1 99 99 99 99 2.1232862E+08
J1.132~+, . 4 0 3 2 99 99 99 99 2.0267756E+08
i.i VM3'9 +6 C. I 0 4 0 99 99 99 99 3.1246723E+08
1.1323v +,,o 0. 4 0 4 1 99 99 99 99 3.1109180E+08
4.132"' , +", . 0 4 2 99 99 99 99 3.05d1977E+08
i.132.33: +L c. 4 1 0 U 99 99 99 99 1.205b916E+08
+1.1o34+J J  0 1 99 99 99 99 1.3251662E+08
1.1 L4339 +Ct . 4 1 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.4901315E+08
1.13ch:i +jO U. 4 1 1 0 99 99 99 99 1.1507156E+06
.3 + . 4 1 1 1 99 99 99 99 2.2599387E+06
.133. 1 2 99 99 99 99 6.6325676E+06
1.13233, +i) 0. + 1 2 0 9, 99 99 99 7.4782152E+C7
i.14 5$ + . '. 1 2 1 9 99 99 9 6. 8630012E+07
1.1302'3,+b J. 4 1 2 j 99 99 99 99 5.4988168E+07
±.1 2'33: ;+-( * 4 1 3 C 99 99 99 99 2.2654073E+08
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)" (Continued)
PILOT CONTROLLER
PHASE1 PHASE2
DNOT DSTR H V H- V H V H- V DCA
S1. 5jN393+ J . 4 I 3 1 99 99 99 99 2.2314425E+081.1328339:+6 . 4 1 3 2 99 99 99 99 2.1238468E+081.1328339-+6uo . 4 1 4 0 99 99 99 99 3.0956085E+08
1.1i2)339:-+'u u. 4 1 4 1 99 99 99 99 3.0818758E+08
1.132833+,I . 4 1 4 2 99 99 99 99 3.0296917E+08
1.13283399+U'6 C. 4 2 0 0 99 99 99 99 8.0586061E+07
1.132839+T+0 ) . 4 2 0 1 99 99 99 99 1.0011286E+08
1.1328 539 +6 . 4 2 0 2 99 99 99 99 1.2417735E+08
i. 3283 = +h i. 94 2 1 0 99 99 99 99 2.6442505E+
1.383+2 1 9 99 99 99 7.0474835L+05
7.J47433cE+4-J50. 4 2 1 2 99 99 99 99 1.3255015E+06
1.~i474 35 +0 3. 4 2 2 0 99 99 99 99 9.2918667E+07
(. ;0474o? 5? +5 . 4 2 2 1 99 99 99 99 8.5845987E+077.047483+05 2. 4 2 2 2 99 99 99 99 6.9201169E+07
7.0)k748~i5+U5 U. 4 2 3 U 99 99 99 99 2.3456117E+08
7. 0474835 +25 0. 2 3 1 99 99 99 99 2.3119966E+08
7.04746"57+15 2. 4 2 3 2 99 99 99 99 2.1992132E+08
7. 04743 5 +05. 4 2 4 0 99 99 99 99 3.0643939E+08
7.0 474835+"l5 C. 4 2 4 1 99 99 99 99 3.0510981E+08
7.U474835 -L5+ J. 4 2 4 2 99 99 99 99 3.0003535E+08
7.047483x+t'5 4 2 1 1 99 99 99 99
7.047435J3 t. 00000JJ+O 2 1 1 99 99 99 99
Figure 57. "DCA-Squared for Each Trajectory Pair (Off Line)" (Continued)
7 .047483:5E+05 8 .3949291E+02 4 2 1 1 ' 99 9
7. .047435E+05 S .: 3949291E+02 4 1 1 ':_ 4 9
I .0474:-:35E+I'i 5 :3949291 4 1 1 ....
1 . 2 39E i 1 . 13 :3599E+ 3 4 1 0 99 99 1
MAXIMUM POSSI LE TFRAiJECTORIE: 5625
FACTUAL TRA.JEiCTOFIE: e494
Figure 58. Winning Trajectory Data Print (On Line)
print contains the distance squared, the distance, and 
the parameters of the
winning trajectory. The winning trajectory has a distance of closest
approach of 839 feet. This means that with altitude commands 
a separation
of 839 feet can be guaranteed (subject, of course, to the assumption that
enough pilot maneuvers have been considered by the program user).
The program next considers altitude commands for aircraft 
1 and other
(heading and speed) commands for aircraft 2. First it considers 
the command
set (99,99,99,0) - i.e., aircraft 2 is given a heading command of 2440.
For this command set the program starts to consider all possible pilot
maneuvers. Note, however, that it does not need to complete all the pos-
sible maneuvers. For example, when it gets to case (4,1,1,0,99,99,99,0) it
finds that the distance is less than the distance which can be guaranteed by
altitude maneuvers only. Consequently, there is no need to consider this
command set further, and the program goes on to the next command set
(99,99,99,1).
For all of the command sets in which aircraft 1 is given an altitude
maneuver, the program finds the same thing - the guaranteed separation can-
not be improved beyond the separation already guaranteed by the altitude
separation. At this point, the program prints out the results 
so far.
Since a better command pair has not been found, the print is a repeat of 
the
previous line.
Next the program considers the situation when heading or speed com-
mands are given to both aircraft. It considers all possible such command
sets. For the command set (99,0,99,0) it runs through all possible pilot
maneuvers until it finds a distance which is less than the separation
already guaranteed. For the next command set (99,0,99,1) it runs all the
way through the pilot maneuvers and finds that the minimum 
of the distances
is greater than the separation already guaranteed. The critical 
trajectory
is (4,1,1,0,99,0,99,1) and the corresponding distance (squared) is
1.28 x 106 which is greater than the previous value 7.05 x 10
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The program continues through all the other command pairs and never
finds a better guaranteed separation. The final result is printed on line.
(The fourth line of Figure 58).
The program also prints out the number of trajectories which it ran
and the number which it "considered," i.e., those it would have run if the
command pair cases were not terminated early as explained above. (As a
matter of interest, the program on Case 1 considered 67,500 and ran 24,354
trajectory pairs in 380 seconds CPU time. Thus the portion of Case 1 shown
in Figure 58 took about 30 seconds CPU time to run. This indicates that
this particular SAUR formulation and this ground computer mechanization
(CDC 6500) would not allow this problem to be worked in real time 
for
operational use. More analysis would be needed in order to evaluate 
the
operational computer speed and capacity requirements).
Upon request, the program prints out the details of any trajectory.
An example of such a printout is shown in Figure 59. The first part of
printout contains a set of constants which are used to compute the trajec-
tories. The major part of the printout contains a listing of the speed,
heading, and (x,y) positions of both aircraft, the guaranteed vertical
separation "DELTAZ," and the distance between the two aircraft.
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TIIME HEiADIG TUN rAiT E SPrFEI) ACCEL X Y A C 
0 E
AIPCRAFT 1
.OAI 24.30 .0') 169.000 2.000 4764.59 -4601.11 5.351E+03 -3.537E+03 1.210E+03 1.432E+01 i.026E+02
16.25 424.3J0 .00 2U1.500 '2.000 4810.18 -2195.05 4.810E+03 -2.195E+03 8.988E-01 
4.384E-01 0.
23.00 424.)30 0.0 209.000 -2.000 .5501.97 -1857.64 5.5Q2E+03 -1.858E+03 8.988E-01 4.384E-01
55'.CO 424.30 0.0J 139.OCO C.000 10975.63 812.04 1.098E+04 8.120E+02 8.988E-01 4.384E-01
AIRCkAFT 2
AIRCRAF 154. -5.00 422.003 -1.000 -7399.70 15171.64 -2.996E+03 1.717E+04 -4.836E+03 1.146E+01 
-1.313E+02
6.00 124.JO J.30 416.000 -1.000 -5770.33 13294.88 -5.770E+03 1.329E+04 8.290E-01 -5.592E-01 0.
20.0C 124.00 U.33 402.000 3.000 -1023.26 10092.94 -1.023E+03 1.009E+04 8.290E-01 
-5.592E-01
40.67 124.00 0.00 482.000 u.000 3748.33 3501.92 8.748E+03 3.502E+03 8.290E-01 -5.592E-01
TIME K I)IST r~Ar'lNG SPEED X1 YI HEADING SPEED X2 Y2 DELTA X DELTA 
Y DELTA Z
u.00 L 23214.9J 294.00 1b9.JO 4764.59 -4601.11 154.00 422.00 -7399.70 15171.64 -12164.29 19772.75 
0.00
1.00 1 22547.72 302.(C 171.00 4614.62 -4521.34 149.00 421.00 -7198.65 14801.34 -11813.27 19322.68 0.00
2.00 1 22C69.05 310.00 173.00 4475.59 -4420.30 144.00 420.00 -6966.64 14450.79 -11442.24 
18871.10 0.00
3.00 1 21435.16 313.00 175.00 4350.55 -4299.52 139.00 419.00 -6705.59 14122.59 -11056.13 18422.11 
0.00
4.0C 1 20Y02.52 326.00 177.00 4242.30 -4160.92 134.00 418.00 -6417.61 13819.11 -10659.90 17980.04 
0.00
5.30 1 2u327.7t 334.00 179.00 4153.39 -4006.89 129.00 417.00 -6105.02 13542.55 -10258.41 
17549.44 0.00
o.0G 19717.55 342.2C 181.00 4086.33 -3840.12 124.00 416.00 -5770.33 13294.88 -9856.36 17135.00 
0.00
7.00 1 19219.97 350.00 133.00 4042.06 -3663.66 124.00 415.00 -5425.86 13062.53 -9467.92 
16726.20 0.00
6.00 1 18660.74 358.00 185.00 4022.87 -3480.82 124.00 414.00 -5082.22 12830.75 -9105.09 16311.57 
0.00
9.00 1 18152.97 J66.)0 187.00 4029.38 -3295.08 124.00 413.00 -4739.42 12599.52 -8768.80 15894.61 0.00
10.00 1 17639.74 374.U0 189.00 4062.02 -3110.09 124.00 412.00 -4397.44 12368.86 -8459.46 
15478.95 0.00
1.CC00 1 17144.00 332.0) 191.00 4120.71 -2929.55 124.00 411.00 -4056.29 12138.75 -8177.00 15068.29 0.00
12.uO 1 lbo8.54 390.Ju 193.00 4204.83 -2757.13 124.00 410.00 -3715.97 11909.20 -7920.80 
14666.33 0.00
13.00 1 16215.67 39d.CC 195.00 4313.24 -2596.44 124.00 409.00 -3376.48 11680.21 
-7689.72 14276.65 0.00
14.00 1 15188.19 4u6.00 197.00 4444.30 -2450.92 124.00 408.00 -3037.82 11451.78 -7482.12 
13902.70 0.00
15.00 1 15387.30 '14.JO 199.00 4595.87 -2323.7o 124.00 407.00 -2699.99 11223.91 
-7295.86 13547.67 0.00
1o.C0 15C14.52 422.0C ZCI.00 4765.36 -2217.89 124.00 406.00 -2362.98 10996.60 -7128.34 13214.48 
0.00
17.00 2 14662.74 %24.00 203.J0 4946.52 -2128.55 124.00 405.00 -2026.81 10769.84 
-6973.33 12898.40 0.00
13.C0 2 14312.82 424.CC 205.00 5129.87 -2039.12 124.00 404.00 -1691.46 10543.65 
-6821.33 12582.77 0.00
19.00 2 13963.90 424.00 207.00 5315.02 -1948.82 124.00 403.00 -1356.94 10318.02 
-6671.97 12266.84 0.00
20.00UO 3 13015.98 424.00 209.00 5501.97 -1857.64 124.00 402.00 -1023.26 10092.94 
-6525.23 11950.58 0.00
21.00 3 13207.22 424.2C 207.30 5688.92 -1766.46 124.00 405.00 -688.74 
9867.31 -6377.66 11633.76 0.00
22.00 3 12915.72 q24.00 205.00 5874.07 -1676.15 124.00 408.00 -351.74 9639.99 -6225.81 
11316.15 0.00
2..00 3 12561.49 424.00 203.00 b057.43 -1586.72 124.00 411.00 -12.25 9411.01 
-6069.67 10997.73 0.00
24.00 3 12;204.5U 424.00 201.00 6Z38.98 -1498.17 124.00 414.00 329.73 9180.34 
-5909.25 10678.51 0.00
25.09 3 11644.75 424.00 199.30 6418.74 -1410.50 124.00 417.00 674.20 8947.99 
-5744.55 10358.49 0.00
26.0 3 11432.23 424.00 197.J0 6596.70 -1323.70 124.00 420.00 1021.15 
8713.97 -5575.55 10037.67 0.00
Figure 59. Trajectory Print (Off Line)
TIME K DIST HEADING SPEED Xl Y1 HEADING SPEED X2 
Y2 DELTA X DELTA Y DELTA Z
27.C 3 11116.94 424.00 195.00 6772.87 -1237.78 124.00 423.00 
1370.59 8678.27 -5402.28 9716.05 0.00
28.00 i 1374.86 424.00 193.00 6947.23 -1152.74 124.00 
426.00 1722.52 8240.89 -5224.72 9393.63 0.00
24.00 3 103.718.0 424.00 191.00 7119.80 -1068.57 124.00 
429.00 2076.93 8001.84 -5042.87 9070.41 0.00
30.00 3 10004.36 424.00 189.00 7290.57 -985.28 124.00 432.00 
2433.83 7761.11 -4856.74 8746.39 0.00
31.00 3 9627.95 424.00 181.00 7459.55 -902.87 124.00 435.00 
2793.22 7518.70 -4666.33 8421.56 0.00
32.00 3 9248.77 424.00 185.00 7626.72 -821.33 124.00 438.00 
3155.09 7274.61 -4471.63 8095.94 0.00
33.00 3 8866.84 424.00 183.00 7792.10 -740.67 124.00 441.00 
3519.45 7028.84 -4272.65 7769.51 0.00
34.00 3 6482.18 424.00 181.00 7955.68 -660.88 124.00 444.00 
3886.30 6781.40 -4069.38 7442.29 0.00
35.00 3 8094.83 424.00 179.00 8117.46 -581.98 124.00 447.00 
4255.64 653.2.28 -3861.82 7114.26 0.00
36.00 3 7704.63 424.00 177.00 8277.45 -503.95 124.00 450.00 
4627.46 6281.48 -3649.99 6785.43 0.00
37.00 3 7312.24 424.00 175.00 8435.64 -426.79 124.00 453.00 
5001.77 6029.01 -3433.86 6455.80 0.00
38.00 3 6917.11 +24.00 1T3.00 8592.03 -350.52 124.00 456.00 
5378.57 5774.85 -3213.46 6125.37 0.00
39.00 3 6519.57 424.00 171.00 8746.62 -275.12 124.00 459.00 
5757.86 5519.02 -2988.76 5794.14 0.00
40.00 3 6119.73 424.00 169.00 8899.41 -200.60 124.00 462.00 
6139.63 5261.51 -2759.79 5462.11 0.00
41.00 3 5117.76 424.0C 167.00 9050.41 -126.95 124.00 465.00 
6523.89 5002.33 -2526.53 5129.28 0.00
42.00 3 5313.91 424.C00 165.00 9199.61 -54.18 124.00 468.00 
6910.63 4741.46 -2288.98 4795.64 0.00
43.00 3 4908.48 424.00 163.00 9347.01 17.71 124.00 471.00 
7299.87 4478.92 -2047.15 4461.21 0.00
44.00 3 4501.43 424.C0 161.00 9492.62 88.73 124.00 474.00 7691.59 4214.71 -1801.03 
4125.98 0.00
45.00 3 4094.89 424.00 159.00 963u.43 158.87 124.00 477.00 
8085.79 3948.81 -1550.63 3789.94 0.00
46.00 3 3686.28 424.00 157.00 9778.44 228.13 124.00 480.00 
8482.49 3681.24 -1295.95 3453.10 0.00
47.00 3 3283.54 424.00 155.00 9918.65 296.52 124.00 482.00 
8881.53 3412.08 -1037.12 3115.56 0.00
4.00 3 2884.63 424.00 153.00 10057.06 364.03 124.00 482.00 
9281.13 3142.55 -775.93 2778.52 0.00
49.00 3 2495.64 424.00 151.00 10193.68 430.66 124.00 482.00 
9680.72 2873.02 -512.95 2442.36 0.00
50.00 3 2121.63 424.00 149.00 10328.50 496.42 124.00 482.00 
10080.32 2603.48 -248.18 2107.07 0.00
51.00 3 1772.75 424.00 147.00 10461.52 561.29 124.00 482.00 
10479.92 2333.95 18.40 1772.66 0.00
52.00 3 1467.42 424.00 145.00U 10592.74 625.30 124.00 482.00 
10879.51 2064.42 286.77 1439.13 0.00
53.00 3 1238.73 424.00 143.00 10722.17 688.42 124.00 482.00 
11279.11 1794.89 556.94 1106.47 0.00
54.00 3 1134.56 424.00 141.00 10849.80 750.67 124.00 482.00 
11678.70 1525.36 828.91 774.69 0.00
55.00 4 1138.63 424.00 139.00 10975.63 812.04 124.00 482.00 
12078.30 1255.83 1102.67 443.79 0.00
5o.00 4 13d.99 424.00 139.00 11100.56 872.98 124.00 482.00 12477.90 
986.30 1377.34 113.32 0.00
57.00 4 1666.21 424.00 139.00 11225.49 933.91 124.00 482.00 
12877.49 716.77 1652.00 -217.14 0.00
58.00 4 2032.97 424.00 139.00 11350.43 994.34 124.00 482.00 13277.09 
447.24 1926.66 -547.61 0.00
59.00 4 23b9.99 424.00 139.00 11475.36 1055.78 124.00 482.00 
13676.68 177.71 2201.33 -878.07 0.00
bO.00 4 2755.19 4 24.OC 139.00 IlbOC.29 1116.71 124.00 482.00 
14076.28 -91.83 2475.99 -1208.54 0.00
Figure 59. Trajectory Print (Off Line) (Continued)
APPENDIX B
COMMAND LOAD ANALYSIS EQUATIONS
A more detailed description of the method of calculating the total
number of commands per unit time can be obtained by referring to Figure 60.
The X, Y coordinates of the aircraft on the path r are computed as follows:
Y (NORTH)
Y --- C
C Ip = pilot turn rate
mc = controller turn rate
V RS2COS8 v2 V = velocity
rl = V/mp
r2 = V/wcYb-- -- "- - - -
EI "2SINE E - H
I I T = delay time
H V (T-) = DI D = V(T-O/wp)
I I
XXb X (EAST)
Figure 60. Turning Geometry
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From the diagram:
Xa = r1 sin 0
Ya = rl (1-cos 0)
Also:
T = I/wp
Then:
Cb = Xa + V cos O (T7)
Yb = Ya + V sin 0 (T-T)
So:
Xc = Xb , r2 sin O ST
Yc = Yb + r2 cos 0 ST
Where:
I+1 left turn
T 1l right turn
The circle r is defined by:
(X-X)2 + (Y-Y c)2 = r22
Or:
(X2+Y2) - 2(XX + YY) + (X2 +Yc2-r22) = 0
Let: X = R cos 6
Y = R sin B
Then:
R - 2R (X cos B+Yc sin 8) + (Xc 2+Y-r2 2) 0
So: the solution for the larger R is given by:
R = (X cos +Yc sin ) + (X cos + sin )2-(X 2 +Yc2 -r2
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An aircraft approaching at heading HA will potentially interfere with
the aircraft at the origin if its containment contour intersects the region
defined by:
w = max (dI) + max (d2)
If the two aircraft are identical (i.e.., have identical containment contours)
the interference distance W is doubled.
W = 2m = 2[max(dl) + max(d2)]
Thus the program computes the value of W for each heading HA and
forms the average
N
CR = PS Z WiVRii=l
where: p is the aircraft density, Vri is the relative velocity for heading
HAi, and N is the number of approach headings considered. The 
result is
the command rate, CR. Simultaneously, the program computes
N N
CR reg= D VRi = DN = VRi
where PD is a (constant) minimum separation distance. The quantity CR reg
represents the required minimum communication rate. By comparing CR with
C regit is possible to observe the increase in communication rate
R reg
caused by maneuvers as a function of the parameters of the maneuver.
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The basic procedure now is to find the maximum value of R (and the
associated X and Y) for all permissible values of 0 in a left turn. This
set of points, parameterized by a, represents the aircraft containment con-
tour for left turns. Call this set of points Rmax L(6), Xmax L(a), Ymax L(B)
Repeat the process for right turns to obtain the set RmaxR(6), XmaxR(),
YmaxR(6). Now the desired contour is the set of points which, for a given
value of 6, represent the smaller value of RmaxL. This contour represents
R
that area in which the controller can guarantee the presence of the aircraft
regardless of the pilot-initiated turn. Define the points on this contour
(Figure 61) as Ex(a), Ey (6), then:
Xmax R(6) if Rmax R(6)<Rmax L( )
xX(6) =
Xmax L(6) if Rmax L ()<Rmax R(
Ymax R(6) if Rmax R(6)<Rmax L(a)
Ymax L(B) if Rmax L(B) Rmax R(6)
Y
H -
d
C = containment contour
HA = approach heading of second A/C
Figure 61. Containment Contour
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